openstack
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oslo.messaging
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oslo.messaging/bandit.yaml

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# optional: after how many files to update progress
#show_progress_every: 100
# optional: plugins directory name
#plugins_dir: plugins
# optional: plugins discovery name pattern
plugin_name_pattern: '*.py'
# optional: terminal escape sequences to display colors
#output_colors:
# DEFAULT: \033[0m
# HEADER: \033[95m
# LOW: \033[94m
# MEDIUM: \033[93m
# HIGH: \033[91m
# optional: log format string
#log_format: "[%(module)s]\t%(levelname)s\t%(message)s"
# globs of files which should be analyzed
include:
- '*.py'
- '*.pyw'
# a list of strings, which if found in the path will cause files to be excluded
# for example /tests/ - to remove all files in tests directory
exclude_dirs:
- '/tests/'
profiles:
oslo.messaging:
include:
- any_other_function_with_shell_equals_true
# Some occurrences in the olso.messaging code, but not much to do
# to get rid of these warnings, so just skip this.
# - assert_used
- blacklist_calls
- blacklist_import_func
- blacklist_imports
- exec_used
- execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true
- hardcoded_bind_all_interfaces
- hardcoded_password_string
- hardcoded_password_funcarg
- hardcoded_password_default
- hardcoded_sql_expressions
- hardcoded_tmp_directory
- jinja2_autoescape_false
- linux_commands_wildcard_injection
- paramiko_calls
- password_config_option_not_marked_secret
- request_with_no_cert_validation
- set_bad_file_permissions
- subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true
- subprocess_without_shell_equals_true
- start_process_with_a_shell
- start_process_with_no_shell
- start_process_with_partial_path
- ssl_with_bad_defaults
- ssl_with_bad_version
- ssl_with_no_version
# This might be nice to have, but we currently ignore a lot of
# exceptions during the cleanup phases, so this throws a lot
# false positives.
# - try_except_pass
- use_of_mako_templates
- weak_cryptographic_key
XSS:
include:
- jinja2_autoescape_false
- use_of_mako_templates
ShellInjection:
include:
- subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true
- subprocess_without_shell_equals_true
- any_other_function_with_shell_equals_true
- start_process_with_a_shell
- start_process_with_no_shell
- start_process_with_partial_path
exclude:
SqlInjection:
include:
- hardcoded_sql_expressions
blacklist_calls:
bad_name_sets:
- pickle:
qualnames:
- pickle.loads
- pickle.load
- pickle.Unpickler
- cPickle.loads
- cPickle.load
- cPickle.Unpickler
message: >
Pickle library appears to be in use, possible security issue.
- marshal:
qualnames: [marshal.load, marshal.loads]
message: >
Deserialization with the marshal module is possibly dangerous.
- md5:
qualnames:
- hashlib.md5
- Crypto.Hash.MD2.new
- Crypto.Hash.MD4.new
- Crypto.Hash.MD5.new
- cryptography.hazmat.primitives.hashes.MD5
message: Use of insecure MD2, MD4, or MD5 hash function.
- ciphers:
qualnames:
- Crypto.Cipher.ARC2.new
- Crypto.Cipher.ARC4.new
- Crypto.Cipher.Blowfish.new
- Crypto.Cipher.DES.new
- Crypto.Cipher.XOR.new
- cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms.ARC4
- cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms.Blowfish
- cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.algorithms.IDEA
message: >
Use of insecure cipher {func}. Replace with a known secure
cipher such as AES.
level: HIGH
- cipher_modes:
qualnames:
- cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.modes.ECB
message: Use of insecure cipher mode {func}.
- mktemp_q:
qualnames: [tempfile.mktemp]
message: Use of insecure and deprecated function (mktemp).
- eval:
qualnames: [eval]
message: >
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer
ast.literal_eval.
- mark_safe:
names: [mark_safe]
message: >
Use of mark_safe() may expose cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities and should be reviewed.
- httpsconnection:
qualnames: [httplib.HTTPSConnection]
message: >
Use of HTTPSConnection does not provide security, see
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0033
- yaml_load:
qualnames: [yaml.load]
message: >
Use of unsafe yaml load. Allows instantiation of arbitrary
objects. Consider yaml.safe_load().
- urllib_urlopen:
qualnames:
- urllib.urlopen
- urllib.urlretrieve
- urllib.URLopener
- urllib.FancyURLopener
- urllib2.urlopen
- urllib2.Request
message: >
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or
custom schemes is often unexpected.
- telnetlib:
qualnames:
- telnetlib.*
message: >
Telnet-related funtions are being called. Telnet is considered
insecure. Use SSH or some other encrypted protocol.
level: HIGH
# Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
# https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax
- xml_bad_cElementTree:
qualnames:
- xml.etree.cElementTree.parse
- xml.etree.cElementTree.iterparse
- xml.etree.cElementTree.fromstring
- xml.etree.cElementTree.XMLParser
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_ElementTree:
qualnames:
- xml.etree.ElementTree.parse
- xml.etree.ElementTree.iterparse
- xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring
- xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_expatreader:
qualnames: [xml.sax.expatreader.create_parser]
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_expatbuilder:
qualnames:
- xml.dom.expatbuilder.parse
- xml.dom.expatbuilder.parseString
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_sax:
qualnames:
- xml.sax.parse
- xml.sax.parseString
- xml.sax.make_parser
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_minidom:
qualnames:
- xml.dom.minidom.parse
- xml.dom.minidom.parseString
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_pulldom:
qualnames:
- xml.dom.pulldom.parse
- xml.dom.pulldom.parseString
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
- xml_bad_etree:
qualnames:
- lxml.etree.parse
- lxml.etree.fromstring
- lxml.etree.RestrictedElement
- lxml.etree.GlobalParserTLS
- lxml.etree.getDefaultParser
- lxml.etree.check_docinfo
message: >
Using {func} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {func} with its defusedxml
equivalent function.
shell_injection:
# Start a process using the subprocess module, or one of its wrappers.
subprocess:
- subprocess.Popen
- subprocess.call
- subprocess.check_call
- subprocess.check_output
- utils.execute
- utils.execute_with_timeout
# Start a process with a function vulnerable to shell injection.
shell:
- os.system
- os.popen
- os.popen2
- os.popen3
- os.popen4
- popen2.popen2
- popen2.popen3
- popen2.popen4
- popen2.Popen3
- popen2.Popen4
- commands.getoutput
- commands.getstatusoutput
# Start a process with a function that is not vulnerable to shell injection.
no_shell:
- os.execl
- os.execle
- os.execlp
- os.execlpe
- os.execv
- os.execve
- os.execvp
- os.execvpe
- os.spawnl
- os.spawnle
- os.spawnlp
- os.spawnlpe
- os.spawnv
- os.spawnve
- os.spawnvp
- os.spawnvpe
- os.startfile
blacklist_imports:
bad_import_sets:
- telnet:
imports: [telnetlib]
level: HIGH
message: >
A telnet-related module is being imported. Telnet is
considered insecure. Use SSH or some other encrypted protocol.
- info_libs:
imports: [pickle, cPickle, subprocess, Crypto]
level: LOW
message: >
Consider possible security implications associated with
{module} module.
# Most of this is based off of Christian Heimes' work on defusedxml:
# https://pypi.python.org/pypi/defusedxml/#defusedxml-sax
- xml_libs:
imports:
- xml.etree.cElementTree
- xml.etree.ElementTree
- xml.sax.expatreader
- xml.sax
- xml.dom.expatbuilder
- xml.dom.minidom
- xml.dom.pulldom
- lxml.etree
- lxml
message: >
Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace {module} with the equivalent
defusedxml package.
level: LOW
- xml_libs_high:
imports: [xmlrpclib]
message: >
Using {module} to parse untrusted XML data is known to be
vulnerable to XML attacks. Use defused.xmlrpc.monkey_patch()
function to monkey-patch xmlrpclib and mitigate XML
vulnerabilities.
level: HIGH
hardcoded_tmp_directory:
tmp_dirs: [/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm]
hardcoded_password:
# Support for full path, relative path and special "%(site_data_dir)s"
# substitution (/usr/{local}/share)
word_list: "%(site_data_dir)s/wordlist/default-passwords"
ssl_with_bad_version:
bad_protocol_versions:
- PROTOCOL_SSLv2
- SSLv2_METHOD
- SSLv23_METHOD
- PROTOCOL_SSLv3 # strict option
- PROTOCOL_TLSv1 # strict option
- SSLv3_METHOD # strict option
- TLSv1_METHOD # strict option
password_config_option_not_marked_secret:
function_names:
- oslo.config.cfg.StrOpt
- oslo_config.cfg.StrOpt
execute_with_run_as_root_equals_true:
function_names:
- ceilometer.utils.execute
- cinder.utils.execute
- neutron.agent.linux.utils.execute
- nova.utils.execute
- nova.utils.trycmd
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