openstack/designate
Code Issues Proposed changes

Update bandit.yaml + fix failing test

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Change-Id: I7f06af507a63e0c0e8fd2618c7ae5a94b1819190
This commit is contained in:
Graham Hayes 2016-04-06 13:56:19 +01:00
parent 48d36b05b7
commit 1554666111
3 changed files with 4 additions and 249 deletions
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248
bandit.yaml
View File

@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
#optional: after how many files to update progress
#show_progress_every: 100
# optional: plugins directory name
#plugins_dir: 'plugins'
# optional: plugins discovery name pattern
plugin_name_pattern: '*.py'
# optional: terminal escape sequences to display colors
#output_colors:
# DEFAULT: '\033[0m'
# HEADER: '\033[95m'
# LOW: '\033[94m'
# MEDIUM: '\033[93m'
# HIGH: '\033[91m'
# optional: log format string
#log_format: "[%(module)s]\t%(levelname)s\t%(message)s"
# globs of files which should be analyzed
include:
- '*.py'
- '*.pyw'
# a list of strings, which if found in the path will cause files to be excluded
# for example /tests/ - to remove all all files in tests directory
exclude_dirs:
- '/tests/'
profiles:
gate:
include:
- any_other_function_with_shell_equals_true
#- assert_used
- blacklist_calls
- blacklist_import_func
# One of the blacklisted imports is the subprocess module. Keystone
# has to import the subprocess module in a single module for
# eventlet support so in most cases bandit won't be able to detect
# that subprocess is even being imported. Also, Bandit's
# recommendation is just to check that the use is safe without any
# documentation on what safe or unsafe usage is. So this test is
# skipped.
# - blacklist_imports
- exec_used
# Keystone doesn't use rootwrap and never will.
- execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true
#- hardcoded_bind_all_interfaces
# Not working because wordlist/default-passwords file not bundled,
# see https://bugs.launchpad.net/bandit/+bug/1451575 :
- hardcoded_password
# Not used because it's prone to false positives:
- hardcoded_sql_expressions
- hardcoded_tmp_directory
# Keystone has no use for jinja2.
- jinja2_autoescape_false
- linux_commands_wildcard_injection
# Keystone has no use for paramiko.
- paramiko_calls
#- password_config_option_not_marked_secret
- request_with_no_cert_validation
- set_bad_file_permissions
- subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true
- subprocess_without_shell_equals_true
- start_process_with_a_shell
#- start_process_with_no_shell
#- start_process_with_partial_path
- ssl_with_bad_defaults
- ssl_with_bad_version
- ssl_with_no_version
#- try_except_pass
# Keystone has no use for mako.
# - use_of_mako_templates
blacklist_calls:
bad_name_sets:
- pickle:
qualnames: [pickle.loads, pickle.load, pickle.Unpickler,
cPickle.loads, cPickle.load, cPickle.Unpickler]
message: "Pickle library appears to be in use, possible security issue."
- marshal:
qualnames: [marshal.load, marshal.loads]
message: "Deserialization with the marshal module is possibly dangerous."
#- md5:
# qualnames: [hashlib.md5, Crypto.Hash.MD2.new, Crypto.Hash.MD4.new, Crypto.Hash.MD5.new, cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.MD5]
# message: "Use of insecure MD2, MD4, or MD5 hash function."
- mktemp_q:
qualnames: [tempfile.mktemp]
message: "Use of insecure and deprecated function (mktemp)."
- eval:
qualnames: [eval]
message: "Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval."
- mark_safe:
names: [mark_safe]
message: "Use of mark_safe() may expose cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and should be reviewed."
- httpsconnection:
qualnames: [httplib.HTTPSConnection]
message: "Use of HTTPSConnection does not provide security, see https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033"
- yaml_load:
qualnames: [yaml.load]
message: "Use of unsafe yaml load. Allows instantiation of arbitrary objects. Consider yaml.safe_load()."
- urllib_urlopen:
qualnames: [urllib.urlopen, urllib.urlretrieve, urllib.URLopener, urllib.FancyURLopener, urllib2.urlopen, urllib2.Request]
message: "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected."
#- random:
# qualnames: [random.random, random.randrange, random.randint, random.choice, random.uniform, random.triangular]
# message: "Standard pseudo-random generators are not suitable for security/cryptographic purposes."
# level: "LOW"
# Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
# https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax
- xml_bad_cElementTree:
qualnames: [xml.etree.cElementTree.parse,
xml.etree.cElementTree.iterparse,
xml.etree.cElementTree.fromstring,
xml.etree.cElementTree.XMLParser]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_ElementTree:
qualnames: [xml.etree.ElementTree.parse,
xml.etree.ElementTree.iterparse,
xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring,
xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_expatreader:
qualnames: [xml.sax.expatreader.create_parser]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_expatbuilder:
qualnames: [xml.dom.expatbuilder.parse,
xml.dom.expatbuilder.parseString]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_sax:
qualnames: [xml.sax.parse,
xml.sax.parseString,
xml.sax.make_parser]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_minidom:
qualnames: [xml.dom.minidom.parse,
xml.dom.minidom.parseString]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_pulldom:
qualnames: [xml.dom.pulldom.parse,
xml.dom.pulldom.parseString]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
- xml_bad_etree:
qualnames: [lxml.etree.parse,
lxml.etree.fromstring,
lxml.etree.RestrictedElement,
lxml.etree.GlobalParserTLS,
lxml.etree.getDefaultParser,
lxml.etree.check_docinfo]
message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
shell_injection:
# Start a process using the subprocess module, or one of its wrappers.
subprocess: [subprocess.Popen, subprocess.call, subprocess.check_call,
subprocess.check_output, utils.execute, utils.execute_with_timeout]
# Start a process with a function vulnerable to shell injection.
shell: [os.system, os.popen, os.popen2, os.popen3, os.popen4,
popen2.popen2, popen2.popen3, popen2.popen4, popen2.Popen3,
popen2.Popen4, commands.getoutput, commands.getstatusoutput]
# Start a process with a function that is not vulnerable to shell injection.
no_shell: [os.execl, os.execle, os.execlp, os.execlpe, os.execv,os.execve,
os.execvp, os.execvpe, os.spawnl, os.spawnle, os.spawnlp,
os.spawnlpe, os.spawnv, os.spawnve, os.spawnvp, os.spawnvpe,
os.startfile]
blacklist_imports:
bad_import_sets:
- telnet:
imports: [telnetlib]
level: HIGH
message: "Telnet is considered insecure. Use SSH or some other encrypted protocol."
- info_libs:
imports: [pickle, cPickle, subprocess, Crypto]
level: LOW
message: "Consider possible security implications associated with {module} module."
# Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
# https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax
- xml_libs:
imports: [xml.etree.cElementTree,
xml.etree.ElementTree,
xml.sax.expatreader,
xml.sax,
xml.dom.expatbuilder,
xml.dom.minidom,
xml.dom.pulldom,
lxml.etree,
lxml]
message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {module} with the equivilent defusedxml package."
level: LOW
- xml_libs_high:
imports: [xmlrpclib]
message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Use defused.xmlrpc.monkey_patch() function to monkey-patch xmlrpclib and mitigate XML vulnerabilities."
level: HIGH
hardcoded_tmp_directory:
tmp_dirs: ['/tmp', '/var/tmp', '/dev/shm']
hardcoded_password:
# Support for full path, relative path and special "%(site_data_dir)s"
# substitution (/usr/{local}/share)
word_list: "%(site_data_dir)s/wordlist/default-passwords"
ssl_with_bad_version:
bad_protocol_versions:
- 'PROTOCOL_SSLv2'
- 'SSLv2_METHOD'
- 'SSLv23_METHOD'
- 'PROTOCOL_SSLv3' # strict option
- 'PROTOCOL_TLSv1' # strict option
- 'SSLv3_METHOD' # strict option
- 'TLSv1_METHOD' # strict option
password_config_option_not_marked_secret:
function_names:
- oslo.config.cfg.StrOpt
- oslo_config.cfg.StrOpt
execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true:
function_names:
- ceilometer.utils.execute
- cinder.utils.execute
- neutron.agent.linux.utils.execute
- nova.utils.execute
- nova.utils.trycmd
- designate.utils.execute
try_except_pass:
check_typed_exception: True

1
designate/backend/impl_infoblox/config.py
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@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ OPTS = [
cfg.StrOpt(
'password',
deprecated_for_removal=True,
secret=True,
deprecated_reason="All backend options have been migrated to options "
"in the pools.yaml file"),
cfg.BoolOpt(

4
tox.ini
View File

@ -39,7 +39,9 @@ commands = python setup.py testr --coverage --testr-args='{posargs}'
[testenv:bandit]
deps = -r{toxinidir}/test-requirements.txt
commands = bandit -c bandit.yaml -r designate -n5 -p gate
commands = bandit -r designate -n5 -x tests -t \
B111,B505,B504,B503,B502,B501,B604,B605,B001,B601,B602,B701,B609,B702,\
B608,B506,B312,B310,B411,B109,B108,B103,B102,B309,B308,B302,B307,B306
[testenv:debug]
commands = oslo_debug_helper {posargs}