In May 2019, four new microprocessor security flaws, known as "MDS" (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) have been discovered. These flaws affect unpatched Nova Compute nodes and instances running on Intel x86_64 CPUs. The said security flaws are also referred to as "RIDL" (Rogue In-Flight Data Load) and "Fallout". Refer to the following pages for further details: - https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/mds - https://mdsattacks.com/ - https://zombieloadattack.com/ * * * If we're adding the guide for "MDS" flaws, then it begs the question: "What about mitigation guides for previous vulnerabilities?" Two points: (a) Write the mitigation document for rest of the previous vulnerabilities too, for completeness' sake. (In April 2018 I wrote this doc[1] for Meltdown — polish it and submit it. Parts of that document's content is already incorporated into the help text for the config attribute `cpu_model_extra_flags`.) (b) For now, we can live with the cliché, "something is better than nothing"; we'll add the other docs "when we get to it". Meanwhile, operators get mitigation details from various other places — processor vendors, Linux distributions, etc. [1] https://kashyapc.fedorapeople.org/Reducing-OpenStack-Guest-Perf-Impact-from-Meltdown.txt Change-Id: I1bb472c3438cc9a91945999d2350b2c59fa6a1f3 Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
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Security hardening
OpenStack Compute can be integrated with various third-party technologies to increase security. For more information, see the OpenStack Security Guide.
Encrypt Compute metadata traffic
Enabling SSL encryption
OpenStack supports encrypting Compute metadata traffic with HTTPS.
Enable SSL encryption in the metadata_agent.ini
file.
Enable the HTTPS protocol.
nova_metadata_protocol = https
Determine whether insecure SSL connections are accepted for Compute metadata server requests. The default value is
False
.nova_metadata_insecure = False
Specify the path to the client certificate.
nova_client_cert = PATH_TO_CERT
Specify the path to the private key.
nova_client_priv_key = PATH_TO_KEY
Securing live migration streams with QEMU-native TLS
It is strongly recommended to secure all the different live migration
streams of a nova instance—i.e. guest RAM, device state, and disks (via
NBD) when using non-shared storage. For further details on how to set
this up, refer to the secure-live-migration-with-qemu-native-tls
document.
Mitigation for MDS (Microarchitectural Data Sampling) security flaws
It is strongly recommended to patch all compute nodes and nova
instances against the processor-related security flaws, such as MDS (and
other previous vulnerabilities). For details on applying mitigation for
the MDS flaws, refer to the mitigation-for-Intel-MDS-security-flaws
document.