Merge "Security Planning shall support customer expectations"
This commit is contained in:
Zuul
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commit
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doc/source/.vscode/settings.json
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doc/source/.vscode/settings.json
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@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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{
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"restructuredtext.confPath": ""
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"restructuredtext.confPath": "",
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"esbonio.sphinx.confDir": ""
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
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.. _container-security-df8a251ec03f:
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===========================
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Container Security Planning
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===========================
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The following container security best practices are recommended as part of your
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network security planning.
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Restrict Direct (SSH) Access to Kubernetes Nodes
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------------------------------------------------
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To reduce the risk of unauthorized access to host resources, only system
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administrators should be allowed SSH access to |prod| nodes. Non-system admin
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users should be restricted to helm and kubectl for remote access.
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Use Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
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------------------------------------
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Define RBAC policies to exercise strict control over permissions granted to
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non-admin users. Restrict non-admin users to the minimum level of privileges.
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Use Namespaces
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--------------
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Use Namespaces to partition application resources into logical groups to allow
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the creation of RBAC policies to managing access to these resources as a whole.
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Use Network Policies
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--------------------
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Use network policies to restrict pod-to-pod traffic to approved profiles.
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Segregate Sensitive Workloads
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-----------------------------
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Use a combination of node taints and pod toleration to ensure that pods do not
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get scheduled onto inappropriate nodes.
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For sole-tenant nodes, use node selectors to segregate applications from
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tenants on different worker nodes to minimize container-escape scope to
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applications of the sole-tenant.
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Define Resource Quotas and Resource Limits Policies
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---------------------------------------------------
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Do not allow the configuration of resource-unbounded containers as this puts
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the system at risk of Denial-of-Service or “noisy neighbor” scenarios.
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Specify Minimal-Required Security Context for Pods
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--------------------------------------------------
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Explicitly specify the minimal-required security context for pods, containers
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and volumes through pod security policies, for example:
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- runAsNonRoot
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- Capabilities
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- readOnlyRootFilesystem
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---------------
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Kata Containers
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---------------
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Kata containers are an optional capability on |prod| that provide a secure
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container runtime with lightweight virtual machines that feel and perform like
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containers, but provide stronger workload isolation. For improved performance
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wrt isolation, Kata containers leverages hardware-enforced isotation with
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virtualization VT extensions.
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For more information, see :ref:`starlingx-kubernetes-user-tutorials-overview`.
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---------------------
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Pod Security Policies
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---------------------
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Pod security policies provide a cluster-level resource that controls the use
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of security-sensitive aspects of Pod security. PodSecurityPolicies (PSP) define
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different levels of access to security-sensitive aspects of the pod. RBAC
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[Cluster]Roles can then be created for these PSPs, with RBAC
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[Cluster]RoleBindings of these roles to a ‘subject’ (i.e. users, groups,
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serviceaccounts, etc.).
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The following considerations apply to PodSecurityPolicies (PSPs):
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- includes enabling or disabling options such as running as root, access to
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host filesystem, access to host networking, etc.
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- are disabled by default
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- can be enable by the System Administor via **system service-parameter-add
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kubernetes kube_apiserver admission_plugins=PodSecurityPolicy**
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|prod| provides default PSP and RBAC definitions to simplify initial
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usage:
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- Define a ‘restrictive’ and ‘privileged’ PSP, and corresponding
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representative RBAC Roles
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- Define initial RBAC RoleBindings for these roles such that:
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- cluster-admin can still perform anything / anywhere
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- authenticated users can only perform a restricted set of
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security-sensitive options on Pods and only in namespaces the user
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is allowed to access
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Administrator can then:
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- create other custom PodSecurityPolicies and associated RBAC Roles
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- create [Cluster]RoleBindings to the appropriate ‘subjects’.
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------------------------------------
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Container Image Signature Validation
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------------------------------------
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The Portieris admission controller allows you to enforce image security polices
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to:
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- enforce trust pinning and blocks creation of resources that use untrusted
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images
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- access trusted data in Notary server corresponding to the image
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For more information about Portieris, including installation instructions, see :ref:'portieris-overview'.
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@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
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:start-after: kub-begin
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:end-before: kub-end
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************
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------------
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Introduction
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************
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------------
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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@ -96,7 +96,47 @@ Security planning
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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security-planning-uefi-secure-boot-planning
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infrastructure-security
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container-security-df8a251ec03f
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Security hardening Guidelines
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*****************************
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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security-hardening-intro
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Recommended Security Features with a Minimal Performance Impact
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---------------------------------------------------------------
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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uefi-secure-boot
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Secure System Accounts
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----------------------
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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local-linux-account-for-sysadmin
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local-and-ldap-linux-user-accounts
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starlingx-accounts
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web-administration-login-timeout
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ssh-and-console-login-timeout
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system-account-password-rules
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Security Features
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-----------------
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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secure-https-external-connectivity
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security-hardening-firewall-options
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isolate-starlingx-internal-cloud-management-network
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**********************************
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Installation and resource planning
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189
doc/source/planning/kubernetes/infrastructure-security.rst
Executable file
189
doc/source/planning/kubernetes/infrastructure-security.rst
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
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.. qzw1552672165570
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.. _infrastructure_security:
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=======================
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Infrastructure Security
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=======================
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A key aspect of planning your installation and configuration is addressing
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infrastructure security. By planning your configuration to include industry
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standard best practices prior to deployment, you can reduce the risk of
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security and compliance issues.
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---------------------------------------
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|prod| Infrastructure Security Features
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---------------------------------------
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The security features listed below are available with |prod| and should be
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included in your infrastructure security planning.
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- Regular CVE scanning and fixing of |prod| Platform’s CentOS Kernel and RPM
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Packages
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- UEFI Secure Boot on |prod| Hosts
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- Signed boot loaders, initramfs, kernel and kernel modules
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- Signed in formal builds with |prod| private key on |prod| secure
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signing server
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- Validated by board-specific UEFI Secure Boot Firmware
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For more information, see :ref:`Kubernetes_UEFI_Secure_Boot_Planning`
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- Signed ISOs and Patches/Updates
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- Signed in formal builds with |prod| private key on |prod| secure
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signing server
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- Public key built into ISO and patch signature validation code
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- Signatures checked on load import and update import commands
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- Authentication and Authorization on all interfaces of:
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- SSH / Local Console (local LDAP)
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- Linux User/Group Permissions
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- Linux sudo
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- |prod| REST APIs/CLIs (Keystone - local DB)
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- Keystone Roles - admin, member
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- Kubernetes APIs/CLIs (Service Accounts and Remote LDAP / Windows
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Active Directory via OIDC/DEX)
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- K8S RBAC Policies
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- |prod| Dashboard Webserver (Keystone - Local DB)
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- Keystone Roles - admin, member
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- Local Docker Registry (Keystone - Local DB)
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- Keystone - admin, non-admin user
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- HTTPS Support for all external Platform endpoints including:
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- System, Kubernetes, local docker registry REST APIs
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- Platform Dashboard Webserver
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- Certificate Management for K8S Certificates
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- Bootstrap configured K8S Root CA Certificates (auto-generated or
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user-specified)
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- Cron Jobs for renewing K8S server & client Certificates
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- Procedure for updating K8S Root CA Certificate
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- Certificate Management for HTTPS Platform endpoints (StarlingX APIs,
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Registry, OIDC, …) including use of Cert-Manager for install and
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auto-renewal of Certificates
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- Trusted CA Management for local client-side certificate validation
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- Alarming of soon-to-expired and expired Certificates
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- ‘show-certs.sh’ for displaying status and residual time for all
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certificates.
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- Secure (HTTPS) Platform management network communication in Distributed
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Cloud providing secure management network connectivity between the system
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controller and subclouds with auto-renewal of certificates
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- OAM / API Firewall includes default firewall rules automatically applied
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and customer modifiable through Calico network policies
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- Helm v3 support including the removal of the default use of Helmv2/Tiller
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(insecure)
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- Secure User Management including:
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- User Password Complexity enforcement
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- User forced log out on idle activity
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- User temporary lock out on N consecutive authentication failures
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- Audit logs for operator commands and authentication events
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- Shell commands (on SSH / Local Console)
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- StarlingX REST APIs / CLIs
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- All logs can be sent to external Log Server using Wind River Analytics
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application
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- Linux Auditd support for running on all hosts with configurable rules
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- OpenScap Modules included in Host ISO
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- Security Services for Hosted Applications including:
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- Cert Manager support including integration of the cert-manager project
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to automate the management and issuance of TLS certificates from
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various issuing sources (e.g. interface with external CA for
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certificate signing, auto-renewal of certificates)
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- Secure secret management and storage (Hashicorp Vault) with the
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integration of upstream Hashicorp Vault project and Support Vault
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general secret management for hosted applications
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.. _Kubernetes_UEFI_Secure_Boot_Planning:
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|
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------------------------------------
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Kubernetes UEFI Secure Boot Planning
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------------------------------------
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|
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|UEFI| Secure Boot Planning allows you to authenticate modules before they are
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allowed to execute.
|
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|
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The initial installation of |prod| should be done in |UEFI| mode if you plan on
|
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using the secure boot feature in the future.
|
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|
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The |prod| secure boot certificate can be found in the |prod| ISO, on the EFI
|
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bootable FAT filesystem. The file is in the directory /CERTS. You must add this
|
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certificate database to the motherboard's |UEFI| certificate database. How to
|
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add this certificate to the database is determined by the |UEFI| implementation
|
||||
provided by the motherboard manufacturer.
|
||||
|
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You may need to work with your hardware vendor to have the certificate
|
||||
installed.
|
||||
|
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There is an option in the |UEFI| setup utility that allows a user to browse to
|
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a file containing a certificate to be loaded in the authorized database. This
|
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option may be hidden in the |UEFI| setup utility unless |UEFI| mode is enabled,
|
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and secure boot is enabled.
|
||||
|
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Many motherboards ship with Microsoft secure boot certificates pre-programmed
|
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in the |UEFI| certificate database. These certificates may be required to boot
|
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|UEFI| drivers for video cards, |RAID| controllers, or |NICs| \(for example,
|
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the |PXE| boot software for a |NIC| may have been signed by a Microsoft
|
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certificate\). While certificates can be removed from the certificate database
|
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\(this is |UEFI| implementation specific\) it may be required that you keep the
|
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Microsoft certificates to allow for complete system operation.
|
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|
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Mixed combinations of secure boot and non-secure boot nodes are supported. For
|
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example, a controller node may secure boot, while a worker node may not. Secure
|
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boot must be enabled in the |UEFI| firmware of each node for that node to be
|
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protected by secure boot.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _security-planning-uefi-secure-boot-planning-ul-h4z-lzg-bjb:
|
||||
|
||||
- Secure Boot is supported in |UEFI| installations only. It is not used when
|
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booting |prod| as a legacy boot target.
|
||||
|
||||
- |prod| does not currently support switching from legacy to |UEFI| mode
|
||||
after a system has been installed. Doing so requires a reinstall of the
|
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system. This means that upgrading from a legacy install to a secure boot
|
||||
install \(|UEFI|\) is not supported.
|
||||
|
||||
- When upgrading a |prod| system from a version that did not support secure
|
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boot to a version that does, do not enable secure boot in |UEFI| firmware
|
||||
until the upgrade is complete.
|
||||
@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
|
||||
|
||||
.. qzw1552672165570
|
||||
.. _security-planning-uefi-secure-boot-planning:
|
||||
|
||||
====================================
|
||||
Kubernetes UEFI Secure Boot Planning
|
||||
====================================
|
||||
|
||||
|UEFI| Secure Boot Planning allows you to authenticate modules before they are
|
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allowed to execute.
|
||||
|
||||
The initial installation of |prod| should be done in |UEFI| mode if you plan on
|
||||
using the secure boot feature in the future.
|
||||
|
||||
The |prod| secure boot certificate can be found in the |prod| ISO, on the EFI
|
||||
bootable FAT filesystem. The file is in the directory /CERTS. You must add this
|
||||
certificate database to the motherboard's |UEFI| certificate database. How to
|
||||
add this certificate to the database is determined by the |UEFI| implementation
|
||||
provided by the motherboard manufacturer.
|
||||
|
||||
You may need to work with your hardware vendor to have the certificate
|
||||
installed.
|
||||
|
||||
There is an option in the |UEFI| setup utility that allows a user to browse to
|
||||
a file containing a certificate to be loaded in the authorized database. This
|
||||
option may be hidden in the |UEFI| setup utility unless |UEFI| mode is enabled,
|
||||
and secure boot is enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
Many motherboards ship with Microsoft secure boot certificates pre-programmed
|
||||
in the |UEFI| certificate database. These certificates may be required to boot
|
||||
|UEFI| drivers for video cards, |RAID| controllers, or |NICs| \(for example,
|
||||
the |PXE| boot software for a |NIC| may have been signed by a Microsoft
|
||||
certificate\). While certificates can be removed from the certificate database
|
||||
\(this is |UEFI| implementation specific\) it may be required that you keep the
|
||||
Microsoft certificates to allow for complete system operation.
|
||||
|
||||
Mixed combinations of secure boot and non-secure boot nodes are supported. For
|
||||
example, a controller node may secure boot, while a worker node may not. Secure
|
||||
boot must be enabled in the |UEFI| firmware of each node for that node to be
|
||||
protected by secure boot.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _security-planning-uefi-secure-boot-planning-ul-h4z-lzg-bjb:
|
||||
|
||||
- Secure Boot is supported in |UEFI| installations only. It is not used when
|
||||
booting |prod| as a legacy boot target.
|
||||
|
||||
- |prod| does not currently support switching from legacy to |UEFI| mode
|
||||
after a system has been installed. Doing so requires a reinstall of the
|
||||
system. This means that upgrading from a legacy install to a secure boot
|
||||
install \(|UEFI|\) is not supported.
|
||||
|
||||
- When upgrading a |prod| system from a version that did not support secure
|
||||
boot to a version that does, do not enable secure boot in |UEFI| firmware
|
||||
until the upgrade is complete.
|
||||
@ -8,5 +8,4 @@ UEFI Secure Boot Planning
|
||||
|
||||
You may want to plan for utilizing the supported |UEFI| secure boot feature.
|
||||
|
||||
See :ref:`Kubernetes UEFI Secure Boot Planning
|
||||
<security-planning-uefi-secure-boot-planning>` for details.
|
||||
See :ref:`infrastructure_security` for details.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -224,46 +224,6 @@ Security Feature Configuration for Spectre and Meltdown
|
||||
|
||||
security-feature-configuration-for-spectre-and-meltdown
|
||||
|
||||
*****************************
|
||||
Security Hardening Guidelines
|
||||
*****************************
|
||||
|
||||
.. toctree::
|
||||
:maxdepth: 1
|
||||
|
||||
security-hardening-intro
|
||||
|
||||
Recommended Security Features with a Minimal Performance Impact
|
||||
***************************************************************
|
||||
|
||||
.. toctree::
|
||||
:maxdepth: 1
|
||||
|
||||
uefi-secure-boot
|
||||
|
||||
Secure System Accounts
|
||||
**********************
|
||||
|
||||
.. toctree::
|
||||
:maxdepth: 1
|
||||
|
||||
local-linux-account-for-sysadmin
|
||||
local-and-ldap-linux-user-accounts
|
||||
starlingx-accounts
|
||||
web-administration-login-timeout
|
||||
ssh-and-console-login-timeout
|
||||
system-account-password-rules
|
||||
|
||||
Security Features
|
||||
*****************
|
||||
|
||||
.. toctree::
|
||||
:maxdepth: 1
|
||||
|
||||
secure-https-external-connectivity
|
||||
security-hardening-firewall-options
|
||||
isolate-starlingx-internal-cloud-management-network
|
||||
|
||||
************************
|
||||
Deprecated Functionality
|
||||
************************
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user