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160 lines
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..
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
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License.
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
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==============================
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TLS Data Security and Barbican
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==============================
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Launchpad blueprint:
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https://blueprints.launchpad.net/octavia/+spec/tls-data-security
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Octavia will have some need of secure storage for TLS related data. This BP is
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intended to identify all of the data that needs secure storage, or any other
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interaction that will require the use of Barbican or another secure solution.
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Problem description
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===================
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1. Octavia will support TLS Termination (including SNI), which will require us
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to store and retrieve certificates and private keys from a secure repository.
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2. Octavia will communicate with its Amphorae using TLS, so each Amphora
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will need a certificate for the controller to validate.
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3. Octavia will need TLS data for exposing its own API via HTTPS.
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Proposed change
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===============
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The initial supported implementation for TLS related functions will be
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Barbican, but the interface will be generic such that other implementations
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could be created later.
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.. seqdiag:: tls-data-security-1.diag
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1. Create a CertificateManager interface for storing and retrieving certificate
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and private key pairs (and intermediate certs / private key passphrase).
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Users will pass their TLS data to Octavia in the form of a certificate_id,
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which is a reference to their data in some secure service. Octavia will store
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that certificate_id for each Listener/SNI and will retrieve the data when
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necessary. (Barbican specific: users will need to add Octavia's user account as
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an authorized user on the Container and all Secrets [1] so we catch fetch the
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data on their behalf.)
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We will need to validate the certificate data (including key and intermediates)
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when we initially receive it, and will assume that it remains unchanged for
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the lifespan of the LB (in Barbican the data is immutable so this is a safe
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assumption, I do not know how well this will work for other services). In the
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case of invalid TLS data, we will reject the request with a 400 (if it is an
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initial create) or else put the LB into ERROR status (if it is on a failover
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event or during some other non-interactive scenario).
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.. seqdiag:: tls-data-security-2.diag
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2. Create a CertificateGenerator interface to generate certificates from CSRs.
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When the controller creates an Amphora, it will generate a private key and a
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CSR, generate a signed certificate from the CSR, and include the private key
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and signed certificate in a ConfigDrive for the new Amphora. It will also
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include a copy of the Controller's certificate on the ConfigDrive. All future
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communications with the Amphora will do certificate validation based on these
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certificates. For the Amphora, this will be based on our (private) certificate
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authority and the CN of the Amphora's cert matching the ID of the Amphora. For
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the Controller, the cert should be a complete match with the version provided.
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(The CertificateManager and CertificateGenerator interfaces are separate
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because while Barbican can perform both functions, future implementations
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may need to use two distinct services to achieve both.)
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3. The key/cert for the main Octavia API/controller should be maintained
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manually by the server operators using whatever configuration management
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they choose. We should not need to use a specific external repo for this.
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The trusted CA Cert will also need to be retrieved from barbican and manually
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loaded in the config.
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Alternatives
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------------
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We could skip the interface and just use Barbican directly, but that would be
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diverging from what seems to be the accepted OpenStack model for Secret Store
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integration.
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We could also store everything locally or in the DB, but that isn't a real
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option for production systems because it is incredibly insecure (though there
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will be a "dummy driver" that operates this way for development purposes).
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Data model impact
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-----------------
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Nothing new, the models for this should already be in place. Some of the
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columns/classes might need to be renamed more generically (currently there is
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a tls_container_id column, which would become tls_certificate_id to be more
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generic).
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REST API impact
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---------------
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None
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Security impact
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---------------
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Using Barbican is considered secure.
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Notifications impact
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--------------------
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None
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Other end user impact
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---------------------
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None
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Performance Impact
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------------------
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Adding an external touchpoint (a certificate signing service) to the Amphora
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spin-up workflow will increase the average time for readying an Amphora. This
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shouldn't be a huge problem if the standby-pool size is sufficient for the
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particular deployment.
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Other deployer impact
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---------------------
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None
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Developer impact
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----------------
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None
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Implementation
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==============
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Assignee(s)
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-----------
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Adam Harwell (adam-harwell)
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Work Items
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----------
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1. Create CertificateManager interface.
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2. Create CertificateGenerator interface.
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3. Create BarbicanCertificateManager implementation.
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4. Create BarbicanCertificateGenerator implementation.
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5. Create unit tests!
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Dependencies
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============
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This script will depend on the OpenStack Barbican project, including some
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features that are still only at the blueprint stage.
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Testing
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=======
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There will be testing. Yes.
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Documentation Impact
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====================
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Documentation changes will be primarily internal.
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References
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==========
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.. line-block::
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[1] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/127353/
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[2] https://review.openstack.org/#/c/129048/
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