Add security segregation usecase

Change-Id: I5a1ff68e3dc89ef9cda07ac80c7d75dcca5e1d03
changes/99/163399/11
Daniel Schabarum 8 years ago
parent 40eb43b886
commit e8e502e5b6
  1. 195
      usecases/sec_segregation.rst

@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
..
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
..
======================================
Security Segregation (Placement Zones)
======================================
The goal of this use-case is to present the need for a (partly) segregation
of physical resources to support the well-known classic separation of DMZ
and MZ, which is still needed by several applications (VNFs) and requested
by telco security rules.
Glossary
========
**AZ**
Availability Zone (OpenStack terminology)
**DMZ**
Demilitarized Zone provides access to the public network,
but adds an additional security layer (e.g. virtual firewall). Designed for
security critical customer facing services (e.g. customer control center).
**EHD**
Exposed Host Domain provides direct access from the public network (e.g.
Internet).
Designed for services which require a high traffic volume (e.g. CDN) and are
not security critical.
**MZ**
Militarized Zone is a logical network without any access from the public
network. Designed for systems without direct customer connectivity (e.g.
databases containing sensitive data) and high security demands.
**PZ**
Placement Zone is a concept to classify different securiy areas based on
different security requirements. PZ are separated on a per host basis.
**SEC**
Secure Network Zone for all devices providing a security function including
devices providing connectivity between Placement Zones (e.g. virtual firewall
for DMZ-MZ traffic).
**VNF**
Virtual Network Function is an implementation of an functional building block
within a network infrastructure that can be deployed on a virtualization
infrastructure or rather an OpenStack based cloud platform (a non virtualized
network function is today often a physical appliance).
Problem description
===================
The main driver therefore is that a vulnerability
of a single system must not affect further critical systems or endanger
exposure of sensitive data. On the one side the benefits of virtualization
and automation techniques are mandatory for telcos but on the other side
telecommunication data and involved systems must be protected by the
highest level of security and comply to local regulatory laws (which are
often more strict in comparison with enterprise).
Placement Zones should act as multiple lines of defense against a security
breach. If a security breach happens in a placement zone, all other
placement zones and related VNFs must not be affected. This must be ensured
by the design.
This use case affects all of the main OpenStack modules.
Current Situation
-----------------
Today the DMZ and MZ concept is an essential part of the security design
of nearly every telco application deployment. Today this separation is
done by a consequent physical segregation including hosts, network and
management systems. This separation leads to high investment and
operational costs.
Enable the following
--------------------
Placement Zones should be used to reduce the risk that the whole cloud platform
is affected by a serious security breach.
If the hypervisor is breached, there is a risk to all of the VNFs on that
hypervisor. To reduce this risk, a physical separation of VMs not assigned to
the same security class is necessary. Placement Zones should be used to ensure
that only VMs following the same security classification will run on the same
group of physical hosts.
This should avoid a mix of VMs from different zones (e.g. DMZ and MZ),
coming up with different security requirements, running on the same group
of hosts. Therefore a host (respectively multiple hosts) must be classified
and assigned to only one placement zone. During the deployment process of a
VM it must be possible to assign it to one placement zone (or use the
default one), which automatically leads to a grouping of VMs.
The security separation within the network can be done on a logical layer
using the same physical elements but adding segregation through VLANs
(Virtual LAN), virtual firewalls and other overlay techniques.
The security separation for virtual machine storage can be done on a logical
layer. It must be ensured that a hypervisor belonging to a specific placement
zone can not access the storage of a different placement zone. Otherwise an
attacker could inject malicious code into the virtual disk of a VM.
Examples
--------
An application presentation layer (e.g. webserver) must be decoupled from
the systems containing sensitive data (e.g. database) through at least one
security enforcement device (e.g. virtual firewall) and a separation of
underlying infrastructure (hypervisor).
*Potential candidate for Group Based Policy with Service Function Chaining from
a network perspective? GBP would need updates for this concept.*
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/File:TelcoWG_Placementzones.png
Affected By
-----------
unknown
Requirements
============
* One OpenStack installation must be capable to manage different placement
zones. All resources (compute, network and storage) are assigned to one
placement zone. By default, all resources are assigned to the "default"
placement zone of OpenStack
* It must be possible to configure the allowed communication between
placement zones on the network layer
* SEC is a special placement zone - it provides the glue to connect the
placement zones on the network layer using VNFs. SEC VNFs may be attached to
resources of other placement zones
* Placement zone usage requires a permission (in SEC, tenants cannot start VMs,
this zone supports only the deployment of Xaas services FWaas, LBaas,...])
* If placement zones are required in a cloud, VMs must be assigned to one
placement zone
* All resources, which are needed to run a VM must belong to the same placement
zone
* Physical Hosts (compute nodes) must be able to assigned to only one placement
zone and re-assigning should possible due to changing utilization
* Several assignments must be restricted by the API
* If a host is reassigned it must evacuate all existing VM
* ...and the whole thing must be optional :-)
Related Use Cases
=================
none
Gaps
====
**Nova issues:**
* Usage of availability zone(AZ)/host aggregates to assign a vm to a placement
zone is feasable [Ref.1], but:
* By default a physical host can be assigned to multiple host aggregates
* It is up to the operator to ensure security using non OpenStack mechanisms
* Maybe Congress [Ref. 2] (Policy as a Service) could be a solution?
**Neutron issues:**
* AZs or PZs are not known to Neutron services
* It's up to the operator to ensure that the right networks are attached to VMs
**Cinder/Manila/Storage issues:**
* Storage can be segregated with volume-types
* AZs are not known to the storage services
* Must be ensured from the deployment tool that the right storage is accessible
**OpenStack regions** provide a segregation of all resources. The region concept
can be used to implement placement zones, but:
* Complex and resource consuming installation for the Openstack management
systems
* Tenants must deal with additional regions
* No L2 network sharing for VMs in the SEC placement zone required to glue the
zones together
* No real enforcement
* Complex operations
References
==========
* [1]: http://docs.openstack.org/openstack-ops/content/scaling.html
* [2]: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Congress
Loading…
Cancel
Save