Tag 3.19.1

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Merge tag '3.19.1'

Tag 3.19.1

Change-Id: I868905ac23b17c4644ec2195ad9a0423d252f213
This commit is contained in:
James E. Blair 2020-12-01 15:24:04 -08:00
commit 7b6473b4ca
1 changed files with 42 additions and 0 deletions

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---
security:
- |
A long-standing security vulnerability regarding executing code on
the executor was corrected.
The Zuul executor was designed to prohibit executing command or
shell tasks on the executor itself (i.e., localhost in Ansible)
from untrusted playbooks. Tobias Henkel discovered that this
check has been broken for some time, likely since June of 2018.
The use of bubblewrap means that any commands executed via this
vulnerability would still be contained within the restricted
environment, meaning that they can not access files outside of the
build directory or continue running longer than the job. However,
by executing arbitrary commands, users may have been able to
connect to unprotected internal network services.
Because this bug is so long-standing, it is possible, even likely,
that users may have accidentally come to rely on it. We
discovered two jobs in the zuul-jobs library which did so:
dco-license and promote-docker-image. The promote-docker-image
job has been altered so it no longer needs to run a command on the
executor. The dco-license job has been altered to run on a node.
If you would prefer to run it on the exceutor, you can create a
new job in a config-project that uses the validate-dco-license
role.
You may want to look for other jobs in your system which may be
affected by this. To aid in that, we have created a script which
will examine the job-output.json files created by previous builds
and output any tasks it finds which are now (once again)
prohibited. This script is available here:
https://opendev.org/zuul/zuul/src/branch/master/tools/find-untrusted-exec.py
fixes:
- |
The dependency on kazoo has been upgraded to 2.8.0 which has an important
fix for using Zookeeper over TLS.
- |
The Github access token URL has been updated in order to remove a
deprecation warning.