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.. :Copyright: 2017, OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team
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.. :License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
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Attribution 3.0 Unported License.
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode
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==================================
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Vulnerability Management Process
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==================================
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The OpenStack :ref:`Vulnerability Management Team` is responsible
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for coordinating the progressive disclosure of a vulnerability.
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Members of the team are independent and security-minded folks who
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ensure that vulnerabilities are dealt with in a timely manner and
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that downstream stakeholders are notified in a coordinated and fair
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manner. Where a member of the team is employed by a downstream
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stakeholder, the member does not give their employer prior notice of
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any vulnerabilities. In order to reduce the disclosure of
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vulnerability in the early stages, membership of this team is
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intentionally limited to a small number of people.
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Supported versions
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------------------
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The Vulnerability Management team coordinates patches fixing
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vulnerabilities in maintained stable branches (corresponding to
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previous major releases) of OpenStack, in addition to the master
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branch (next version under development), for all :ref:`repositories
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overseen`.
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Process
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-------
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Each security bug is assigned a VMT *coordinator* (member from the
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vulnerability management team) that will drive the fixing and
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disclosure process. Here are the steps we follow.
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.. image:: vmt-process.png
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:width: 100 %
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:alt: VMT Process
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:target: _images/vmt-process.png
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Reception
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^^^^^^^^^
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A report can be received either as a private encrypted email to one
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of the VMT members, or as a StoryBoard or Launchpad security bug
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(check the box marked "this is a security issue").
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The first steps performed by the VMT are to:
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* create a bug in StoryBoard or Launchpad if one does not yet exist
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* check that the report indicates the correct project and adjust as
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necessary
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* prefix the report description with an `embargo reminder`_
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including an end date for its embargo
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* add a *Todo/Incomplete* task for the openstack/ossa or ossa
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project
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* subscribe the project's core security review team for confirmation
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of impact and determination of affected branches
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* add a comment with an `incomplete reception`_ message
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Once the VMT confirms an OSSA is warranted, the ossa bugtask status
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will be set to *Progress/Confirmed*. If the need for an OSSA is
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challenged, the ossa bugtask status should be set back to
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*Todo/Incomplete* until that question is resolved.
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If no OSSA is warranted and there is no benefit to an OSSN_ then the
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ossa bugtask will be set to *Won't Fix* or *Invalid* (depending on
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the tracker and situation) and the bug state switched from *Private
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Security* to *Public*, optionally adding a *security* bug tag if the
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report concerns a potential security hardening opportunity. The
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specifics are indexed in the `report taxonomy`_ and :ref:`task status`
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tables.
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.. _embargo reminder: #reception-embargo-reminder-private-issues
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.. _incomplete reception: #reception-incomplete-message-unconfirmed-issues
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.. _OSSN: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/Security_Notes
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Patch development
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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For a private report, the reporter (automatic if reported directly
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as a bug) and the affected projects' core security review teams plus
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anyone they deem necessary to develop and validate a fix are added
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to the bug's subscription list. A fix is proposed as a patch to the
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current master branch (as well as any affected supported branches)
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and attached to the private bug report, **not sent to the public
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code review system**.
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For public reports, there is no need to directly subscribe anyone
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and patches can be submitted directly to the code review system
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instead of as bug attachments (though the bug should be referenced
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in any commit messages so it will be updated automatically).
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If project-side delays are encountered at this or any subsequent
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stage of the process, the VMT and other interested parties may reach
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out to that project's `security liaison`_ requesting more immediate
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attention to the issue.
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.. _security liaison: https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/CrossProjectLiaisons#Vulnerability_management
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Patch review
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^^^^^^^^^^^^
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For a private report once the initial patch has been attached to the
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bug, core reviewers on the subscription list from the project in
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question should review it and suggest updates or pre-approve it for
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merging. Privately-developed patches need to be pre-approved so that
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they can be fast-tracked through public code review later at
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disclosure time.
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For public reports, OpenStack's usual public code review and
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approval processes apply.
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Draft impact description
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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In the mean time, the VMT coordinator prepares a vulnerability
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description that will be communicated to downstream stakeholders,
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and will serve as the basis for the Security Advisory that will be
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finally published.
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The description should properly credit the reporter, specify
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affected versions (including unsupported ones) and accurately
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describe impact and mitigation mechanisms. The VMT coordinator
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should use the template below. Once the description is posted, the
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openstack/ossa or ossa bugtask status should be switched to
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*Review/Triaged*.
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Review impact description
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The description is validated by the reporter and the PTL.
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Send CVE request
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To ensure full traceability, we attempt to obtain a CVE assignment
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before the issue is communicated to a larger public. This is
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generally done as the patch gets nearer to final approval. The ossa
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bugtask status is set to *In progress* and the approved impact
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description is submitted through `MITRE's CVE Request form`_. The
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*request type* is ``Request a CVE ID``, the *e-mail address* should
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be that of the requester (generally the assigned VMT coordinator in
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the case of reports officially managed by the VMT), and for
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embargoed reports the coordinator's OpenPGP key should be pasted
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into the field provided.
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In the *required* section set the checkboxes indicating the product
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is not CNA-covered and that no prior CVE ID has been assigned,
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select an appropriate *vulnerability type* (using ``Other or
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Unknown`` to enter a freeform type if there is nothing relevant on
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the drop-down), set the *vendor* to ``OpenStack``, and the *product*
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and *version* fields to match the ``$PROJECTS`` and
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``$AFFECTED_VERSIONS`` from the impact description. In the
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*optional* section set the radio button for *confirmed/acknowledged*
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to ``Yes``, choose an appropriate *attack type* in the drop-down
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(often this is ``Context-dependent`` for our cases), check the
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relevant *impact* checkboxes, attempt to fill in the *affected
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components* and *attack vector* fields if possible, paste in the
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*suggested description* from the prose of the impact description
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(usually omitting the first sentence as it's redundant with other
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fields), put the ``$CREDIT`` details in the *discoverer/credits*
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field, and the bug URL (along with Gerrit URLs for patches if
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already public) in the *references* field. If the report is still
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private, note that in the *additional information* field like ``This
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report is currently under embargo and no disclosure date has been
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scheduled at this time.``
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At the bottom of the page, fill in the *security code* and click the
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*submit request* button. If some fields contain invalid data they
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will be highlighted red; correct these, update the *security code*
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and *submit request* again until you get a confirmation page.
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.. _MITRE's CVE Request form: https://cveform.mitre.org/
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Get assigned CVE
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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MITRE returns the assigned CVE. It is added to the bug (see "link to
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CVE" at the top-right in Launchpad or use a story comment in
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StoryBoard), and the bug is retitled to "$TITLE ($CVE)".
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Embargoed disclosure
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Once the patches are approved and the CVE is assigned, a signed
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email with the vulnerability description is sent to the downstream
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stakeholders. The disclosure date is set to 3-5 business days,
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excluding Monday/Friday and holiday periods, at 1500 UTC. No
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stakeholder is supposed to deploy public patches before disclosure
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date. Once the email is sent, any stakeholders who reply requesting
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subscription to the report may be added.
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For non-embargoed, public vulnerabilities no separate downstream
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advance notification is sent. Instead the OSSA bugtask is set to fix
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committed status once the CVE assignment is received OSSA is
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drafting begins immediately.
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Open bug, Push patch
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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In preparation for this, make sure you have a core reviewer and a
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stable maintainer available to help pushing the fix at disclosure
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time.
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On the disclosure hour, open bug, push patches to Gerrit for review
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on master and supported stable branches, fast-track approvals
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(referencing the bug).
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Update the bug title to "[OSSA-$NUM] $TITLE".
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Embargo reminder can be removed at that point.
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`MITRE's CVE Request form`_ should be used again at this point, but
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instead select a *request type* of ``Notify CVE about a
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publication`` and fill in the coordinator's *e-mail address*,
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provide a *link to the advisory* (the URL to it on
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https://security.openstack.org/ if this was an official OSSA), the
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*CVE IDs* covered, and the *date published*. Once more, fill in the
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*security code* at the bottom of the page and *submit request*.
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Publish OSSA
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^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Shortly after pushing the patches (potentially waiting for the first
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test runs to complete), publish the advisory to the OpenStack ML.
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Wait until all patches merged to supported branches before setting
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the ossa bugtask status to *Fix released*.
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All patches merged
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Patches approved in code review do not necessarily merge
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immediately, but should be tracked closely until they do (if the bug
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number is correctly identified in commit messages then it will be
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automatically updated to reflect this as well). Subsequent security
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point releases of affected software may then be tagged if warranted.
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Abnormal embargo termination
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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If a report is held in embargo for 90 days without a fix, or
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significant details of the report are disclosed in a public venue,
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the embargo is terminated by a VMT coordinator at that time and
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subsequent process switches to the public report workflow instead.
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.. _incident report taxonomy:
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Report Taxonomy
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---------------
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The VMT is now using this classification list in order to assist
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vulnerability report triage, especially whenever a bug does not
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warrant an advisory.
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Classes | Outcome | Description |
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+==========+===========+===========================================+
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| Class A | OSSA | A vulnerability to be fixed in master and |
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| | | all supported releases |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class B1 | OSSN | A vulnerability that can only be fixed in |
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| | | master, security note for stable |
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| | | branches, e.g., default config value is |
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| | | insecure |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class B2 | OSSN | A vulnerability without a complete fix |
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| | | yet, security note for all versions, |
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| | | e.g., poor architecture / design |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class B3 | OSSN | A vulnerability in experimental or |
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| | | debugging features not intended for |
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| | | production use |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class C1 | Potential | Not considered a practical vulnerability |
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| | OSSN | (but some people might assign a CVE for |
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| | | it) |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class C2 | Potential | A vulnerability, but not in OpenStack |
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| | OSSN | supported code, e.g., in a dependency |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class D | Potential | Not a vulnerability, just a bug with |
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| | OSSN | (some) security implications, e.g., |
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| | | strengthening opportunities / misleading |
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| | | documentation |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class E | | Neither a vulnerability nor hardening |
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| | | opportunity |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class Y | | Vulnerability only found in development |
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| | | release |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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| Class Z | | When due process fails |
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+----------+-----------+-------------------------------------------+
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.. _task status:
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OSSA Task status
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----------------
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Here is a summary of the different OSSA task status meanings:
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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| Status | Meaning |
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+=====================+============================================+
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| Todo/Incomplete | It is still unclear whenever the report |
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| | warrants an advisory |
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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| Progress/Confirmed | The vulnerability is confirmed, impact |
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| | description is in progress |
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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| Review/Triaged | Impact description has been submitted for |
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| | review |
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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| Merged/Fix Released | All patches have been merged |
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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| Invalid/Won't Fix | No further action to be taken |
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+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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Extent of Disclosure
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--------------------
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The science of vulnerability management is somewhere around being
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able to assess impact and severity of a report, being able to design
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security patches, being an obsessive process-following perfectionist
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and respecting the rule of lesser disclosure.
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Lesser disclosure is about disclosing the vulnerability details to
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an increasing number of people over time, but only to the people
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that are necessary to reach the next step. The diagram above shows
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"disclosure extent" across the various steps of the process.
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Vulnerability reporters retain final control over the disclosure of
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their findings. If for some reason they are uncomfortable with our
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process, their choice of disclosure terms prevails.
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Embargo exceptions
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To keep the embargo period short and effective, the VMT may
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choose to open bug reports. Issues that take too much time
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to be fixed (e.g., more than 2 weeks) or issues that require
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a complex patch are usually better solved in the open. Only under
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unusual circumstances should any embargo extend past 90 days.
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Downstream stakeholders
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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OpenStack as an upstream project is used in a number of
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distributions, products, private and public service offerings that
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are negatively affected by vulnerabilities. In the spirit of
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coordinated disclosure, this ecosystem, collectively known as the
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downstream stakeholders, needs to be warned in advance to be able to
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prepare patches and roll them out in a coordinated fashion on
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disclosure day. The embargo period is kept voluntarily small (3-5
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business days), as a middle ground between keeping the vulnerability
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under cover for too long and not giving a chance to downstream
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stakeholders to react.
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If you're currently not a referenced stakeholder and think you
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should definitely be included on that email distribution list,
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please submit an email with a rationale to member(s) of the
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:ref:`Vulnerability Management Team`.
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Templates
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---------
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Reception incomplete message (unconfirmed issues)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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::
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Since this report concerns a possible security risk, an incomplete
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security advisory task has been added while the core security
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reviewers for the affected project or projects confirm the bug and
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discuss the scope of any vulnerability along with potential
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solutions.
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Reception embargo reminder (private issues)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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::
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This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under
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embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed
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(private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated
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publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the
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form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes
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discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as
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mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also
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avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved
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for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to
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those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All
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discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and
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any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This
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embargo shall not extend past $NINETY_DAYS and will be made
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public by or on that date even if no fix is identified.
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The NINETY_DAYS value should be 90 days from the date the report is
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accepted by the coordinator and project reviewers are subscribed. It
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can be trivially calculated with the ``date -I -d90days`` shell
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command.
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Impact description ($DESCRIPTION)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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::
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Title: $TITLE
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Reporter: $CREDIT
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Products: $PROJECT
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Affects: $AFFECTED_VERSIONS
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Description:
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$CREDIT reported a vulnerability in [project feature name].
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By doing [action] a [actor] may [impact] resulting in [consequence].
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Only [project deployment mode] are affected.
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The AFFECTED_VERSIONS needs to stay valid after the fix is released.
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For example, when kilo, liberty and mitaka are still security supported,
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the AFFECTED_VERSIONS of keystone should read like this:
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::
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Affects: >=2015.1.0 <2015.1.5, >=8.0.0 <8.1.1 and ==9.0.0
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Once kilo reaches end of life, that line becomes:
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::
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Affects: >=8.0.0 <8.1.1 and ==9.0.0
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If the oldest version affected is not easily identified, leave it
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open-ended:
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::
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Affects: <8.1.1 and ==9.0.0
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By convention, the ``<`` version is the next possible patchlevel
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release following three-component SemVer rules, so if the current
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highest affected version on a given branch is ``8.1.0`` then the
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affected versions includes ``<8.1.1`` even though the next actual
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version tagged might well be ``8.2.0`` or ``9.0.0`` (but since we
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don't know what the next version will necessarily be at the time of
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publication, we choose the lowest possible version it could be).
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This convention also makes it clear that prerelease versions may not
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be sufficient to address the vulnerability.
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Downstream stakeholders notification email (private issues)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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We send two separate emails, to avoid off-topic replies to linux-distros:
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* *To:* embargo-notice@lists.openstack.org
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* *Subject:* [pre-OSSA] Vulnerability in OpenStack $PROJECT ($CVE)
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* *To:* linux-distros@vs.openwall.org
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* *Subject:* [vs] Vulnerability in OpenStack $PROJECT ($CVE)
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The message body for both emails should be identical:
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::
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This is an advance warning of a vulnerability discovered in
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OpenStack, to give you, as downstream stakeholders, a chance to
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coordinate the release of fixes and reduce the vulnerability window.
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Please treat the following information as confidential until the
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proposed public disclosure date.
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$DESCRIPTION
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Proposed patch:
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See attached patches. Unless a flaw is discovered in them, these
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patches will be merged to their corresponding branches on the public
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disclosure date.
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CVE: $CVE
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Proposed public disclosure date/time:
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$DISCLOSURE, 1500UTC
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Please do not make the issue public (or release public patches)
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before this coordinated embargo date.
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Original private report:
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https://launchpad.net/bugs/$BUG
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For access to read and comment on this report, please reply to me
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with your Launchpad username and I will subscribe you.
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--
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$VMT_COORDINATOR_NAME
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OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team
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Proposed patches are attached, email must be GPG-signed. Use
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something unique and descriptive for the patch attachment file
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names, for example ``cve-2013-4183-master-havana.patch`` or
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``cve-2013-4183-stable-grizzly.patch``.
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Note that the post to linux-distros should be encrypted to the key
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at https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros and
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expect replies to arrive encrypted for the key with which you signed
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your message.
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OpenStack security advisories (OSSA)
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The document is first submitted as a yaml description to the ossa
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project using this template::
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date: YYYY-MM-DD
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id: OSSA-$NUM
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title: '$TITLE'
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description: '$DESCRIPTION_CONTENT'
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affected-products:
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- product: $PROJECT
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version: $AFFECTED_VERSIONS
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vulnerabilities:
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- cve-id: $CVE
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reporters:
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- name: '$CREDIT'
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affiliation: $CREDIT_AFFILIATION
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reported:
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- $CVE
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issues:
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links:
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- https://launchpad.net/bugs/$BUG
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reviews:
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kilo:
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- https://review.opendev.org/$MASTER_REVIEW
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juno:
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- https://review.opendev.org/$STABLE_REVIEW
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notes:
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- 'Optional note such as cross project version requirements'
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Once approved, view the gate-ossa-docs output and browse to the
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rendered HTML advisory, then alter the URL to insert ``_sources/``
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before the first path component and change the file extension to
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``rst`` to get the generated RST document. We send two separate
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emails, to avoid off-topic replies to oss-security list:
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* *To:* openstack-announce@lists.openstack.org, openstack-discuss@lists.openstack.org
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* *To:* oss-security@lists.openwall.com
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Subject and content for both emails is identical:
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* *Subject:* [OSSA-$NUM] $PROJECT: $TITLE ($CVE)
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* *Body:* The generated RST document
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Notes:
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* Email must be GPG-signed.
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* $CVE must always be of the form CVE-YYYY-XXXX
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* $NUM is of the form YYYY-XX
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