There's no real need for this to exist as its own standalone document now that we have a separate CPU models doc. Combine them. Change-Id: I3a3e19b1f2660dd773fd3d47332abadc0c0e5c55 Signed-off-by: Stephen Finucane <stephenfin@redhat.com>
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CPU models
Nova allows you to control the guest CPU model that is exposed to instances. Use cases include:
- To maximize performance of instances by exposing new host CPU features to the guest
- To ensure a consistent default behavior across all machines, removing reliance on system defaults.
Important
The functionality described below is currently only supported by the libvirt driver.
CPU modes
In libvirt, the CPU is specified by providing a base CPU model name
(which is a shorthand for a set of feature flags), a set of additional
feature flags, and the topology (sockets/cores/threads). The libvirt KVM
driver provides a number of standard CPU model names. These models are
defined in /usr/share/libvirt/cpu_map/*.xml
. You can
inspect these files to determine which models are supported by your
local installation.
Two Compute configuration options in the :oslo.configlibvirt
group of
nova.conf
define which type of CPU model is exposed to the
hypervisor when using KVM: :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_mode
and :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
.
The :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_mode
option can take one of the
following values: none
, host-passthrough
,
host-model
, and custom
.
See Effective Virtual CPU configuration in Nova for a recorded presentation about this topic.
Host model
If :oslo.configcpu_mode=host-model <libvirt.cpu_mode>
, the
CPU model in /usr/share/libvirt/cpu_map/*.xml
that most
closely matches the host and requests additional CPU flags to complete
the match. This CPU model has a number of advantages:
- It provides almost all of the host CPU features to the guest, thus providing close to the maximum functionality and performance possible.
- It auto-adds critical guest CPU flags for mitigation from certain security flaws, provided the CPU microcode, kernel, QEMU, and libvirt are all updated.
- It computes live migration compatibility, with the caveat that live migration in both directions is not always possible.
In general, using host-model
is a safe choice if your
compute node CPUs are largely identical. However, if your compute nodes
span multiple processor generations, you may be better advised to select
a custom
CPU model.
The host-model
CPU model is the default for the KVM
& QEMU hypervisors (:oslo.configlibvirt.virt_type
=kvm
/qemu
)
Note
As noted above, live migration is not always possible in both
directions when using host-model
. During live migration,
the source CPU model definition is transferred to the destination host
as-is. This results in the migrated guest on the destination seeing
exactly the same CPU model as on source even if the destination compute
host is capable of providing more CPU features. However, shutting down
and restarting the guest on the may present different hardware to the
guest, as per the new capabilities of the destination compute.
Host passthrough
If :oslo.configcpu_mode=host-passthrough <libvirt.cpu_mode>
,
libvirt tells KVM to pass through the host CPU with no modifications. In
comparison to host-model
which simply matches feature
flags, host-passthrough
ensures every last detail of the
host CPU is matched. This gives the best performance, and can be
important to some apps which check low level CPU details, but it comes
at a cost with respect to migration.
In host-passthrough
mode, the guest can only be
live-migrated to a target host that matches the source host extremely
closely. This includes the physical CPU model and running microcode, and
may even include the running kernel. Use this mode only if your compute
nodes have a very large degree of homogeneity (i.e. substantially all of
your compute nodes use the exact same CPU generation and model), and you
make sure to only live-migrate between hosts with exactly matching
kernel versions. Failure to do so will result in an inability to support
any form of live migration.
Note
The reason for that it is necessary for the CPU microcode versions to match is that hardware performance counters are exposed to an instance and it is likely that they may vary between different CPU models. There may also be other reasons due to security fixes for some hardware security flaws being included in CPU microcode.
Custom
If :oslo.configcpu_mode=custom <libvirt.cpu_mode>
, you can
explicitly specify an ordered list of supported named models using the
:oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
configuration option. It is
expected that the list is ordered so that the more common and less
advanced CPU models are listed earlier.
In selecting the custom
mode, along with a
:oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
that matches the oldest of your
compute node CPUs, you can ensure that live migration between compute
nodes will always be possible. However, you should ensure that the
:oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
you select passes the correct
CPU feature flags to the guest.
If you need to further tweak your CPU feature flags in the
custom
mode, see CPU feature
flags.
Note
If :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
is configured, the CPU models in
the list needs to be compatible with the host CPU. Also, if
:oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_model_extra_flags
is configured, all
flags needs to be compatible with the host CPU. If incompatible CPU
models or flags are specified, nova service will raise an error and fail
to start.
None
If :oslo.configcpu_mode=none <libvirt.cpu_mode>
, libvirt
does not specify a CPU model. Instead, the hypervisor chooses the
default model.
The none
CPU model is the default for all non-KVM.QEMU
hypervisors. (:oslo.configlibvirt.virt_type
!=kvm
/qemu
)
CPU feature flags
18.0.0 (Rocky)
Regardless of your configured :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_mode
, it is
also possible to selectively enable additional feature flags. This can
be accomplished using the :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_model_extra_flags
config option. For
example, suppose you have configured a custom CPU model of
IvyBridge
, which normally does not enable the
pcid
feature flag, but you do want to pass
pcid
into your guest instances. In this case, you could
configure the following in nova.conf
to enable this
flag.
[libvirt]
cpu_mode = custom
cpu_models = IvyBridge
cpu_model_extra_flags = pcid
An end user can also specify required CPU features through traits.
When specified, the libvirt driver will select the first CPU model in
the :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_models
list that can provide the
requested feature traits. If no CPU feature traits are specified then
the instance will be configured with the first CPU model in the
list.
Consider the following nova.conf
:
[libvirt]
cpu_mode = custom
cpu_models = Penryn,IvyBridge,Haswell,Broadwell,Skylake-Client
These different CPU models support different feature flags and are
correctly configured in order of oldest (and therefore most widely
supported) to newest. If the user explicitly required the
avx
and avx2
CPU features, the latter of which
is only found of Haswell-generation processors or newer, then they could
request them using the :novatrait{group}:HW_CPU_X86_AVX
and :novatrait{group}:HW_CPU_X86_AVX2
flavor extra
specs. For example:
$ openstack flavor set $FLAVOR \
--property trait:HW_CPU_X86_AVX=required \
--property trait:HW_CPU_X86_AVX2=required
As Haswell
is the first CPU model supporting both of
these CPU features, the instance would be configured with this
model.
Mitigation for MDS ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling") Security Flaws
In May 2019, four new microprocessor flaws, known as MDS and also referred to as RIDL and Fallout or ZombieLoad, were discovered. These flaws affect unpatched Nova compute nodes and instances running on Intel x86_64 CPUs.
Resolution
To get mitigation for the said MDS security flaws, a new CPU flag,
md-clear
, needs to be exposed to the Nova instances. This
can be done as follows.
Update the following components to the versions from your Linux distribution that have fixes for the MDS flaws, on all compute nodes with Intel x86_64 CPUs:
microcode_ctl
kernel
qemu-system-x86
libvirt
When using the libvirt driver, ensure that the CPU flag
md-clear
is exposed to the Nova instances. This can be done in one of three ways, depending on your configured CPU mode::oslo.config
libvirt.cpu_mode
=host-modelWhen using the
host-model
CPU mode, themd-clear
CPU flag will be passed through to the Nova guests automatically.This mode is the default, when :oslo.config
libvirt.virt_type
=kvm|qemu is set in/etc/nova/nova-cpu.conf
on compute nodes.:oslo.config
libvirt.cpu_mode
=host-passthroughWhen using the
host-passthrough
CPU mode, themd-clear
CPU flag will be passed through to the Nova guests automatically.:oslo.config
libvirt.cpu_mode
=customWhen using the
custom
CPU mode, you must explicitly enable the CPU flagmd-clear
to the Nova instances, in addition to the flags required for previous vulnerabilities, using the :oslo.configlibvirt.cpu_model_extra_flags
. For example:[libvirt] cpu_mode = custom cpu_models = IvyBridge cpu_model_extra_flags = spec-ctrl,ssbd,md-clear
Reboot the compute node for the fixes to take effect.
To minimize workload downtime, you may wish to live migrate all guests to another compute node first.
Once the above steps have been taken on every vulnerable compute node in the deployment, each running guest in the cluster must be fully powered down, and cold-booted (i.e. an explicit stop followed by a start), in order to activate the new CPU models. This can be done by the guest administrators at a time of their choosing.
Validation
After applying relevant updates, administrators can check the
kernel's sysfs
interface to see what mitigation is in
place, by running the following command on the host:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable
To unpack the message "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT vulnerable":
Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers
means you have the "CPU buffer clearing" mitigation enabled, which is mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers by invoking a CPU instruction called "VERW".SMT vulnerable
means, depending on your workload, you may still be vulnerable to SMT-related problems. You need to evaluate whether your workloads need SMT (also called "Hyper-Threading") to be disabled or not. Refer to the guidance from your Linux distribution and processor vendor.
To see the other possible values for
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
, refer to the
MDS
system information section in Linux kernel's documentation for
MDS.
On the host, validate that KVM is capable of exposing the
md-clear
flag to guests:
# virsh domcapabilities kvm | grep md-clear
<feature policy='require' name='md-clear'/>
More information can be found on the 'Diagnosis' tab of this security notice document.
Performance Impact
Refer to this section titled "Performance Impact and Disabling MDS" from this security notice document, under the Resolve tab.
Note
Although the article referred to is from Red Hat, the findings and recommendations about performance impact apply for other distributions also.