I changed asserts with more specific assert methods.
e.g.: from assertTrue(sth == None) to assertIsNone(*) or
assertTrue(isinstance(inst, type)) to assertIsInstace(inst, type)
or assertTrue(not sth) to assertFalse(sth).
The code gets more readable, and a better description will be shown on fail.
Change-Id: If6aad8681aab7c9a41d65a4f449d8abbe3e64616
When we were caching directly to the WSGI environment, it made sense to
have different keys for the different caches. Now that we have a
separate data structure for the per-request cache, however, we ought to
be consistent.
Change-Id: I199cba6e5fc9ab4205bba369e6a2f34fc5ce22d4
get_account_info used to work like this:
* make an account HEAD request
* ignore the response
* get the account info by digging around in the request environment,
where it had been deposited by elves or something
Not actually elves, but the proxy's GETorHEAD_base method would take
the HEAD response and cache it in the response environment, which was
the same object as the request environment, thus enabling
get_account_info to find it.
This was extraordinarily brittle. If a WSGI middleware were to
shallow-copy the request environment, then any middlewares to its left
could not use get_account_info, as the left middleware's request
environment would no longer be identical to the response environment
down in GETorHEAD_base.
Now, get_account_info works like this:
* make an account HEAD request.
* if the account info is in the request environment, return it. This
is an optimization to avoid a double-set in memcached.
* else, compute the account info from the response headers, store it
in caches, and return it.
This is much easier to think about; get_account_info can get and cache
account info all on its own; the cache check and cache set are right
next to each other.
All the above is true for get_container_info as well.
get_info() is still around, but it's just a shim. It was trying to
unify get_account_info and get_container_info to exploit the
commonalities, but the number of times that "if container:" showed up
in get_info and its helpers really indicated that something was
wrong. I'd rather have two functions with some duplication than one
function with no duplication but a bunch of "if container:" branches.
Other things of note:
* a HEAD request to a deleted account returns 410, but
get_account_info would return 404 since the 410 came from the
account controller *after* GETorHEAD_base ran. Now
get_account_info returns 410 as well.
* cache validity period (recheck_account_existence and
recheck_container_existence) is now communicated to
get_account_info via an X-Backend header. This way,
get_account_info doesn't need a reference to the
swift.proxy.server.Application object.
* both logged swift_source values are now correct for
get_container_info calls; before, on a cold cache,
get_container_info would call get_account_info but not pass along
swift_source, resulting in get_account_info logging "GET_INFO" as
the source. Amusingly, there was a unit test asserting this bogus
behavior.
* callers that modify the return value of get_account_info or of
get_container_info don't modify what's stored in swift.infocache.
* get_account_info on an account that *can* be autocreated but has
not been will return a 200, same as a HEAD request. The old
behavior was a 404 from get_account_info but a 200 from
HEAD. Callers can tell the difference by looking at
info['account_really_exists'] if they need to know the difference
(there is one call site that needs to know, in container
PUT). Note: this is for all accounts when the proxy's
"account_autocreate" setting is on.
Change-Id: I5167714025ec7237f7e6dd4759c2c6eb959b3fca
Previously, if you called get_account_info, get_container_info, or
get_object_info, then the results of that call would be cached in the
WSGI environment as top-level keys. This is okay, except that if you,
in middleware, copy the WSGI environment and then make a subrequest
using the copy, information retrieved in the subrequest is cached
only in the copy and not in the original. This can mean lots of extra
trips to memcache for, say, SLO validation where the segments are in
another container; the object HEAD ends up getting container info for
the segment container, but then the next object HEAD gets it again.
This commit moves the cache for get_*_info into a dictionary at
environ['swift.infocache']; this way, you can shallow-copy the request
environment and still get the benefits from the cache.
Change-Id: I3481b38b41c33cd1e39e19baab56193c5f9bf6ac
Requiring 2/2 backends for PUT requests means that the cluster can't
tolerate a single failure. Likewise, if you have 4 replicas in 2
regions, requiring 3/4 on a POST request means you cannot POST with
your inter-region link down or congested.
This changes the (replication) quorum size in the proxy to be at least
half the nodes instead of a majority of the nodes.
Daemons that were looking for a majority remain unchanged. The
container reconciler, replicator, and updater still require majorities
so their functioning is unchanged.
Odd numbers of replicas are unaffected by this commit.
Change-Id: I3b07ff0222aba6293ad7d60afe1747acafbe6ce4
There are some unit test cases which assumes 200 as the response
of PUT request, but 200 is never returned in PUT.
This patch replaces 200 in PUT by 201, and adapt unit test cases
to real case.
Change-Id: I35fc7a4fe7fcc5558a9e6c6371105793c2710f3e
This patch provides unit tests to check responses for various situation
in three/four replicas env.
Change-Id: I1af48728b28da9780a2a78f3110e1c7487047ff8
The assert_() method is deprecated and can be safely replaced by assertTrue().
This patch makes sure that running the tests does not create undesired
warnings.
Change-Id: I0602ba39ef93263386644ee68088d5f65fcb4a71
Objects now have a storage policy index associated with them as well;
this is determined by their filesystem path. Like before, objects in
policy 0 are in /srv/node/$disk/objects; this provides compatibility
on upgrade. (Recall that policy 0 is given to all existing data when a
cluster is upgraded.) Objects in policy 1 are in
/srv/node/$disk/objects-1, objects in policy 2 are in
/srv/node/$disk/objects-2, and so on.
* 'quarantined' dir already created 'objects' subdir so now there
will also be objects-N created at the same level
This commit does not address replicators, auditors, or updaters except
where method signatures changed. They'll still work if your cluster
has only one storage policy, though.
DocImpact
Implements: blueprint storage-policies
Change-Id: I459f3ed97df516cb0c9294477c28729c30f48e09
Prior to this patch both mainline code and testing modules imported
and used constraints directly into their own namespace, or relied on
the namespace of other modules that were not the constraints
module. This meant that if a unit test wanted to change a constraint
for its operation, it had to know how that module was using the
constraint, instead of referencing the constraint module itself.
This patch unifies the use of constraints so that all constraints are
referenced via the constraints module. In turn, this allows a test to
leverage the re-loadable nature of the constraints in the constraints
module.
It addition, a number of functional tests where using the default
values for constraints, instead of the configured value discovered in
a test.conf or in an existing swift.conf. This patch removes those
direct references in favor of the load_constraint() method from the
test/functional/tests.py module.
Change-Id: Ia5313d653c667dd9ca800786de59b59334c34eaa
* Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control
* Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion
* Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth
X-Account-Access-Control Header
-------------------------------
Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other
form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque
string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded
dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the
knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a
starting point.
The reference implementation describes three levels of account access:
"admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control
features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will
automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON
dictionary header format.
The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written
by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but
now also any user on the "admin" ACL.
Access Levels:
Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this
list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in
the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get
a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container,
retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the
account, any container, or any object.
Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this
list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user
with read-write account access can create new containers, set any
unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers,
etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any
PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account).
Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of
identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access
can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers
and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of
X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or
admin access to other users.
The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header,
if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level
descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems.
When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new
format_acl() method, described below.
New ACL Format
--------------
The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the
existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several
reasons for this:
* Container ACL format does not support Unicode
* Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs
+ account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings
+ accounts have additional "admin" access level
+ account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more
appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing
container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access
In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom,
so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next
version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the
following benefits:
* JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages
* no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named
".rlistings" if you want)
* forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but
your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception
I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default
to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped
to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite
V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already,
but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration.
TempAuth Account ACL Implementation
-----------------------------------
As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the
X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners),
for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the
account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests
by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of
this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for
defining the content of the header and taking action based on it.
In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format
to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl
module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch
also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth
now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes
GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes
PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc.
Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to
add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not
the auth system) is responsible for that.
DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in
summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in
swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring.
I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed.
Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
Middleware or core features may need to store metadata
against accounts or containers. This patch adds a
generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted
in backend databases, without polluting the user
metadata namespace, by using the reserved header
namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*.
Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist
system metadata headers alongside user metadata and
other system state.
For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT
and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user
metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for
object requests.
Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that
headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through
in requests to backend servers.
Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers
in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info
dict, which middleware can access.
Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided
which filters all system metadata headers from requests
and responses by removing headers with names starting
x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper
also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in
anticipation of future support for system metadata being
set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or
reading system metadata.
The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is
modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that
if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the
pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close
to the start of the pipeline.
blueprint cluster-federation
Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
The proxy server was calling swob.Request.path_info_pop() prior to
instantiating a controller so that req.path_info was just /a/c/o (sans
/v1). The version got moved over into SCRIPT_NAME.
This lead to some unfortunate behavior when trying to re-use a request
from middleware. Something like this:
# Imagine we're a WSGIContext object here.
#
# To start, SCRIPT_NAME = '' and PATH_INFO='/v1/a/c/o'
resp_iter = self._app_call(env, start_response)
# Now SCRIPT_NAME='/v1' and PATH_INFO ='/a/c/o'
if something_special in self._response_headers:
env['REQUEST_METHOD'] = 'GET'
env.pop('HTTP_RANGE', None)
# 404 SURPRISE! The proxy calls path_info_pop() again,
# and now SCRIPT_NAME='/v1/a' and PATH_INFO='/c/o', so this
# gets treated as a container request. Yikes.
resp_iter = self._app_call(env, start_response)
Now we just leave SCRIPT_NAME and PATH_INFO alone. To make life easy
for everyone who does want just /a/c/o, I defined
swob.Request.swift_entity_path, which just strips off the /v1.
Note that there's still one call to path_info_pop() in tempauth, but
that's only for requests going to /auth, so it won't affect Swift API
requests. It might be a good idea to remove that one later, but let's
do one thing at a time.
Change-Id: I87557a11c01f3f3889b610578cda6ba7d3933e7a
These are headers that will be stripped unless the WSGI environment
contains a true value for 'swift_owner'. The exact definition of a
swift_owner is up to the auth system in use, but usually indicates
administrative responsibilities.
DocImpact
Change-Id: I972772fbbd235414e00130ca663428e8750cabca
The proxy can now be configured to prefer local object servers for PUT
requests, where "local" is governed by the "write_affinity". The
"write_affinity_node_count" setting controls how many local object
servers to try before giving up and going on to remote ones.
I chose to simply re-order the object servers instead of filtering out
nonlocal ones so that, if all of the local ones are down, clients can
still get successful responses (just slower).
The goal is to trade availability for throughput. By writing to local
object servers across fast LAN links, clients get better throughput
than if the object servers were far away over slow WAN links. The
downside, of course, is that data availability (not durability) may
suffer when drives fail.
The default configuration has no write affinity in it, so the default
behavior is unchanged.
Added some words about these settings to the admin guide.
DocImpact
Change-Id: I09a0bd00524544ff627a3bccdcdc48f40720a86e
Consolidate the different ways in which info of account/container
is gathered, cached, used, updated, etc.
This refactoring increases code reuse and is a basis for later
addition of account ACLs.
Changing the get_info users is left for future.
This staged approach ensures the behaviour is unchanged.
Change-Id: I67b58030d3f9e3bc86bcd7ece0f1dc693c4e08c3
Fixes: Bug #1162199
