Dan Smith f45b5f024e Enforce image safety during image_conversion ... This does two things: 1. It makes us check that the QCOW backing_file is unset on those types of images. Nova and Cinder do this already to prevent an arbitrary (and trivial to accomplish) host file exposure exploit. 2. It makes us restrict VMDK files to only allowed subtypes. These files can name arbitrary files on disk as extents, providing the same sort of attack. Default that list to just the types we believe are actually useful for openstack, and which are monolithic. The configuration option to specify allowed subtypes is added in glance's config and not in the import options so that we can extend this check later to image ingest. The format_inspector can tell us what the type and subtype is, and we could reject those images early and even in the case where image_conversion is not enabled. Closes-Bug: #1996188 Change-Id: Idf561f6306cebf756c787d8eefdc452ce44bd5e0 (cherry picked from commit 0d6282a016) (cherry picked from commit 4967ab6935) (cherry picked from commit dc8e5a5cc7)		2022-12-19 15:35:58 +00:00
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_internal_plugins	Make copy_image plugin use action wrapper	2021-02-10 07:36:24 -08:00
plugins	Enforce image safety during image_conversion	2022-12-19 15:35:58 +00:00
__init__.py	Rename async package to async_	2018-08-07 14:42:14 -04:00
api_image_import.py	Add image_count_uploading quota enforcement	2021-07-02 08:29:07 -07:00
base_import.py	Rethinking filesystem access	2019-10-01 09:53:48 +00:00
convert.py	Rethinking filesystem access	2019-10-01 09:53:48 +00:00
introspect.py	Rename async package to async_	2018-08-07 14:42:14 -04:00
ovf_process.py	Rethinking filesystem access	2019-10-01 09:53:48 +00:00