7852ca24a4
This is the squash of 2 patches related to bcrypt hashing settings. 1. Force algo specific maximum length The bcrypt algorithm that we use for password hashing silently length limits the size of the password that is hashed giving the user a false sense of security [0]. This patch adds a check in the verify_length_and_trunc_password function for the hash in use and updates the max_length accordingly, this will override the configured value and log a warning if the password is truncated. Conflicts: * tox.ini [0]: https://passlib.readthedocs.io/en/stable/lib/passlib.hash.bcrypt.html#security-issues 2. Properly trimm bcrypt hashed passwords bcrypt hashing algorythm has a limitation on length of passwords it can hash on 72 bytes. In [1] a password trimm to 54 symbols has been implemented, which resulted in password being invalidated after the keystone upgrade, since passwords are trimmed differently by bcrypt itself, as well as len(str()) is not always equal to len(str().encode()) as trimming should be done based on bytes and not string itself. With the change we return a byte object from `verify_length_and_trunc_password`, so it does not need to be encoded afterwards, since we need to strip based on bytes rather then on length of the string. [1] https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/keystone/+/828595 Closes-Bug: #2028809 Related-Bug: #1901891 original change id: Iea95a3c2df041a0046647b3d3dadead1a6d054d1 (cherry picked from commit |
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