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DoS style attack on noVNC server can lead to service interruption or disruption
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### Summary ###
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There is currently no limit to the number of noVNC or SPICE console
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sessions that can be established by a single user. The console host has
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limited resources and an attacker launching many sessions may be able to
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exhaust the available resources, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS)
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condition.
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### Affected Services / Software ###
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Horizon, Nova, noVNC proxy, SPICE console, Grizzly, Havana
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### Discussion ###
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Currently with a single user token, no restrictions are enforced on the
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number or frequency of noVNC or SPICE console sessions that may be
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established. While a user can only access their own virtual machine
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instances, resources can be exhausted on the console proxy host by
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creating an excessive number of simultaneous console sessions. This can
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result in timeouts for subsequent connection requests to instances using
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the same console proxy. Not only would this prevent the user from
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accessing their own instances, but other legitimate users would also be
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deprived of console access. Further, other services running on the
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noVNC proxy and Compute hosts may degrade in responsiveness.
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By taking advantage of this lack of restrictions around noVNC or SPICE
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console connections, a single user could cause the console proxy
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endpoint to become unresponsive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS)
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style attack. It should be noted that there is no amplification effect.
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### Recommended Actions ###
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For current stable OpenStack releases (Grizzly, Havana), users need to
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workaround this vulnerability by using rate-limiting proxies to cover
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access to the noVNC proxy service. Rate-limiting is a common mechanism
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to prevent DoS and Brute-Force attacks.
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For example, if you are using a proxy such as Repose, enable the rate
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limiting feature by following these steps:
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  https://repose.atlassian.net/wiki/display/REPOSE/Rate+Limiting+Filter
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Future OpenStack releases are looking to add the ability to restrict
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noVNC and SPICE console connections.
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### Contacts / References ###
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Author: Nathan Kinder, Red Hat
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Author: Sriram Subramanian, CloudDon
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This OSSN : https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0008
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Original LaunchPad Bug : https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1227575
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OpenStack Security ML : openstack-security@lists.openstack.org
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OpenStack Security Group : https://launchpad.net/~openstack-ossg
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