I changed asserts with more specific assert methods.
e.g.: from assertTrue(sth == None) to assertIsNone(*) or
assertTrue(isinstance(inst, type)) to assertIsInstace(inst, type) or
assertTrue(not sth) to assertFalse(sth).
The code gets more readable, and a better description will be shown on fail.
Change-Id: I80ec96e0b729bef38213a6be4ff4b6eb65c7612d
This patch changes functional test classes to subclass
unittest2.TestCase rather than unittest.TestCase.
This fixes errors when attempting to use
tox -e func -- -n <test_path_including_test_method>
and
tox -e func -- --until-failure
Also migrate from using nose.SkipTest to unittest2.SkipTest
Change-Id: I903033f5e01833550b2f2b945894edca4233c4a2
Closes-Bug: 1526725
Co-Authored-By: Ganesh Maharaj Mahalingam <ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com>
Defcore uses Tempest, which uses Test Repository.
This change makes it easier for Defcore to pull functional
tests from Swift and run them. Additionally, using testr
allows tests to be run in parallel.
Concurrency set to 1 for now, >1 causes failures for
reasons that are still TBD.
With switch to ostestr all the server logs are being sent to stdout
which makes it completely unreadable. Suppressing the logs by default
now with a flag to enable it if desired.
Co-Authored-By: John Dickinson <me@not.mn>
Co-Authored-By: Robert Collins <rbtcollins@hpe.com>
Co-Authored-By: Matthew Oliver <matt@oliver.net.au>
Co-Authored-By: Ganesh Maharaj Mahalingam <ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com>
Change-Id: I53ef4a116996a772cf1f3abc2eb0ad60047322d5
Related-Bug: 1177924
We have a bunch of assertions like
self.assertTrue(resp.status in (200, 204))
Sometimes we get smart about failure messages and have something like
self.assertTrue(resp.status in (200, 204), resp.status)
so we can see what the status was when it failed.
Since we don't have to support Python 2.6 any more, we can use
assertIn/assertNotIn and get nice failure messages for free.
Change-Id: I2d46c9969d41207a89e01017b4c2bc533c3d744f
The assert_() method is deprecated and can be safely replaced by assertTrue().
This patch makes sure that running the tests does not generate warnings
all over the screen.
Change-Id: I74705c6498249337bfdf955d62e0ad972035bc1f
This patch adds a test for a 204 when a single metadata item in a POST causes
the backend aggregate constraints check to be on the border.
Background:
Overall metadata size constraint is enforced in the container and
account backends as well as in the proxy controllers.
Whereas the proxy controller can check that constraints are not exceeded
by a single PUT or POST request, the backend checks that constraints are not
exceeded by the aggregate of all PUTs and POSTs.
The change [1] added a test for a 400 when a single metadata item in
a POST causes the backend aggregate constraints check to go over limit.
[1] I1489e29686013cbd3d70283d8756b548aea3c2e1
Change-Id: Iac86ea71240ddde177e625c279c21aef67659d10
Overall metadata size constraint is enforced in the container and account
backends as well as in the proxy controllers. Whereas the proxy controller
can check that constraints are not exceeded by a single PUT or POST request,
the backend checks that constraints are not exceeded by the aggregate of all
PUTs and POSTs.
The current functional tests only exercise the proxy controller checks, since
they test for a 400 when sending excessive metadata in a single POST. This patch
adds a test for a 400 when a single metadata item in a POST causes the backend
aggregate constraints check to go over limit.
The extra coverage of the new assertions can be seen by modifying
swift/common/db.DatabasBroker.validate_metadata() to always return None
immediately - only the new assertions fail when functests are run.
Change-Id: I1489e29686013cbd3d70283d8756b548aea3c2e1
Currently metadata limits are checked on a per request basis. If
multiple requests are sent within the per request limits, it is
possible to exceed the overall limits. This patch adds an overall
metadata check to ensure that multiple requests to add metadata to
an account/container will check overall limits before adding
the additional metadata.
Change-Id: Ib9401a4ee05a9cb737939541bd9b84e8dc239c70
Closes-Bug: 1365350
The keystoneauth middleware supports cross-tenant access
control using the syntax <tenant>:<user> in container ACLs,
where <tenant> and <user> may currently be either a unique
id or a name. As a result of the keystone v3 API introducing
domains, names are no longer globally unique and are only
unique within a domain. The use of unqualified tenant and
user names in this ACL syntax is therefore not 'safe' in a
keystone v3 environment.
This patch modifies keystoneauth to restrict cross-tenant
ACL matching to use only ids for accounts that are not in
the default domain. For backwards compatibility,
names will still be matched in ACLs when both the requesting
user and tenant are known to be in the default domain AND the
account's tenant is also in the default domain (the default
domain being the domain to which existing tenants are
migrated).
Accounts existing prior to this patch are assumed to be for
tenants in the default domain. New accounts created using a
v2 token scoped on the tenant are also assumed to be in the
default domain. New accounts created using a v3 token scoped
on the tenant will learn their domain membership from the
token info. New accounts created using any unscoped token,
(i.e. with a reselleradmin role) will have unknown domain
membership and therefore be assumed to NOT be in the default
domain.
Despite this provision for backwards compatibility, names
must no longer be used when setting new ACLs in any account,
including new accounts in the default domain.
This change obviously impacts users accustomed to specifying
cross-tenant ACLs in terms of names, and further work will be
necessary to restore those use cases. Some ideas are
discussed under the bug report. With that caveat, this patch
removes the reported vulnerability when using
swift/keystoneauth with a keystone v3 API.
Note: to observe the new 'restricted' behaviour you will need
to setup keystone user(s) and tenant(s) in a non-default domain
and set auth_version = v3.0 in the auth_token middleware config
section of proxy-server.conf. You may also benefit from the
keystone v3 enabled swiftclient patch under review here:
https://review.openstack.org/#/c/91788/
DocImpact
blueprint keystone-v3-support
Closes-Bug: #1299146
Change-Id: Ib32df093f7450f704127da77ff06b595f57615cb
* additional container tests
* refactor test cross policy copy
* make functional tests cleanup better
In-process functional tests only define a single ring and will skip some of
the multi-storage policy tests, but have been updated to reload_policies with
the patched swift.conf.
DocImpact
Implements: blueprint storage-policies
Change-Id: If17bc7b9737558d3b9a54eeb6ff3e6b51463f002
Merge the swift_testing module into the functional test module itself,
so that we can read the configuration once for all unit tests, sharing
the same constraints.
Change-Id: I9fbbfdade9adca329cd79f7d4291ba009327c842
Prior to this patch both mainline code and testing modules imported
and used constraints directly into their own namespace, or relied on
the namespace of other modules that were not the constraints
module. This meant that if a unit test wanted to change a constraint
for its operation, it had to know how that module was using the
constraint, instead of referencing the constraint module itself.
This patch unifies the use of constraints so that all constraints are
referenced via the constraints module. In turn, this allows a test to
leverage the re-loadable nature of the constraints in the constraints
module.
It addition, a number of functional tests where using the default
values for constraints, instead of the configured value discovered in
a test.conf or in an existing swift.conf. This patch removes those
direct references in favor of the load_constraint() method from the
test/functional/tests.py module.
Change-Id: Ia5313d653c667dd9ca800786de59b59334c34eaa
* Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control
* Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion
* Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth
X-Account-Access-Control Header
-------------------------------
Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other
form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque
string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded
dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the
knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a
starting point.
The reference implementation describes three levels of account access:
"admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control
features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will
automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON
dictionary header format.
The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written
by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but
now also any user on the "admin" ACL.
Access Levels:
Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this
list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in
the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get
a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container,
retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the
account, any container, or any object.
Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this
list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user
with read-write account access can create new containers, set any
unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers,
etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any
PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account).
Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of
identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access
can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers
and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of
X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or
admin access to other users.
The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header,
if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level
descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems.
When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new
format_acl() method, described below.
New ACL Format
--------------
The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the
existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several
reasons for this:
* Container ACL format does not support Unicode
* Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs
+ account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings
+ accounts have additional "admin" access level
+ account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more
appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing
container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access
In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom,
so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next
version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the
following benefits:
* JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages
* no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named
".rlistings" if you want)
* forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but
your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception
I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default
to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped
to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite
V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already,
but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration.
TempAuth Account ACL Implementation
-----------------------------------
As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the
X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners),
for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the
account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests
by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of
this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for
defining the content of the header and taking action based on it.
In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format
to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl
module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch
also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth
now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes
GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes
PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc.
Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to
add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not
the auth system) is responsible for that.
DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in
summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in
swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring.
I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed.
Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
Move the tests from functionalnosetests under functional, so we no
longer have two seperate trees for functional tests. This also drops
the 'nose' name from the directory, so that it doesn't end up with
confusion if we move to testr. Further, since there are no longer two
test runs in .functests, it nows looks very close to the other two.
Change-Id: I8de025c29d71f05072e257df24899927b82c1382
