keystone/bandit.yaml

# optional: after how many files to update progress
#show_progress_every: 100

# optional: plugins directory name
#plugins_dir: 'plugins'

# optional: plugins discovery name pattern
plugin_name_pattern: '*.py'

# optional: terminal escape sequences to display colors
#output_colors:
#    DEFAULT: '\033[0m'
#    HEADER: '\033[95m'
#    LOW: '\033[94m'
#    MEDIUM: '\033[93m'
#    HIGH: '\033[91m'

# optional: log format string
#log_format: "[%(module)s]\t%(levelname)s\t%(message)s"

# globs of files which should be analyzed
include:
    - '*.py'
    - '*.pyw'

# a list of strings, which if found in the path will cause files to be excluded
# for example /tests/ - to remove all all files in tests directory
exclude_dirs:
    - '/tests/'

profiles:
    gate:
        include:

            - any_other_function_with_shell_equals_true
            - assert_used
            - blacklist_calls
            - blacklist_import_func

            # One of the blacklisted imports is the subprocess module. Keystone
            # has to import the subprocess module in a single module for
            # eventlet support so in most cases bandit won't be able to detect
            # that subprocess is even being imported. Also, Bandit's
            # recommendation is just to check that the use is safe without any
            # documentation on what safe or unsafe usage is. So this test is
            # skipped.
            # - blacklist_imports

            - exec_used

            # Keystone doesn't use rootwrap and never will.
            # - execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true

            # TODO:
            # - hardcoded_bind_all_interfaces

            # Not working because wordlist/default-passwords file not bundled,
            # see https://bugs.launchpad.net/bandit/+bug/1451575 :
            # - hardcoded_password

            # Not used because it's prone to false positives:
            # - hardcoded_sql_expressions

            - hardcoded_tmp_directory

            # Keystone has no use for jinja2.
            # - jinja2_autoescape_false

            - linux_commands_wildcard_injection

            # Keystone has no use for paramiko.
            # - paramiko_calls

            # TODO:
            # - password_config_option_not_marked_secret

            - request_with_no_cert_validation
            - set_bad_file_permissions
            - subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true

            # TODO:
            # - subprocess_without_shell_equals_true

            - start_process_with_a_shell
            - start_process_with_no_shell
            - start_process_with_partial_path
            - ssl_with_bad_defaults
            - ssl_with_bad_version
            - ssl_with_no_version

            # TODO:
            # - try_except_pass

            # Keystone has no use for mako.
            # - use_of_mako_templates

blacklist_calls:
    bad_name_sets:
        - pickle:
            qualnames: [pickle.loads, pickle.load, pickle.Unpickler,
                        cPickle.loads, cPickle.load, cPickle.Unpickler]
            message: "Pickle library appears to be in use, possible security issue."
        - marshal:
            qualnames: [marshal.load, marshal.loads]
            message: "Deserialization with the marshal module is possibly dangerous."
        - md5:
            qualnames: [hashlib.md5, Crypto.Hash.MD2.new, Crypto.Hash.MD4.new, Crypto.Hash.MD5.new, cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.MD5]
            message: "Use of insecure MD2, MD4, or MD5 hash function."
        - mktemp_q:
            qualnames: [tempfile.mktemp]
            message: "Use of insecure and deprecated function (mktemp)."
        - eval:
            qualnames: [eval]
            message: "Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval."
        - mark_safe:
            names: [mark_safe]
            message: "Use of mark_safe() may expose cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and should be reviewed."
        - httpsconnection:
            qualnames: [httplib.HTTPSConnection]
            message: "Use of HTTPSConnection does not provide security, see https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033"
        - yaml_load:
            qualnames: [yaml.load]
            message: "Use of unsafe yaml load. Allows instantiation of arbitrary objects. Consider yaml.safe_load()."
        - urllib_urlopen:
            qualnames: [urllib.urlopen, urllib.urlretrieve, urllib.URLopener, urllib.FancyURLopener, urllib2.urlopen, urllib2.Request]
            message: "Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected."
        - random:
            qualnames: [random.random, random.randrange, random.randint, random.choice, random.uniform, random.triangular]
            message: "Standard pseudo-random generators are not suitable for security/cryptographic purposes."
            level: "LOW"

        # Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
        #   https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax

        - xml_bad_cElementTree:
            qualnames: [xml.etree.cElementTree.parse,
                        xml.etree.cElementTree.iterparse,
                        xml.etree.cElementTree.fromstring,
                        xml.etree.cElementTree.XMLParser]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_ElementTree:
            qualnames: [xml.etree.ElementTree.parse,
                        xml.etree.ElementTree.iterparse,
                        xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring,
                        xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_expatreader:
            qualnames: [xml.sax.expatreader.create_parser]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_expatbuilder:
            qualnames: [xml.dom.expatbuilder.parse,
                        xml.dom.expatbuilder.parseString]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_sax:
            qualnames: [xml.sax.parse,
                        xml.sax.parseString,
                        xml.sax.make_parser]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_minidom:
            qualnames: [xml.dom.minidom.parse,
                        xml.dom.minidom.parseString]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_pulldom:
            qualnames: [xml.dom.pulldom.parse,
                        xml.dom.pulldom.parseString]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."
        - xml_bad_etree:
            qualnames: [lxml.etree.parse,
                        lxml.etree.fromstring,
                        lxml.etree.RestrictedElement,
                        lxml.etree.GlobalParserTLS,
                        lxml.etree.getDefaultParser,
                        lxml.etree.check_docinfo]
            message: "Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with it's defusedxml equivilent function."


shell_injection:
    # Start a process using the subprocess module, or one of its wrappers.
    subprocess: [subprocess.Popen, subprocess.call, subprocess.check_call,
                 subprocess.check_output, utils.execute, utils.execute_with_timeout]
    # Start a process with a function vulnerable to shell injection.
    shell: [os.system, os.popen, os.popen2, os.popen3, os.popen4,
            popen2.popen2, popen2.popen3, popen2.popen4, popen2.Popen3,
            popen2.Popen4, commands.getoutput, commands.getstatusoutput]
    # Start a process with a function that is not vulnerable to shell injection.
    no_shell: [os.execl, os.execle, os.execlp, os.execlpe, os.execv,os.execve,
               os.execvp, os.execvpe, os.spawnl, os.spawnle, os.spawnlp,
               os.spawnlpe, os.spawnv, os.spawnve, os.spawnvp, os.spawnvpe,
               os.startfile]

blacklist_imports:
    bad_import_sets:
        - telnet:
            imports: [telnetlib]
            level: HIGH
            message: "Telnet is considered insecure. Use SSH or some other encrypted protocol."
        - info_libs:
            imports: [pickle, cPickle, subprocess, Crypto]
            level: LOW
            message: "Consider possible security implications associated with {module} module."

        # Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
        #   https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax

        - xml_libs:
            imports: [xml.etree.cElementTree,
                      xml.etree.ElementTree,
                      xml.sax.expatreader,
                      xml.sax,
                      xml.dom.expatbuilder,
                      xml.dom.minidom,
                      xml.dom.pulldom,
                      lxml.etree,
                      lxml]
            message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {module} with the equivilent defusedxml package."
            level: LOW
        - xml_libs_high:
            imports: [xmlrpclib]
            message: "Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Use defused.xmlrpc.monkey_patch() function to monkey-patch xmlrpclib and mitigate XML vulnerabilities."
            level: HIGH

hardcoded_tmp_directory:
    tmp_dirs:  ['/tmp', '/var/tmp', '/dev/shm']

hardcoded_password:
    # Support for full path, relative path and special "%(site_data_dir)s"
    # substitution (/usr/{local}/share)
    word_list: "%(site_data_dir)s/wordlist/default-passwords"

ssl_with_bad_version:
    bad_protocol_versions:
        - 'PROTOCOL_SSLv2'
        - 'SSLv2_METHOD'
        - 'SSLv23_METHOD'
        - 'PROTOCOL_SSLv3'  # strict option
        - 'PROTOCOL_TLSv1'  # strict option
        - 'SSLv3_METHOD'    # strict option
        - 'TLSv1_METHOD'    # strict option

password_config_option_not_marked_secret:
    function_names:
        - oslo.config.cfg.StrOpt
        - oslo_config.cfg.StrOpt

execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true:
    function_names:
        - ceilometer.utils.execute
        - cinder.utils.execute
        - neutron.agent.linux.utils.execute
        - nova.utils.execute
        - nova.utils.trycmd

try_except_pass:
  check_typed_exception: True