General updates to Compute for style and convention

Editing the nested sections for the compute chapter. Mostly grammar, wording,
style, convention, etc. This patch includes rootwrap and security. Watch this
space for more.

Change-Id: I63d9691e64f14c4eba9ca4440930f06e757f9750
Partial-Bug: #1251195
This commit is contained in:
Lana Brindley 2015-02-10 15:54:44 +10:00
parent 6b4aa47f9a
commit e880c6e326
2 changed files with 102 additions and 117 deletions

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@ -4,113 +4,93 @@
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
version="5.0"
xml:id="root-wrap-reference">
<title>Secure with root wrappers</title>
<para>The root wrapper enables an unprivileged user to run a number of Compute actions as the
root user in the safest manner possible. Historically, Compute used a specific
<filename>sudoers</filename> file that listed every command that the Compute user was
allowed to run, and used <command>sudo</command> to run that command as
<literal>root</literal>. However this was difficult to maintain (the
<filename>sudoers</filename> file was in packaging), and did not enable complex
filtering of parameters (advanced filters). The rootwrap was designed to solve those
issues.</para>
<simplesect>
<title>How rootwrap works</title>
<para>Instead of calling <command>sudo make me a sandwich</command>, Compute services start
with a <command>nova-rootwrap</command> call; for example, <command>sudo nova-rootwrap
/etc/nova/rootwrap.conf make me a sandwich</command>. A generic sudoers entry lets
the Compute user run <command>nova-rootwrap</command> as root. The
<command>nova-rootwrap</command> code looks for filter definition directories in its
configuration file, and loads command filters from them. Then it checks if the command
requested by Compute matches one of those filters, in which case it executes the command
(as root). If no filter matches, it denies the request.</para>
<note><para>To use <command>nova-rootwrap</command>, you must be aware of the issues with using NFS and
root-owned files. The NFS share must be configured with the
<option>no_root_squash</option> option enabled.</para>
</note>
</simplesect>
<simplesect>
<title>Security model</title>
<para>The escalation path is fully controlled by the root user. A sudoers entry (owned by
root) allows Compute to run (as root) a specific rootwrap executable, and only with a
specific configuration file (which should be owned by root).
<command>nova-rootwrap</command> imports the Python modules it needs from a cleaned
(and system-default) <replaceable>PYTHONPATH</replaceable>. The configuration file (also
root-owned) points to root-owned filter definition directories, which contain root-owned
filters definition files. This chain ensures that the Compute user itself is not in
control of the configuration or modules used by the <command>nova-rootwrap</command>
executable.</para>
</simplesect>
<simplesect>
<title>Details of rootwrap.conf</title>
<para>You configure <command>nova-rootwrap</command> in the
<filename>rootwrap.conf</filename> file. Because it's in the trusted security path,
it must be owned and writable by only the root user. The file's location is specified
both in the sudoers entry and in the <filename>nova.conf</filename> configuration file
with the <code>rootwrap_config=entry</code>.</para>
<para>The <filename>rootwrap.conf</filename> file uses an INI file format with these
sections and parameters:</para>
<table rules="all" frame="border"
xml:id="rootwrap-conf-table-filter-path" width="100%">
<caption>rootwrap.conf configuration options</caption>
<col width="50%"/>
<col width="50%"/>
<thead>
<tr>
<td><para>Configuration option=Default
value</para></td>
<td><para>(Type) Description</para></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><para>[DEFAULT]</para>
<para>filters_path=/etc/nova/rootwrap.d,/usr/share/nova/rootwrap
</para></td>
<td><para>(ListOpt) Comma-separated list of
directories containing filter definition
files. Defines where filters for root wrap
are stored. Directories defined on this
line should all exist, be owned and
writable only by the root
user.</para></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</simplesect>
<simplesect>
<title>Details of .filters files</title>
<para>Filters definition files contain lists of filters that
<command>nova-rootwrap</command> will use to allow or deny a specific command. They
are generally suffixed by .filters. Since they are in the trusted security path, they
need to be owned and writable only by the root user. Their location is specified in the
<filename>rootwrap.conf</filename> file.</para>
<para>Filter definition files use an INI file format with a [Filters] section and several
lines, each with a unique parameter name (different for each filter that you
define):</para>
<table rules="all" frame="border"
xml:id="rootwrap-conf-table-filter-name" width="100%">
<caption>.filters configuration options</caption>
<col width="50%"/>
<col width="50%"/>
<thead>
<tr>
<td><para>Configuration option=Default
value</para></td>
<td><para>(Type) Description</para></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><para>[Filters]</para>
<para>filter_name=kpartx: CommandFilter,
/sbin/kpartx, root</para></td>
<td><para>(ListOpt) Comma-separated list
containing first the Filter class to use,
followed by that Filter arguments (which
vary depending on the Filter class
selected).</para></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</simplesect>
<title>Secure with rootwrap</title>
<para>Rootwrap allows unprivileged users to safely run Compute actions
as the root user. Compute previously used <command>sudo</command> for
this purpose, but this was difficult to maintain, and did not allow
advanced filters. The <command>rootwrap</command> command replaces
<command>sudo</command> for Compute.</para>
<para>To use rootwrap, prefix the Compute command with
<command>nova-rootwrap</command>. For example:</para>
<screen><prompt>$</prompt> <userinput>sudo nova-rootwrap /etc/nova/rootwrap.conf <replaceable>command</replaceable></userinput></screen>
<para>
A generic <filename>sudoers</filename> entry lets the Compute user run
<command>nova-rootwrap</command> as root. The
<command>nova-rootwrap</command> code looks for filter definition
directories in its configuration file, and loads command filters from
them. It then checks if the command requested by Compute matches one of
those filters and, if so, executes the command (as root). If no filter
matches, it denies the request.</para>
<note><para>Be aware of issues with using NFS and root-owned files. The
NFS share must be configured with the <option>no_root_squash</option>
option enabled, in order for rootwrap to work correctly.</para>
</note>
<para>Rootwrap is fully controlled by the root user. The root user owns
the sudoers entry which allows Compute to run a specific rootwrap
executable as root, and only with a specific configuration file (which
should also be owned by root). The <command>nova-rootwrap</command>
command imports the Python modules it needs from a cleaned,
system-default <replaceable>PYTHONPATH</replaceable>. The root-owned
configuration file points to root-owned filter definition directories,
which contain root-owned filters definition files. This chain ensures
that the Compute user itself is not in control of the configuration or
modules used by the <command>nova-rootwrap</command> executable.</para>
<para>Rootwrap is configured using the <filename>rootwrap.conf</filename>
file. Because it's in the trusted security path, it must be owned and
writable by only the root user. The file's location is specified in both
the sudoers entry and in the <filename>nova.conf</filename> configuration
file with the <parameter>rootwrap_config=entry</parameter> parameter.</para>
<para>The <filename>rootwrap.conf</filename> file uses an INI file format
with these sections and parameters:</para>
<table rules="all" frame="border" xml:id="rootwrap-conf-table-filter-path" width="100%">
<caption>rootwrap.conf configuration options</caption>
<col width="50%"/>
<col width="50%"/>
<thead>
<tr>
<td><para>Configuration option=Default value</para></td>
<td><para>(Type) Description</para></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><para>[DEFAULT]</para>
<para>filters_path=/etc/nova/rootwrap.d,/usr/share/nova/rootwrap</para></td>
<td><para>(ListOpt) Comma-separated list of directories containing
filter definition files. Defines where rootwrap filters are
stored. Directories defined on this line should all exist, and be
owned and writable only by the root user.</para></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<para>The filters definition files contain lists of filters that rootwrap
will use to allow or deny a specific command. They are generally
suffixed by <literal>.filters</literal>. Since they are in the trusted
security path, they need to be owned and writable only by the root user.
Their location is specified in the <filename>rootwrap.conf</filename>
file.</para>
<para>Filter definition files use an INI file format with a
<parameter>[Filters]</parameter> section and several lines, each with a
unique parameter name, which should be different for each filter you
define:</para>
<table rules="all" frame="border" xml:id="rootwrap-conf-table-filter-name" width="100%">
<caption>.filters configuration options</caption>
<col width="50%"/>
<col width="50%"/>
<thead>
<tr>
<td><para>Configuration option=Default value</para></td>
<td><para>(Type) Description</para></td>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><para>[Filters]</para>
<para>filter_name=kpartx: CommandFilter, /sbin/kpartx, root</para></td>
<td><para>(ListOpt) Comma-separated list containing the filter class
to use, followed by the Filter arguments (which vary depending
on the Filter class selected).</para></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</section>

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@ -2,23 +2,28 @@
<section xmlns="http://docbook.org/ns/docbook" xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" version="5.0" xml:id="section-compute-security">
<title>Security hardening</title>
<para>You can integrate OpenStack Compute with various third-party technologies to increase
security. For information, see the <link xlink:href="http://docs.openstack.org/sec/"
><citetitle>OpenStack Security Guide</citetitle></link>.</para>
<para>OpenStack Compute can be integrated with various third-party
technologies to increase security. For more information, see the
<link xlink:href="http://docs.openstack.org/sec/">
<citetitle>OpenStack Security Guide</citetitle></link>.</para>
<xi:include href="section_trusted-compute-pools.xml"/>
<section xml:id="section_compute_metadata_https">
<title>Encrypt Compute metadata traffic</title>
<para>OpenStack Juno supports encrypting Compute metadata traffic with HTTPS. You enable SSL
encryption in the <filename>metadata_agent.ini</filename> file.</para>
<para>OpenStack supports encrypting Compute metadata traffic with HTTPS.
Enable SSL encryption in the <filename>metadata_agent.ini</filename>
file.</para>
<procedure>
<title>To enable SSL encryption</title>
<title>Enabling SSL encryption</title>
<step>
<para>Enable the HTTPS protocol:</para>
<programlisting>nova_metadata_protocol = https</programlisting>
</step>
<step>
<para>Determine whether insecure SSL connections are accepted for Compute metadata server
requests. The default value is <option>False</option>:</para>
<para>Determine whether insecure SSL connections are accepted for
Compute metadata server requests. The default value is
<option>False</option>:</para>
<programlisting>nova_metadata_insecure = False</programlisting>
</step>
<step>