40 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
40 lines
1.6 KiB
Plaintext
sha512_crypt is insufficient for password hashing
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### Summary ###
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Use of sha512_crypt for password hashing in versions of Keystone prior to Pike,
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is insufficient and provides limited protection against brute-forcing of
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password hashes.
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### Affected Services / Software ###
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OpenStack Identity Service (Keystone). OpenStack Releases Ocata, Newton.
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### Discussion ###
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Keystone uses sha512_crypt for password hashing. This provides insufficient and
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limited protection, since sha512_crypt algorithm has a low computational cost
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factor, therefore making it easier to crack passwords offline in a short period
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of time.
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The correct mechanism is to use the more secure hashing algorithms with a
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higher computational cost factor such as bcrypt, scrypt, or pbkdf2_sha512
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instead of sha512_crypt.
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### Recommended Actions ###
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It is recommended that operators upgrade to the Pike release where all future
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passwords would be bcrypt hashed.
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Operators should also force password changes on all users [1], which will
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result in the users newly generated passwords being bcrypt hashed.
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### Contacts / References ###
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Author: Luke Hinds <lhinds@redhat.com>
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[1]: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-security-compliance.html#force-users-to-change-password-upon-first-use
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[2] http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf
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This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0081
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Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1668503
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Mailing List : [Security] tag on openstack-dev@lists.openstack.org
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OpenStack Security Project : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg
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