Prohibit file injection writing to host filesystem

This is a refinement of the previous fix in commit 2427d4a9,
which does the file name canonicalization as the root user.
This is required so that guest images could not for example,
protect malicious symlinks in a directory only readable by root.

Fixes bug: 1031311, CVE-2012-3447
Change-Id: I7f7cdeeffadebae7451e1e13f73f1313a7df9c5c

nova/tests/test_virt.py

@@ -99,22 +99,6 @@ class TestVirtDisk(test.TestCase):
 
         self.stubs.Set(utils, 'execute', fake_execute)
 
-    def test_check_safe_path(self):
-        ret = disk_api._join_and_check_path_within_fs('/foo', 'etc',
-                                                      'something.conf')
-        self.assertEquals(ret, '/foo/etc/something.conf')
-
-    def test_check_unsafe_path(self):
-        self.assertRaises(exception.Invalid,
-                          disk_api._join_and_check_path_within_fs,
-                          '/foo', 'etc/../../../something.conf')
-
-    def test_inject_files_with_bad_path(self):
-        self.assertRaises(exception.Invalid,
-                          disk_api._inject_file_into_fs,
-                          '/tmp', '/etc/../../../../etc/passwd',
-                          'hax')
-
     def test_lxc_destroy_container(self):
 
         def proc_mounts(self, mount_point):
@@ -165,3 +149,32 @@ class TestVirtDisk(test.TestCase):
         self.executes.pop()
 
         self.assertEqual(self.executes, expected_commands)
+
+
+class TestVirtDiskPaths(test.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        super(TestVirtDiskPaths, self).setUp()
+
+        real_execute = utils.execute
+
+        def nonroot_execute(*cmd_parts, **kwargs):
+            kwargs.pop('run_as_root', None)
+            return real_execute(*cmd_parts, **kwargs)
+
+        self.stubs.Set(utils, 'execute', nonroot_execute)
+
+    def test_check_safe_path(self):
+        ret = disk_api._join_and_check_path_within_fs('/foo', 'etc',
+                                                      'something.conf')
+        self.assertEquals(ret, '/foo/etc/something.conf')
+
+    def test_check_unsafe_path(self):
+        self.assertRaises(exception.Invalid,
+                          disk_api._join_and_check_path_within_fs,
+                          '/foo', 'etc/../../../something.conf')
+
+    def test_inject_files_with_bad_path(self):
+        self.assertRaises(exception.Invalid,
+                          disk_api._inject_file_into_fs,
+                          '/tmp', '/etc/../../../../etc/passwd',
+                          'hax')

nova/tests/test_xenapi.py

@@ -677,9 +677,13 @@ class XenAPIVMTestCase(stubs.XenAPITestBase):
             self._tee_executed = True
             return '', ''
 
+        def _readlink_handler(cmd_parts, **kwargs):
+            return os.path.realpath(cmd_parts[2]), ''
+
         fake_utils.fake_execute_set_repliers([
             # Capture the tee .../etc/network/interfaces command
             (r'tee.*interfaces', _tee_handler),
+            (r'readlink -nm.*', _readlink_handler),
         ])
         self._test_spawn(IMAGE_MACHINE,
                          IMAGE_KERNEL,

nova/virt/disk/api.py

@@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ def _join_and_check_path_within_fs(fs, *args):
     mounted guest fs.  Trying to be clever and specifying a
     path with '..' in it will hit this safeguard.
     '''
-    absolute_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(fs, *args))
+    absolute_path, _err = utils.execute('readlink', '-nm',
+                                        os.path.join(fs, *args),
+                                        run_as_root=True)
     if not absolute_path.startswith(os.path.realpath(fs) + '/'):
         raise exception.Invalid(_('injected file path not valid'))
     return absolute_path