Merge "docs: Add SEV guide"
This commit is contained in:
Zuul
@@ -525,271 +525,6 @@ See `the KVM documentation
|
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<https://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Nested_Guests#Limitations>`_ for more
|
||||
information on these limitations.
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|
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.. _amd-sev:
|
||||
|
||||
AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization)
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
`Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)`__ is a technology from AMD which
|
||||
enables the memory for a VM to be encrypted with a key unique to the VM.
|
||||
SEV is particularly applicable to cloud computing since it can reduce the
|
||||
amount of trust VMs need to place in the hypervisor and administrator of
|
||||
their host system.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://developer.amd.com/sev/
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||||
|
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Nova supports SEV from the Train release onwards.
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||||
|
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Requirements for SEV
|
||||
--------------------
|
||||
|
||||
First the operator will need to ensure the following prerequisites are met:
|
||||
|
||||
- At least one of the Nova compute hosts must be AMD hardware capable
|
||||
of supporting SEV. It is entirely possible for the compute plane to
|
||||
be a mix of hardware which can and cannot support SEV, although as
|
||||
per the section on `Permanent limitations`_ below, the maximum
|
||||
number of simultaneously running guests with SEV will be limited by
|
||||
the quantity and quality of SEV-capable hardware available.
|
||||
|
||||
- An appropriately configured software stack on those compute hosts,
|
||||
so that the various layers are all SEV ready:
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||||
|
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- kernel >= 4.16
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- QEMU >= 2.12
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- libvirt >= 4.5
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- ovmf >= commit 75b7aa9528bd 2018-07-06
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||||
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.. _deploying-sev-capable-infrastructure:
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||||
|
||||
Deploying SEV-capable infrastructure
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||||
------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
In order for users to be able to use SEV, the operator will need to
|
||||
perform the following steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- Ensure that sufficient memory is reserved on the SEV compute hosts
|
||||
for host-level services to function correctly at all times. This is
|
||||
particularly important when hosting SEV-enabled guests, since they
|
||||
pin pages in RAM, preventing any memory overcommit which may be in
|
||||
normal operation on other compute hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
It is `recommended`__ to achieve this by configuring an ``rlimit`` at
|
||||
the ``/machine.slice`` top-level ``cgroup`` on the host, with all VMs
|
||||
placed inside that. (For extreme detail, see `this discussion on the
|
||||
spec`__.)
|
||||
|
||||
__ http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#memory-reservation-solutions
|
||||
__ https://review.opendev.org/#/c/641994/2/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.rst@167
|
||||
|
||||
An alternative approach is to configure the
|
||||
:oslo.config:option:`reserved_host_memory_mb` option in the
|
||||
``[DEFAULT]`` section of :file:`nova.conf`, based on the expected
|
||||
maximum number of SEV guests simultaneously running on the host, and
|
||||
the details provided in `an earlier version of the AMD SEV spec`__
|
||||
regarding memory region sizes, which cover how to calculate it
|
||||
correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/stein/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#proposed-change
|
||||
|
||||
See `the Memory Locking and Accounting section of the AMD SEV spec`__
|
||||
and `previous discussion for further details`__.
|
||||
|
||||
__ http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#memory-locking-and-accounting
|
||||
__ https://review.opendev.org/#/c/641994/2/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.rst@167
|
||||
|
||||
- A cloud administrator will need to define one or more SEV-enabled
|
||||
flavors :ref:`as described in the user guide
|
||||
<extra-specs-memory-encryption>`, unless it is sufficient for users
|
||||
to define SEV-enabled images.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally the cloud operator should consider the following optional
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
.. _num_memory_encrypted_guests:
|
||||
|
||||
- Configure the :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.num_memory_encrypted_guests`
|
||||
option in :file:`nova.conf` to represent the number of guests an SEV
|
||||
compute node can host concurrently with memory encrypted at the
|
||||
hardware level. For example:
|
||||
|
||||
.. code-block:: ini
|
||||
|
||||
[libvirt]
|
||||
num_memory_encrypted_guests = 15
|
||||
|
||||
This option exists because on AMD SEV-capable hardware, the memory
|
||||
controller has a fixed number of slots for holding encryption keys,
|
||||
one per guest. For example, at the time of writing, earlier
|
||||
generations of hardware only have 15 slots, thereby limiting the
|
||||
number of SEV guests which can be run concurrently to 15. Nova
|
||||
needs to track how many slots are available and used in order to
|
||||
avoid attempting to exceed that limit in the hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
At the time of writing (September 2019), work is in progress to
|
||||
allow QEMU and libvirt to expose the number of slots available on
|
||||
SEV hardware; however until this is finished and released, it will
|
||||
not be possible for Nova to programmatically detect the correct
|
||||
value.
|
||||
|
||||
So this configuration option serves as a stop-gap, allowing the
|
||||
cloud operator the option of providing this value manually. It may
|
||||
later be demoted to a fallback value for cases where the limit
|
||||
cannot be detected programmatically, or even removed altogether when
|
||||
Nova's minimum QEMU version guarantees that it can always be
|
||||
detected.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note::
|
||||
|
||||
When deciding whether to use the default of ``None`` or manually
|
||||
impose a limit, operators should carefully weigh the benefits
|
||||
vs. the risk. The benefits of using the default are a) immediate
|
||||
convenience since nothing needs to be done now, and b) convenience
|
||||
later when upgrading compute hosts to future versions of Nova,
|
||||
since again nothing will need to be done for the correct limit to
|
||||
be automatically imposed. However the risk is that until
|
||||
auto-detection is implemented, users may be able to attempt to
|
||||
launch guests with encrypted memory on hosts which have already
|
||||
reached the maximum number of guests simultaneously running with
|
||||
encrypted memory. This risk may be mitigated by other limitations
|
||||
which operators can impose, for example if the smallest RAM
|
||||
footprint of any flavor imposes a maximum number of simultaneously
|
||||
running guests which is less than or equal to the SEV limit.
|
||||
|
||||
- Configure :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.hw_machine_type` on all
|
||||
SEV-capable compute hosts to include ``x86_64=q35``, so that all
|
||||
x86_64 images use the ``q35`` machine type by default. (Currently
|
||||
Nova defaults to the ``pc`` machine type for the ``x86_64``
|
||||
architecture, although `it is expected that this will change in the
|
||||
future`__.)
|
||||
|
||||
Changing the default from ``pc`` to ``q35`` makes the creation and
|
||||
configuration of images by users more convenient by removing the
|
||||
need for the ``hw_machine_type`` property to be set to ``q35`` on
|
||||
every image for which SEV booting is desired.
|
||||
|
||||
.. caution::
|
||||
|
||||
Consider carefully whether to set this option. It is
|
||||
particularly important since a limitation of the implementation
|
||||
prevents the user from receiving an error message with a helpful
|
||||
explanation if they try to boot an SEV guest when neither this
|
||||
configuration option nor the image property are set to select
|
||||
a ``q35`` machine type.
|
||||
|
||||
On the other hand, setting it to ``q35`` may have other
|
||||
undesirable side-effects on other images which were expecting to
|
||||
be booted with ``pc``, so it is suggested to set it on a single
|
||||
compute node or aggregate, and perform careful testing of typical
|
||||
images before rolling out the setting to all SEV-capable compute
|
||||
hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1780138
|
||||
|
||||
Launching SEV instances
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Once an operator has covered the above steps, users can launch SEV
|
||||
instances either by requesting a flavor for which the operator set the
|
||||
``hw:mem_encryption`` extra spec to ``True``, or by using an image
|
||||
with the ``hw_mem_encryption`` property set to ``True``.
|
||||
|
||||
These do not inherently cause a preference for SEV-capable hardware,
|
||||
but for now SEV is the only way of fulfilling the requirement for
|
||||
memory encryption. However in the future, support for other
|
||||
hardware-level guest memory encryption technology such as Intel MKTME
|
||||
may be added. If a guest specifically needs to be booted using SEV
|
||||
rather than any other memory encryption technology, it is possible to
|
||||
ensure this by adding ``trait:HW_CPU_X86_AMD_SEV=required`` to the
|
||||
flavor extra specs or image properties.
|
||||
|
||||
In all cases, SEV instances can only be booted from images which have
|
||||
the ``hw_firmware_type`` property set to ``uefi``, and only when the
|
||||
machine type is set to ``q35``. This can be set per image by setting
|
||||
the image property ``hw_machine_type=q35``, or per compute node by
|
||||
the operator via :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.hw_machine_type` as
|
||||
explained above.
|
||||
|
||||
Impermanent limitations
|
||||
-----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The following limitations may be removed in the future as the
|
||||
hardware, firmware, and various layers of software receive new
|
||||
features:
|
||||
|
||||
- SEV-encrypted VMs cannot yet be live-migrated or suspended,
|
||||
therefore they will need to be fully shut down before migrating off
|
||||
an SEV host, e.g. if maintenance is required on the host.
|
||||
|
||||
- SEV-encrypted VMs cannot contain directly accessible host devices
|
||||
(PCI passthrough). So for example mdev vGPU support will not
|
||||
currently work. However technologies based on `vhost-user`__ should
|
||||
work fine.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/VirtioVhostUser
|
||||
|
||||
- The boot disk of SEV-encrypted VMs can only be ``virtio``.
|
||||
(``virtio-blk`` is typically the default for libvirt disks on x86,
|
||||
but can also be explicitly set e.g. via the image property
|
||||
``hw_disk_bus=virtio``). Valid alternatives for the disk
|
||||
include using ``hw_disk_bus=scsi`` with
|
||||
``hw_scsi_model=virtio-scsi`` , or ``hw_disk_bus=sata``.
|
||||
|
||||
- QEMU and libvirt cannot yet expose the number of slots available for
|
||||
encrypted guests in the memory controller on SEV hardware. Until
|
||||
this is implemented, it is not possible for Nova to programmatically
|
||||
detect the correct value. As a short-term workaround, operators can
|
||||
optionally manually specify the upper limit of SEV guests for each
|
||||
compute host, via the new
|
||||
:oslo.config:option:`libvirt.num_memory_encrypted_guests`
|
||||
configuration option :ref:`described above
|
||||
<num_memory_encrypted_guests>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Permanent limitations
|
||||
---------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The following limitations are expected long-term:
|
||||
|
||||
- The number of SEV guests allowed to run concurrently will always be
|
||||
limited. `On the first generation of EPYC machines it will be
|
||||
limited to 15 guests`__; however this limit becomes much higher with
|
||||
the second generation (Rome).
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2019-January/msg00652.html
|
||||
|
||||
- The operating system running in an encrypted virtual machine must
|
||||
contain SEV support.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-limitations
|
||||
---------------
|
||||
|
||||
For the sake of eliminating any doubt, the following actions are *not*
|
||||
expected to be limited when SEV encryption is used:
|
||||
|
||||
- Cold migration or shelve, since they power off the VM before the
|
||||
operation at which point there is no encrypted memory (although this
|
||||
could change since there is work underway to add support for `PMEM
|
||||
<https://pmem.io/>`_)
|
||||
|
||||
- Snapshot, since it only snapshots the disk
|
||||
|
||||
- ``nova evacuate`` (despite the name, more akin to resurrection than
|
||||
evacuation), since this is only initiated when the VM is no longer
|
||||
running
|
||||
|
||||
- Attaching any volumes, as long as they do not require attaching via
|
||||
an IDE bus
|
||||
|
||||
- Use of spice / VNC / serial / RDP consoles
|
||||
|
||||
- `VM guest virtual NUMA (a.k.a. vNUMA)
|
||||
<https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-12/singlehtml/article_vt_best_practices/article_vt_best_practices.html#sec.vt.best.perf.numa.vmguest>`_
|
||||
|
||||
For further technical details, see `the nova spec for SEV support`__.
|
||||
|
||||
__ http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Guest agent support
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ instance for these kind of workloads.
|
||||
emulated-tpm
|
||||
uefi
|
||||
secure-boot
|
||||
sev
|
||||
managing-resource-providers
|
||||
resource-limits
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
272
doc/source/admin/sev.rst
Normal file
272
doc/source/admin/sev.rst
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
|
||||
.. _amd-sev:
|
||||
|
||||
AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization)
|
||||
=========================================
|
||||
|
||||
.. versionadded:: 20.0.0 (Train)
|
||||
|
||||
`Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)`__ is a technology from AMD which
|
||||
enables the memory for a VM to be encrypted with a key unique to the VM.
|
||||
SEV is particularly applicable to cloud computing since it can reduce the
|
||||
amount of trust VMs need to place in the hypervisor and administrator of
|
||||
their host system.
|
||||
|
||||
.. __: https://developer.amd.com/sev/
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
.. _deploying-sev-capable-infrastructure:
|
||||
|
||||
Enabling SEV
|
||||
------------
|
||||
|
||||
First the operator will need to ensure the following prerequisites are met:
|
||||
|
||||
- Currently SEV is only supported when using the libvirt compute driver with a
|
||||
:oslo.config:option:`libvirt.virt_type` of ``kvm`` or ``qemu``.
|
||||
|
||||
- At least one of the Nova compute hosts must be AMD hardware capable
|
||||
of supporting SEV. It is entirely possible for the compute plane to
|
||||
be a mix of hardware which can and cannot support SEV, although as
|
||||
per the section on `Permanent limitations`_ below, the maximum
|
||||
number of simultaneously running guests with SEV will be limited by
|
||||
the quantity and quality of SEV-capable hardware available.
|
||||
|
||||
In order for users to be able to use SEV, the operator will need to
|
||||
perform the following steps:
|
||||
|
||||
- Ensure that sufficient memory is reserved on the SEV compute hosts
|
||||
for host-level services to function correctly at all times. This is
|
||||
particularly important when hosting SEV-enabled guests, since they
|
||||
pin pages in RAM, preventing any memory overcommit which may be in
|
||||
normal operation on other compute hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
It is `recommended`__ to achieve this by configuring an ``rlimit`` at
|
||||
the ``/machine.slice`` top-level ``cgroup`` on the host, with all VMs
|
||||
placed inside that. (For extreme detail, see `this discussion on the
|
||||
spec`__.)
|
||||
|
||||
__ http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#memory-reservation-solutions
|
||||
__ https://review.opendev.org/#/c/641994/2/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.rst@167
|
||||
|
||||
An alternative approach is to configure the
|
||||
:oslo.config:option:`reserved_host_memory_mb` option in the
|
||||
``[DEFAULT]`` section of :file:`nova.conf`, based on the expected
|
||||
maximum number of SEV guests simultaneously running on the host, and
|
||||
the details provided in `an earlier version of the AMD SEV spec`__
|
||||
regarding memory region sizes, which cover how to calculate it
|
||||
correctly.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/stein/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#proposed-change
|
||||
|
||||
See `the Memory Locking and Accounting section of the AMD SEV spec`__
|
||||
and `previous discussion for further details`__.
|
||||
|
||||
__ http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html#memory-locking-and-accounting
|
||||
__ https://review.opendev.org/#/c/641994/2/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.rst@167
|
||||
|
||||
- A cloud administrator will need to define one or more SEV-enabled
|
||||
flavors :ref:`as described below <extra-specs-memory-encryption>`, unless it
|
||||
is sufficient for users to define SEV-enabled images.
|
||||
|
||||
Additionally the cloud operator should consider the following optional
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
|
||||
.. _num_memory_encrypted_guests:
|
||||
|
||||
- Configure the :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.num_memory_encrypted_guests`
|
||||
option in :file:`nova.conf` to represent the number of guests an SEV
|
||||
compute node can host concurrently with memory encrypted at the
|
||||
hardware level. For example:
|
||||
|
||||
.. code-block:: ini
|
||||
|
||||
[libvirt]
|
||||
num_memory_encrypted_guests = 15
|
||||
|
||||
This option exists because on AMD SEV-capable hardware, the memory
|
||||
controller has a fixed number of slots for holding encryption keys,
|
||||
one per guest. For example, at the time of writing, earlier
|
||||
generations of hardware only have 15 slots, thereby limiting the
|
||||
number of SEV guests which can be run concurrently to 15. Nova
|
||||
needs to track how many slots are available and used in order to
|
||||
avoid attempting to exceed that limit in the hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
At the time of writing (September 2019), work is in progress to
|
||||
allow QEMU and libvirt to expose the number of slots available on
|
||||
SEV hardware; however until this is finished and released, it will
|
||||
not be possible for Nova to programmatically detect the correct
|
||||
value.
|
||||
|
||||
So this configuration option serves as a stop-gap, allowing the
|
||||
cloud operator the option of providing this value manually. It may
|
||||
later be demoted to a fallback value for cases where the limit
|
||||
cannot be detected programmatically, or even removed altogether when
|
||||
Nova's minimum QEMU version guarantees that it can always be
|
||||
detected.
|
||||
|
||||
.. note::
|
||||
|
||||
When deciding whether to use the default of ``None`` or manually
|
||||
impose a limit, operators should carefully weigh the benefits
|
||||
vs. the risk. The benefits of using the default are a) immediate
|
||||
convenience since nothing needs to be done now, and b) convenience
|
||||
later when upgrading compute hosts to future versions of Nova,
|
||||
since again nothing will need to be done for the correct limit to
|
||||
be automatically imposed. However the risk is that until
|
||||
auto-detection is implemented, users may be able to attempt to
|
||||
launch guests with encrypted memory on hosts which have already
|
||||
reached the maximum number of guests simultaneously running with
|
||||
encrypted memory. This risk may be mitigated by other limitations
|
||||
which operators can impose, for example if the smallest RAM
|
||||
footprint of any flavor imposes a maximum number of simultaneously
|
||||
running guests which is less than or equal to the SEV limit.
|
||||
|
||||
- Configure :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.hw_machine_type` on all
|
||||
SEV-capable compute hosts to include ``x86_64=q35``, so that all
|
||||
x86_64 images use the ``q35`` machine type by default. (Currently
|
||||
Nova defaults to the ``pc`` machine type for the ``x86_64``
|
||||
architecture, although `it is expected that this will change in the
|
||||
future`__.)
|
||||
|
||||
Changing the default from ``pc`` to ``q35`` makes the creation and
|
||||
configuration of images by users more convenient by removing the
|
||||
need for the ``hw_machine_type`` property to be set to ``q35`` on
|
||||
every image for which SEV booting is desired.
|
||||
|
||||
.. caution::
|
||||
|
||||
Consider carefully whether to set this option. It is
|
||||
particularly important since a limitation of the implementation
|
||||
prevents the user from receiving an error message with a helpful
|
||||
explanation if they try to boot an SEV guest when neither this
|
||||
configuration option nor the image property are set to select
|
||||
a ``q35`` machine type.
|
||||
|
||||
On the other hand, setting it to ``q35`` may have other
|
||||
undesirable side-effects on other images which were expecting to
|
||||
be booted with ``pc``, so it is suggested to set it on a single
|
||||
compute node or aggregate, and perform careful testing of typical
|
||||
images before rolling out the setting to all SEV-capable compute
|
||||
hosts.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/1780138
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
.. _extra-specs-memory-encryption:
|
||||
|
||||
Configuring a flavor or image
|
||||
-----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Once an operator has covered the above steps, users can launch SEV
|
||||
instances either by requesting a flavor for which the operator set the
|
||||
:nova:extra-spec:`hw:mem_encryption` extra spec to ``True``, or by using an
|
||||
image with the ``hw_mem_encryption`` property set to ``True``. For example, to
|
||||
enable SEV for a flavor:
|
||||
|
||||
.. code-block:: console
|
||||
|
||||
$ openstack flavor set FLAVOR-NAME \
|
||||
--property hw:mem_encryption=true
|
||||
|
||||
These do not inherently cause a preference for SEV-capable hardware,
|
||||
but for now SEV is the only way of fulfilling the requirement for
|
||||
memory encryption. However in the future, support for other
|
||||
hardware-level guest memory encryption technology such as Intel MKTME
|
||||
may be added. If a guest specifically needs to be booted using SEV
|
||||
rather than any other memory encryption technology, it is possible to
|
||||
ensure this by setting the :nova:extra-spec:`trait{group}:HW_CPU_X86_AMD_SEV`
|
||||
extra spec or equivalent image metadata property to ``required``.
|
||||
|
||||
In all cases, SEV instances can only be booted from images which have
|
||||
the ``hw_firmware_type`` property set to ``uefi``, and only when the
|
||||
machine type is set to ``q35``. This can be set per image by setting
|
||||
the image property ``hw_machine_type=q35``, or per compute node by
|
||||
the operator via :oslo.config:option:`libvirt.hw_machine_type` as
|
||||
explained above.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Limitations
|
||||
-----------
|
||||
|
||||
Impermanent limitations
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
The following limitations may be removed in the future as the
|
||||
hardware, firmware, and various layers of software receive new
|
||||
features:
|
||||
|
||||
- SEV-encrypted VMs cannot yet be live-migrated or suspended,
|
||||
therefore they will need to be fully shut down before migrating off
|
||||
an SEV host, e.g. if maintenance is required on the host.
|
||||
|
||||
- SEV-encrypted VMs cannot contain directly accessible host devices
|
||||
(PCI passthrough). So for example mdev vGPU support will not
|
||||
currently work. However technologies based on `vhost-user`__ should
|
||||
work fine.
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/VirtioVhostUser
|
||||
|
||||
- The boot disk of SEV-encrypted VMs can only be ``virtio``.
|
||||
(``virtio-blk`` is typically the default for libvirt disks on x86,
|
||||
but can also be explicitly set e.g. via the image property
|
||||
``hw_disk_bus=virtio``). Valid alternatives for the disk
|
||||
include using ``hw_disk_bus=scsi`` with
|
||||
``hw_scsi_model=virtio-scsi`` , or ``hw_disk_bus=sata``.
|
||||
|
||||
- QEMU and libvirt cannot yet expose the number of slots available for
|
||||
encrypted guests in the memory controller on SEV hardware. Until
|
||||
this is implemented, it is not possible for Nova to programmatically
|
||||
detect the correct value. As a short-term workaround, operators can
|
||||
optionally manually specify the upper limit of SEV guests for each
|
||||
compute host, via the new
|
||||
:oslo.config:option:`libvirt.num_memory_encrypted_guests`
|
||||
configuration option :ref:`described above
|
||||
<num_memory_encrypted_guests>`.
|
||||
|
||||
Permanent limitations
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
The following limitations are expected long-term:
|
||||
|
||||
- The number of SEV guests allowed to run concurrently will always be
|
||||
limited. `On the first generation of EPYC machines it will be
|
||||
limited to 15 guests`__; however this limit becomes much higher with
|
||||
the second generation (Rome).
|
||||
|
||||
__ https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2019-January/msg00652.html
|
||||
|
||||
- The operating system running in an encrypted virtual machine must
|
||||
contain SEV support.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-limitations
|
||||
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
||||
|
||||
For the sake of eliminating any doubt, the following actions are *not*
|
||||
expected to be limited when SEV encryption is used:
|
||||
|
||||
- Cold migration or shelve, since they power off the VM before the
|
||||
operation at which point there is no encrypted memory (although this
|
||||
could change since there is work underway to add support for `PMEM
|
||||
<https://pmem.io/>`_)
|
||||
|
||||
- Snapshot, since it only snapshots the disk
|
||||
|
||||
- ``nova evacuate`` (despite the name, more akin to resurrection than
|
||||
evacuation), since this is only initiated when the VM is no longer
|
||||
running
|
||||
|
||||
- Attaching any volumes, as long as they do not require attaching via
|
||||
an IDE bus
|
||||
|
||||
- Use of spice / VNC / serial / RDP consoles
|
||||
|
||||
- `VM guest virtual NUMA (a.k.a. vNUMA)
|
||||
<https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles-12/singlehtml/article_vt_best_practices/article_vt_best_practices.html#sec.vt.best.perf.numa.vmguest>`_
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
References
|
||||
----------
|
||||
|
||||
- `libvirt driver launching AMD SEV-encrypted instances (spec)`__
|
||||
|
||||
.. __: http://specs.openstack.org/openstack/nova-specs/specs/train/approved/amd-sev-libvirt-support.html
|
||||
@@ -184,18 +184,6 @@ Performance Monitoring Unit (vPMU)
|
||||
required, such workloads should set ``hw:pmu=False``. For most workloads
|
||||
the default of unset or enabling the vPMU ``hw:pmu=True`` will be correct.
|
||||
|
||||
.. _extra-specs-memory-encryption:
|
||||
|
||||
Hardware encryption of guest memory
|
||||
If there are compute hosts which support encryption of guest memory
|
||||
at the hardware level, this functionality can be requested via the
|
||||
``hw:mem_encryption`` extra spec parameter:
|
||||
|
||||
.. code-block:: console
|
||||
|
||||
$ openstack flavor set FLAVOR-NAME \
|
||||
--property hw:mem_encryption=True
|
||||
|
||||
.. _extra-specs-hiding-hypervisor-signature:
|
||||
|
||||
Hiding hypervisor signature
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user