diff --git a/keystone/api/_shared/EC2_S3_Resource.py b/keystone/api/_shared/EC2_S3_Resource.py
index 803254816c..ff94286b6e 100644
--- a/keystone/api/_shared/EC2_S3_Resource.py
+++ b/keystone/api/_shared/EC2_S3_Resource.py
@@ -113,7 +113,9 @@ class ResourceBase(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
project_id=cred.get('project_id'),
access=loaded.get('access'),
secret=loaded.get('secret'),
- trust_id=loaded.get('trust_id')
+ trust_id=loaded.get('trust_id'),
+ app_cred_id=loaded.get('app_cred_id'),
+ access_token_id=loaded.get('access_token_id')
)
# validate the signature
@@ -132,8 +134,34 @@ class ResourceBase(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
raise ks_exceptions.Unauthorized from e
self._check_timestamp(credentials)
- roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project(
- user_ref['id'], project_ref['id'])
+
+ trustee_user_id = None
+ auth_context = None
+ if cred_data['trust_id']:
+ trust = PROVIDERS.trust_api.get_trust(cred_data['trust_id'])
+ roles = [r['id'] for r in trust['roles']]
+ # NOTE(cmurphy): if this credential was created using a
+ # trust-scoped token with impersonation, the user_id will be for
+ # the trustor, not the trustee. In this case, issuing a
+ # trust-scoped token to the trustor will fail. In order to get a
+ # trust-scoped token, use the user ID of the trustee. With
+ # impersonation, the resulting token will still be for the trustor.
+ # Without impersonation, the token will be for the trustee.
+ if trust['impersonation'] is True:
+ trustee_user_id = trust['trustee_user_id']
+ elif cred_data['app_cred_id']:
+ ac_client = PROVIDERS.application_credential_api
+ app_cred = ac_client.get_application_credential(
+ cred_data['app_cred_id'])
+ roles = [r['id'] for r in app_cred['roles']]
+ elif cred_data['access_token_id']:
+ access_token = PROVIDERS.oauth_api.get_access_token(
+ cred_data['access_token_id'])
+ roles = jsonutils.loads(access_token['role_ids'])
+ auth_context = {'access_token_id': cred_data['access_token_id']}
+ else:
+ roles = PROVIDERS.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project(
+ user_ref['id'], project_ref['id'])
if not roles:
raise ks_exceptions.Unauthorized(_('User not valid for project.'))
@@ -144,7 +172,14 @@ class ResourceBase(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
method_names = ['ec2credential']
+ if trustee_user_id:
+ user_id = trustee_user_id
+ else:
+ user_id = user_ref['id']
token = PROVIDERS.token_provider_api.issue_token(
- user_id=user_ref['id'], method_names=method_names,
- project_id=project_ref['id'])
+ user_id=user_id, method_names=method_names,
+ project_id=project_ref['id'],
+ trust_id=cred_data['trust_id'],
+ app_cred_id=cred_data['app_cred_id'],
+ auth_context=auth_context)
return token
diff --git a/keystone/api/credentials.py b/keystone/api/credentials.py
index 0889c6c8fe..2b81000e09 100644
--- a/keystone/api/credentials.py
+++ b/keystone/api/credentials.py
@@ -60,30 +60,41 @@ class CredentialResource(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
ref['blob'] = jsonutils.dumps(blob)
return ref
- def _assign_unique_id(self, ref, trust_id=None):
+ def _validate_blob_json(self, ref):
+ try:
+ blob = jsonutils.loads(ref.get('blob'))
+ except (ValueError, TabError):
+ raise exception.ValidationError(
+ message=_('Invalid blob in credential'))
+ if not blob or not isinstance(blob, dict):
+ raise exception.ValidationError(attribute='blob',
+ target='credential')
+ if blob.get('access') is None:
+ raise exception.ValidationError(attribute='access',
+ target='credential')
+ return blob
+
+ def _assign_unique_id(
+ self, ref, trust_id=None, app_cred_id=None, access_token_id=None):
# Generates an assigns a unique identifier to a credential reference.
if ref.get('type', '').lower() == 'ec2':
- try:
- blob = jsonutils.loads(ref.get('blob'))
- except (ValueError, TabError):
- raise exception.ValidationError(
- message=_('Invalid blob in credential'))
- if not blob or not isinstance(blob, dict):
- raise exception.ValidationError(attribute='blob',
- target='credential')
- if blob.get('access') is None:
- raise exception.ValidationError(attribute='access',
- target='credential')
-
+ blob = self._validate_blob_json(ref)
ref = ref.copy()
ref['id'] = hashlib.sha256(
blob['access'].encode('utf8')).hexdigest()
- # update the blob with the trust_id, so credentials created with
- # a trust scoped token will result in trust scoped tokens when
- # authentication via ec2tokens happens
+ # update the blob with the trust_id or app_cred_id, so credentials
+ # created with a trust- or app cred-scoped token will result in
+ # trust- or app cred-scoped tokens when authentication via
+ # ec2tokens happens
if trust_id is not None:
blob['trust_id'] = trust_id
ref['blob'] = jsonutils.dumps(blob)
+ if app_cred_id is not None:
+ blob['app_cred_id'] = app_cred_id
+ ref['blob'] = jsonutils.dumps(blob)
+ if access_token_id is not None:
+ blob['access_token_id'] = access_token_id
+ ref['blob'] = jsonutils.dumps(blob)
return ref
else:
return super(CredentialResource, self)._assign_unique_id(ref)
@@ -146,23 +157,47 @@ class CredentialResource(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
)
validation.lazy_validate(schema.credential_create, credential)
trust_id = getattr(self.oslo_context, 'trust_id', None)
+ app_cred_id = getattr(
+ self.auth_context['token'], 'application_credential_id', None)
+ access_token_id = getattr(
+ self.auth_context['token'], 'access_token_id', None)
ref = self._assign_unique_id(
- self._normalize_dict(credential), trust_id=trust_id)
+ self._normalize_dict(credential),
+ trust_id=trust_id, app_cred_id=app_cred_id,
+ access_token_id=access_token_id)
ref = PROVIDERS.credential_api.create_credential(
ref['id'], ref, initiator=self.audit_initiator)
return self.wrap_member(ref), http.client.CREATED
+ def _validate_blob_update_keys(self, credential, ref):
+ if credential.get('type', '').lower() == 'ec2':
+ new_blob = self._validate_blob_json(ref)
+ old_blob = credential.get('blob')
+ if isinstance(old_blob, str):
+ old_blob = jsonutils.loads(old_blob)
+ # if there was a scope set, prevent changing it or unsetting it
+ for key in ['trust_id', 'app_cred_id', 'access_token_id']:
+ if old_blob.get(key) != new_blob.get(key):
+ message = _('%s can not be updated for credential') % key
+ raise exception.ValidationError(message=message)
+
def patch(self, credential_id):
# Update Credential
ENFORCER.enforce_call(
action='identity:update_credential',
build_target=_build_target_enforcement
)
- PROVIDERS.credential_api.get_credential(credential_id)
+ current = PROVIDERS.credential_api.get_credential(credential_id)
credential = self.request_body_json.get('credential', {})
validation.lazy_validate(schema.credential_update, credential)
+ self._validate_blob_update_keys(current.copy(), credential.copy())
self._require_matching_id(credential)
+ # Check that the user hasn't illegally modified the owner or scope
+ target = {'credential': dict(current, **credential)}
+ ENFORCER.enforce_call(
+ action='identity:update_credential', target_attr=target
+ )
ref = PROVIDERS.credential_api.update_credential(
credential_id, credential)
return self.wrap_member(ref)
diff --git a/keystone/api/users.py b/keystone/api/users.py
index e4fa6761ed..f7f1ec0cfa 100644
--- a/keystone/api/users.py
+++ b/keystone/api/users.py
@@ -559,6 +559,25 @@ class UserAppCredListCreateResource(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
role['name']))
return roles
+ def _get_roles(self, app_cred_data, token):
+ if app_cred_data.get('roles'):
+ roles = self._normalize_role_list(app_cred_data['roles'])
+ # NOTE(cmurphy): The user is not allowed to add a role that is not
+ # in their token. This is to prevent trustees or application
+ # credential users from escallating their privileges to include
+ # additional roles that the trustor or application credential
+ # creator has assigned on the project.
+ token_roles = [r['id'] for r in token.roles]
+ for role in roles:
+ if role['id'] not in token_roles:
+ detail = _('Cannot create an application credential with '
+ 'unassigned role')
+ raise ks_exception.ApplicationCredentialValidationError(
+ detail=detail)
+ else:
+ roles = token.roles
+ return roles
+
def get(self, user_id):
"""List application credentials for user.
@@ -594,8 +613,7 @@ class UserAppCredListCreateResource(ks_flask.ResourceBase):
app_cred_data['secret'] = self._generate_secret()
app_cred_data['user_id'] = user_id
app_cred_data['project_id'] = project_id
- app_cred_data['roles'] = self._normalize_role_list(
- app_cred_data.get('roles', token.roles))
+ app_cred_data['roles'] = self._get_roles(app_cred_data, token)
if app_cred_data.get('expires_at'):
app_cred_data['expires_at'] = utils.parse_expiration_date(
app_cred_data['expires_at'])
diff --git a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_application_credential.py b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_application_credential.py
index 7fe02eb0b6..b60307c05a 100644
--- a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_application_credential.py
+++ b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_application_credential.py
@@ -174,6 +174,37 @@ class ApplicationCredentialTestCase(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
expected_status_code=http.client.FORBIDDEN,
headers={'X-Auth-Token': token})
+ def test_create_application_credential_with_trust(self):
+ second_role = unit.new_role_ref(name='reader')
+ PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(second_role['id'], second_role)
+ PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+ self.user_id, self.project_id, second_role['id'])
+ with self.test_client() as c:
+ pw_token = self.get_scoped_token()
+ # create a self-trust - only the roles are important for this test
+ trust_ref = unit.new_trust_ref(
+ trustor_user_id=self.user_id,
+ trustee_user_id=self.user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id,
+ role_ids=[second_role['id']])
+ resp = c.post('/v3/OS-TRUST/trusts',
+ headers={'X-Auth-Token': pw_token},
+ json={'trust': trust_ref})
+ trust_id = resp.json['trust']['id']
+ trust_auth = self.build_authentication_request(
+ user_id=self.user_id,
+ password=self.user['password'],
+ trust_id=trust_id)
+ trust_token = self.v3_create_token(
+ trust_auth).headers['X-Subject-Token']
+ app_cred = self._app_cred_body(roles=[{'id': self.role_id}])
+ # only the roles from the trust token should be allowed, even if
+ # the user has the role assigned on the project
+ c.post('/v3/users/%s/application_credentials' % self.user_id,
+ headers={'X-Auth-Token': trust_token},
+ json=app_cred,
+ expected_status_code=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+
def test_create_application_credential_allow_recursion(self):
with self.test_client() as c:
roles = [{'id': self.role_id}]
diff --git a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_credential.py b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_credential.py
index 81f2b70b71..4cce2d1bf8 100644
--- a/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_credential.py
+++ b/keystone/tests/unit/test_v3_credential.py
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ import http.client
from keystoneclient.contrib.ec2 import utils as ec2_utils
from oslo_db import exception as oslo_db_exception
from testtools import matchers
+import urllib
from keystone.api import ec2tokens
from keystone.common import provider_api
from keystone.common import utils
from keystone.credential.providers import fernet as credential_fernet
from keystone import exception
+from keystone import oauth1
from keystone.tests import unit
from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures
from keystone.tests.unit import test_v3
@@ -63,6 +65,33 @@ class CredentialBaseTestCase(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
return json.dumps(blob), credential_id
+ def _test_get_token(self, access, secret):
+ """Test signature validation with the access/secret provided."""
+ signer = ec2_utils.Ec2Signer(secret)
+ params = {'SignatureMethod': 'HmacSHA256',
+ 'SignatureVersion': '2',
+ 'AWSAccessKeyId': access}
+ request = {'host': 'foo',
+ 'verb': 'GET',
+ 'path': '/bar',
+ 'params': params}
+ signature = signer.generate(request)
+
+ # Now make a request to validate the signed dummy request via the
+ # ec2tokens API. This proves the v3 ec2 credentials actually work.
+ sig_ref = {'access': access,
+ 'signature': signature,
+ 'host': 'foo',
+ 'verb': 'GET',
+ 'path': '/bar',
+ 'params': params}
+ r = self.post(
+ '/ec2tokens',
+ body={'ec2Credentials': sig_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.OK)
+ self.assertValidTokenResponse(r)
+ return r.result['token']
+
class CredentialTestCase(CredentialBaseTestCase):
"""Test credential CRUD."""
@@ -258,6 +287,126 @@ class CredentialTestCase(CredentialBaseTestCase):
'credential_id': credential_id},
body={'credential': update_ref})
+ def test_update_credential_non_owner(self):
+ """Call ``PATCH /credentials/{credential_id}``."""
+ alt_user = unit.create_user(
+ PROVIDERS.identity_api, domain_id=self.domain_id)
+ alt_user_id = alt_user['id']
+ alt_project = unit.new_project_ref(domain_id=self.domain_id)
+ alt_project_id = alt_project['id']
+ PROVIDERS.resource_api.create_project(
+ alt_project['id'], alt_project)
+ alt_role = unit.new_role_ref(name='reader')
+ alt_role_id = alt_role['id']
+ PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(alt_role_id, alt_role)
+ PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+ alt_user_id, alt_project_id, alt_role_id)
+ auth = self.build_authentication_request(
+ user_id=alt_user_id,
+ password=alt_user['password'],
+ project_id=alt_project_id)
+ ref = unit.new_credential_ref(user_id=alt_user_id,
+ project_id=alt_project_id)
+ r = self.post(
+ '/credentials',
+ auth=auth,
+ body={'credential': ref})
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref)
+ credential_id = r.result.get('credential')['id']
+
+ # Cannot change the credential to be owned by another user
+ update_ref = {'user_id': self.user_id, 'project_id': self.project_id}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ expected_status=403,
+ auth=auth,
+ body={'credential': update_ref})
+
+ def test_update_ec2_credential_change_trust_id(self):
+ """Call ``PATCH /credentials/{credential_id}``."""
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user['id'],
+ project_id=self.project_id)
+ blob['trust_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ ref['blob'] = json.dumps(blob)
+ r = self.post(
+ '/credentials',
+ body={'credential': ref})
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref)
+ credential_id = r.result.get('credential')['id']
+ # Try changing to a different trust
+ blob['trust_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+ # Try removing the trust
+ del blob['trust_id']
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+
+ def test_update_ec2_credential_change_app_cred_id(self):
+ """Call ``PATCH /credentials/{credential_id}``."""
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user['id'],
+ project_id=self.project_id)
+ blob['app_cred_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ ref['blob'] = json.dumps(blob)
+ r = self.post(
+ '/credentials',
+ body={'credential': ref})
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref)
+ credential_id = r.result.get('credential')['id']
+ # Try changing to a different app cred
+ blob['app_cred_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+ # Try removing the app cred
+ del blob['app_cred_id']
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+
+ def test_update_ec2_credential_change_access_token_id(self):
+ """Call ``PATCH /credentials/{credential_id}``."""
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user['id'],
+ project_id=self.project_id)
+ blob['access_token_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ ref['blob'] = json.dumps(blob)
+ r = self.post(
+ '/credentials',
+ body={'credential': ref})
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref)
+ credential_id = r.result.get('credential')['id']
+ # Try changing to a different access token
+ blob['access_token_id'] = uuid.uuid4().hex
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+ # Try removing the access token
+ del blob['access_token_id']
+ update_ref = {'blob': json.dumps(blob)}
+ self.patch(
+ '/credentials/%(credential_id)s' % {
+ 'credential_id': credential_id},
+ body={'credential': update_ref},
+ expected_status=http.client.BAD_REQUEST)
+
def test_delete_credential(self):
"""Call ``DELETE /credentials/{credential_id}``."""
self.delete(
@@ -393,7 +542,7 @@ class CredentialTestCase(CredentialBaseTestCase):
self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref)
-class TestCredentialTrustScoped(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
+class TestCredentialTrustScoped(CredentialBaseTestCase):
"""Test credential with trust scoped token."""
def setUp(self):
@@ -446,7 +595,7 @@ class TestCredentialTrustScoped(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
token_id = r.headers.get('X-Subject-Token')
# Create the credential with the trust scoped token
- blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user['id'],
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user_id,
project_id=self.project_id)
r = self.post('/credentials', body={'credential': ref}, token=token_id)
@@ -463,6 +612,21 @@ class TestCredentialTrustScoped(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
self.assertEqual(hashlib.sha256(access).hexdigest(),
r.result['credential']['id'])
+ # Create a role assignment to ensure that it is ignored and only the
+ # trust-delegated roles are used
+ role = unit.new_role_ref(name='reader')
+ role_id = role['id']
+ PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(role_id, role)
+ PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+ self.user_id, self.project_id, role_id)
+
+ ret_blob = json.loads(r.result['credential']['blob'])
+ ec2token = self._test_get_token(
+ access=ret_blob['access'], secret=ret_blob['secret'])
+ ec2_roles = [role['id'] for role in ec2token['roles']]
+ self.assertIn(self.role_id, ec2_roles)
+ self.assertNotIn(role_id, ec2_roles)
+
# Create second ec2 credential with the same access key id and check
# for conflict.
self.post(
@@ -472,35 +636,230 @@ class TestCredentialTrustScoped(test_v3.RestfulTestCase):
expected_status=http.client.CONFLICT)
+class TestCredentialAppCreds(CredentialBaseTestCase):
+ """Test credential with application credential token."""
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ super(TestCredentialAppCreds, self).setUp()
+ self.useFixture(
+ ksfixtures.KeyRepository(
+ self.config_fixture,
+ 'credential',
+ credential_fernet.MAX_ACTIVE_KEYS
+ )
+ )
+
+ def test_app_cred_ec2_credential(self):
+ """Test creating ec2 credential from an application credential.
+
+ Call ``POST /credentials``.
+ """
+ # Create the app cred
+ ref = unit.new_application_credential_ref(roles=[{'id': self.role_id}])
+ del ref['id']
+ r = self.post('/users/%s/application_credentials' % self.user_id,
+ body={'application_credential': ref})
+ app_cred = r.result['application_credential']
+
+ # Get an application credential token
+ auth_data = self.build_authentication_request(
+ app_cred_id=app_cred['id'],
+ secret=app_cred['secret'])
+ r = self.v3_create_token(auth_data)
+ token_id = r.headers.get('X-Subject-Token')
+
+ # Create the credential with the app cred token
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id)
+ r = self.post('/credentials', body={'credential': ref}, token=token_id)
+
+ # We expect the response blob to contain the app_cred_id
+ ret_ref = ref.copy()
+ ret_blob = blob.copy()
+ ret_blob['app_cred_id'] = app_cred['id']
+ ret_ref['blob'] = json.dumps(ret_blob)
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref=ret_ref)
+
+ # Assert credential id is same as hash of access key id for
+ # ec2 credentials
+ access = blob['access'].encode('utf-8')
+ self.assertEqual(hashlib.sha256(access).hexdigest(),
+ r.result['credential']['id'])
+
+ # Create a role assignment to ensure that it is ignored and only the
+ # roles in the app cred are used
+ role = unit.new_role_ref(name='reader')
+ role_id = role['id']
+ PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(role_id, role)
+ PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+ self.user_id, self.project_id, role_id)
+
+ ret_blob = json.loads(r.result['credential']['blob'])
+ ec2token = self._test_get_token(
+ access=ret_blob['access'], secret=ret_blob['secret'])
+ ec2_roles = [role['id'] for role in ec2token['roles']]
+ self.assertIn(self.role_id, ec2_roles)
+ self.assertNotIn(role_id, ec2_roles)
+
+ # Create second ec2 credential with the same access key id and check
+ # for conflict.
+ self.post(
+ '/credentials',
+ body={'credential': ref},
+ token=token_id,
+ expected_status=http.client.CONFLICT)
+
+
+class TestCredentialAccessToken(CredentialBaseTestCase):
+ """Test credential with access token."""
+
+ def setUp(self):
+ super(TestCredentialAccessToken, self).setUp()
+ self.useFixture(
+ ksfixtures.KeyRepository(
+ self.config_fixture,
+ 'credential',
+ credential_fernet.MAX_ACTIVE_KEYS
+ )
+ )
+ self.base_url = 'http://localhost/v3'
+
+ def _urllib_parse_qs_text_keys(self, content):
+ results = urllib.parse.parse_qs(content)
+ return {key.decode('utf-8'): value for key, value in results.items()}
+
+ def _create_single_consumer(self):
+ endpoint = '/OS-OAUTH1/consumers'
+
+ ref = {'description': uuid.uuid4().hex}
+ resp = self.post(endpoint, body={'consumer': ref})
+ return resp.result['consumer']
+
+ def _create_request_token(self, consumer, project_id, base_url=None):
+ endpoint = '/OS-OAUTH1/request_token'
+ client = oauth1.Client(consumer['key'],
+ client_secret=consumer['secret'],
+ signature_method=oauth1.SIG_HMAC,
+ callback_uri="oob")
+ headers = {'requested_project_id': project_id}
+ if not base_url:
+ base_url = self.base_url
+ url, headers, body = client.sign(base_url + endpoint,
+ http_method='POST',
+ headers=headers)
+ return endpoint, headers
+
+ def _create_access_token(self, consumer, token, base_url=None):
+ endpoint = '/OS-OAUTH1/access_token'
+ client = oauth1.Client(consumer['key'],
+ client_secret=consumer['secret'],
+ resource_owner_key=token.key,
+ resource_owner_secret=token.secret,
+ signature_method=oauth1.SIG_HMAC,
+ verifier=token.verifier)
+ if not base_url:
+ base_url = self.base_url
+ url, headers, body = client.sign(base_url + endpoint,
+ http_method='POST')
+ headers.update({'Content-Type': 'application/json'})
+ return endpoint, headers
+
+ def _get_oauth_token(self, consumer, token):
+ client = oauth1.Client(consumer['key'],
+ client_secret=consumer['secret'],
+ resource_owner_key=token.key,
+ resource_owner_secret=token.secret,
+ signature_method=oauth1.SIG_HMAC)
+ endpoint = '/auth/tokens'
+ url, headers, body = client.sign(self.base_url + endpoint,
+ http_method='POST')
+ headers.update({'Content-Type': 'application/json'})
+ ref = {'auth': {'identity': {'oauth1': {}, 'methods': ['oauth1']}}}
+ return endpoint, headers, ref
+
+ def _authorize_request_token(self, request_id):
+ if isinstance(request_id, bytes):
+ request_id = request_id.decode()
+ return '/OS-OAUTH1/authorize/%s' % (request_id)
+
+ def _get_access_token(self):
+ consumer = self._create_single_consumer()
+ consumer_id = consumer['id']
+ consumer_secret = consumer['secret']
+ consumer = {'key': consumer_id, 'secret': consumer_secret}
+
+ url, headers = self._create_request_token(consumer, self.project_id)
+ content = self.post(
+ url, headers=headers,
+ response_content_type='application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
+ credentials = self._urllib_parse_qs_text_keys(content.result)
+ request_key = credentials['oauth_token'][0]
+ request_secret = credentials['oauth_token_secret'][0]
+ request_token = oauth1.Token(request_key, request_secret)
+
+ url = self._authorize_request_token(request_key)
+ body = {'roles': [{'id': self.role_id}]}
+ resp = self.put(url, body=body, expected_status=http.client.OK)
+ verifier = resp.result['token']['oauth_verifier']
+
+ request_token.set_verifier(verifier)
+ url, headers = self._create_access_token(consumer, request_token)
+ content = self.post(
+ url, headers=headers,
+ response_content_type='application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
+ credentials = self._urllib_parse_qs_text_keys(content.result)
+ access_key = credentials['oauth_token'][0]
+ access_secret = credentials['oauth_token_secret'][0]
+ access_token = oauth1.Token(access_key, access_secret)
+
+ url, headers, body = self._get_oauth_token(consumer, access_token)
+ content = self.post(url, headers=headers, body=body)
+ return access_key, content.headers['X-Subject-Token']
+
+ def test_access_token_ec2_credential(self):
+ """Test creating ec2 credential from an oauth access token.
+
+ Call ``POST /credentials``.
+ """
+ access_key, token_id = self._get_access_token()
+
+ # Create the credential with the access token
+ blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user_id,
+ project_id=self.project_id)
+ r = self.post('/credentials', body={'credential': ref}, token=token_id)
+
+ # We expect the response blob to contain the access_token_id
+ ret_ref = ref.copy()
+ ret_blob = blob.copy()
+ ret_blob['access_token_id'] = access_key.decode('utf-8')
+ ret_ref['blob'] = json.dumps(ret_blob)
+ self.assertValidCredentialResponse(r, ref=ret_ref)
+
+ # Assert credential id is same as hash of access key id for
+ # ec2 credentials
+ access = blob['access'].encode('utf-8')
+ self.assertEqual(hashlib.sha256(access).hexdigest(),
+ r.result['credential']['id'])
+
+ # Create a role assignment to ensure that it is ignored and only the
+ # roles in the access token are used
+ role = unit.new_role_ref(name='reader')
+ role_id = role['id']
+ PROVIDERS.role_api.create_role(role_id, role)
+ PROVIDERS.assignment_api.add_role_to_user_and_project(
+ self.user_id, self.project_id, role_id)
+
+ ret_blob = json.loads(r.result['credential']['blob'])
+ ec2token = self._test_get_token(
+ access=ret_blob['access'], secret=ret_blob['secret'])
+ ec2_roles = [role['id'] for role in ec2token['roles']]
+ self.assertIn(self.role_id, ec2_roles)
+ self.assertNotIn(role_id, ec2_roles)
+
+
class TestCredentialEc2(CredentialBaseTestCase):
"""Test v3 credential compatibility with ec2tokens."""
- def _validate_signature(self, access, secret):
- """Test signature validation with the access/secret provided."""
- signer = ec2_utils.Ec2Signer(secret)
- params = {'SignatureMethod': 'HmacSHA256',
- 'SignatureVersion': '2',
- 'AWSAccessKeyId': access}
- request = {'host': 'foo',
- 'verb': 'GET',
- 'path': '/bar',
- 'params': params}
- signature = signer.generate(request)
-
- # Now make a request to validate the signed dummy request via the
- # ec2tokens API. This proves the v3 ec2 credentials actually work.
- sig_ref = {'access': access,
- 'signature': signature,
- 'host': 'foo',
- 'verb': 'GET',
- 'path': '/bar',
- 'params': params}
- r = self.post(
- '/ec2tokens',
- body={'ec2Credentials': sig_ref},
- expected_status=http.client.OK)
- self.assertValidTokenResponse(r)
-
def test_ec2_credential_signature_validate(self):
"""Test signature validation with a v3 ec2 credential."""
blob, ref = unit.new_ec2_credential(user_id=self.user['id'],
@@ -514,15 +873,15 @@ class TestCredentialEc2(CredentialBaseTestCase):
cred_blob = json.loads(r.result['credential']['blob'])
self.assertEqual(blob, cred_blob)
- self._validate_signature(access=cred_blob['access'],
- secret=cred_blob['secret'])
+ self._test_get_token(access=cred_blob['access'],
+ secret=cred_blob['secret'])
def test_ec2_credential_signature_validate_legacy(self):
"""Test signature validation with a legacy v3 ec2 credential."""
cred_json, _ = self._create_dict_blob_credential()
cred_blob = json.loads(cred_json)
- self._validate_signature(access=cred_blob['access'],
- secret=cred_blob['secret'])
+ self._test_get_token(access=cred_blob['access'],
+ secret=cred_blob['secret'])
def _get_ec2_cred_uri(self):
return '/users/%s/credentials/OS-EC2' % self.user_id
@@ -538,8 +897,8 @@ class TestCredentialEc2(CredentialBaseTestCase):
self.assertEqual(self.user_id, ec2_cred['user_id'])
self.assertEqual(self.project_id, ec2_cred['tenant_id'])
self.assertIsNone(ec2_cred['trust_id'])
- self._validate_signature(access=ec2_cred['access'],
- secret=ec2_cred['secret'])
+ self._test_get_token(access=ec2_cred['access'],
+ secret=ec2_cred['secret'])
uri = '/'.join([self._get_ec2_cred_uri(), ec2_cred['access']])
self.assertThat(ec2_cred['links']['self'],
matchers.EndsWith(uri))
diff --git a/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872733-2377f456a57ad32c.yaml b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872733-2377f456a57ad32c.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..656822c2a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872733-2377f456a57ad32c.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+---
+critical:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872733 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872733>`_]
+ Fixed a critical security issue in which an authenticated user could
+ escalate their privileges by altering a valid EC2 credential.
+security:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872733 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872733>`_]
+ Fixed a critical security issue in which an authenticated user could
+ escalate their privileges by altering a valid EC2 credential.
+fixes:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872733 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872733>`_]
+ Fixed a critical security issue in which an authenticated user could
+ escalate their privileges by altering a valid EC2 credential.
diff --git a/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872735-0989e51d2248ce1e.yaml b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872735-0989e51d2248ce1e.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1aed863010
--- /dev/null
+++ b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872735-0989e51d2248ce1e.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+critical:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872735 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872735>`_]
+ Fixed a security issue in which a trustee or an application credential user
+ could create an EC2 credential or an application credential that would
+ permit them to get a token that elevated their role assignments beyond the
+ subset delegated to them in the trust or application credential. A new
+ attribute ``app_cred_id`` is now automatically added to the access blob of
+ an EC2 credential and the role list in the trust or application credential
+ is respected.
+security:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872735 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872735>`_]
+ Fixed a security issue in which a trustee or an application credential user
+ could create an EC2 credential or an application credential that would
+ permit them to get a token that elevated their role assignments beyond the
+ subset delegated to them in the trust or application credential. A new
+ attribute ``app_cred_id`` is now automatically added to the access blob of
+ an EC2 credential and the role list in the trust or application credential
+ is respected.
+fixes:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872735 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872735>`_]
+ Fixed a security issue in which a trustee or an application credential user
+ could create an EC2 credential or an application credential that would
+ permit them to get a token that elevated their role assignments beyond the
+ subset delegated to them in the trust or application credential. A new
+ attribute ``app_cred_id`` is now automatically added to the access blob of
+ an EC2 credential and the role list in the trust or application credential
+ is respected.
diff --git a/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872755-2c81d3267b89f124.yaml b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872755-2c81d3267b89f124.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a30259ffa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/releasenotes/notes/bug-1872755-2c81d3267b89f124.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+security:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872755 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872755>`_]
+ Added validation to the EC2 credentials update API to ensure the metadata
+ labels 'trust_id' and 'app_cred_id' are not altered by the user. These
+ labels are used by keystone to determine the scope allowed by the
+ credential, and altering these automatic labels could enable an EC2
+ credential holder to elevate their access beyond what is permitted by the
+ application credential or trust that was used to create the EC2 credential.
+fixes:
+ - |
+ [`bug 1872755 <https://bugs.launchpad.net/keystone/+bug/1872755>`_]
+ Added validation to the EC2 credentials update API to ensure the metadata
+ labels 'trust_id' and 'app_cred_id' are not altered by the user. These
+ labels are used by keystone to determine the scope allowed by the
+ credential, and altering these automatic labels could enable an EC2
+ credential holder to elevate their access beyond what is permitted by the
+ application credential or trust that was used to create the EC2 credential.