8e6824ec91
We add patches to fix CVEs for grub instead of upgrading because grub2/grub-efi is ported from yocto for secure boot bringing up. The patches for CVE-2022-28736 have conflicts with the patches for secure boot. So refer to below link to fix this CVE: (1) https://patchwork.yoctoproject.org/project/oe-core/patch/ 20221207034254.58292-1-xiangyu.chen@eng.windriver.com/ (2)https://github.com/jiazhang0/meta-secure-core/pull/257 The special patches for grub-efi are from layers meta-lat and meta-secure-core of yocto upstream, which are based on the patches for grub-efi in oe-core layer (including CVE patches). We used to mix all the patches together. Now we will move the patches from meta-lat and meta-secure-core to the end of sequence for applying patches, so that we can keep align with yocto upstream and make it easier to maintain the grub here. Since there are many patches involved here, we don't change the number in patches' name in case confusion is caused if we rename many files. Below commits are added for the CVE: <loader/efi/chainloader: Simplify the loader state> <commands/boot: Add API to pass context to loader> <loader/efi/chainloader: Use grub_loader_set_ex()> Below patches for secure boot are adapted for conflicts with above: secure-core/0009 <efi: chainloader: port shim to grub> secure-core/0010 <efi: chainloader: use shim to load and verify an image> secure-core/0012 <efi: chainloader: take care of unload undershim> All of them are aligned with upstream and no changes here. Test plan: - PASS: build grub2/grub-efi. - PASS: build-image and install and boot up on lab/qemu. - PASS: check that the "stx.N" version number is right for both bios(grub2 ver) and uefi(grub-efi ver) boot. - PASS: the tests are done on lab with secure boot disabled and enabled. Closes-Bug: #2034119 Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com> Change-Id: I9a37cd8b804b238407f8ac6528f087a2eb0cf2de
33 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff
33 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff
From d06de03facd9a330a2085450abeecb1b7e637f9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
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Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2016 12:58:10 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] chainloader: handle the unauthenticated image by shim
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Upstream-Status: Pending
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EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is another case whenever an unauthenticated image is loaded
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by UEFI LoadImage() boot service. Shim verification protocol should handle
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this case as EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION.
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Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
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---
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grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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index 285271d..9ff4faf 100644
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--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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+++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
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@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ grub_cmd_chainloader (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
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goto fail;
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}
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/* try with shim */
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- else if (status == GRUB_EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
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+ else if ((status == GRUB_EFI_ACCESS_DENIED) || (status == GRUB_EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION))
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{
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status = grub_shim_load_image (address, size, &context);
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if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
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--
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2.17.1
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