66 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
66 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
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# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
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# a copy of the License at
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#
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# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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#
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# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
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# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
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# under the License.
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from oslo_policy import policy
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from keystone.common.policies import base
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token_policies = [
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policy.DocumentedRuleDefault(
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name=base.IDENTITY % 'check_token',
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check_str=base.RULE_ADMIN_OR_TOKEN_SUBJECT,
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# FIXME(lbragstad): Token validation should be handled within keystone,
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# but it makes sense to have this be a system-level operation and a
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# project-level operation. If this API is called by a system-level
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# administrator, they should be able to check any token. If this API
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# is called by a project administrator, then the token should be
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# checked with respect to the project the administrator has a role on.
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# Otherwise it would be possible for administrators in one project to
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# validate tokens scoped to another project, which is a security
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# concern. Note the following line should be uncommented once keystone
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# supports the ability for project administrators to validate tokens
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# only within their project.
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# scope_types=['system', 'project'],
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description='Check a token.',
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operations=[{'path': '/v3/auth/tokens',
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'method': 'HEAD'}]),
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policy.DocumentedRuleDefault(
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name=base.IDENTITY % 'validate_token',
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check_str=base.RULE_SERVICE_ADMIN_OR_TOKEN_SUBJECT,
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# FIXME(lbragstad): See the comment above about why this is commented
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# out. If this weren't commented out and the `enforce_scope` were set
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# to True, then users with project-scoped tokens would no longer be
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# able to validate them by setting the same token as the X-Auth-Header
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# and X-Subject-Token.
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# scope_types=['system', 'project'],
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description='Validate a token.',
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operations=[{'path': '/v3/auth/tokens',
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'method': 'GET'}]),
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policy.DocumentedRuleDefault(
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name=base.IDENTITY % 'revoke_token',
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check_str=base.RULE_ADMIN_OR_TOKEN_SUBJECT,
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# FIXME(lbragstad): System administrators should be able to revoke any
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# valid token. Project administrators should only be able to invalidate
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# tokens scoped to the project they administer. Users should be able to
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# invalidate their own tokens. If we uncommented this line without
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# adding support for each of these cases in code, we'd be breaking the
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# ability for users to invalidate their own tokens.
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# scope_types=['system', 'project'],
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description='Revoke a token.',
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operations=[{'path': '/v3/auth/tokens',
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'method': 'DELETE'}])
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]
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def list_rules():
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return token_policies
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