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# Copyright (c) 2010-2012 OpenStack Foundation
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
# You may obtain a copy of the License at
#
# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
# implied.
# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
# limitations under the License.
import mock
import unittest
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
from swift.common.swob import Request, Response
from swift.common.middleware.acl import format_acl
from swift.proxy import server as proxy_server
from swift.proxy.controllers.base import headers_to_account_info
from swift.common import constraints
from test.unit import fake_http_connect, FakeRing, FakeMemcache
from swift.common.storage_policy import StoragePolicy
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
from swift.common.request_helpers import get_sys_meta_prefix
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
import swift.proxy.controllers.base
Fix up get_account_info and get_container_info get_account_info used to work like this: * make an account HEAD request * ignore the response * get the account info by digging around in the request environment, where it had been deposited by elves or something Not actually elves, but the proxy's GETorHEAD_base method would take the HEAD response and cache it in the response environment, which was the same object as the request environment, thus enabling get_account_info to find it. This was extraordinarily brittle. If a WSGI middleware were to shallow-copy the request environment, then any middlewares to its left could not use get_account_info, as the left middleware's request environment would no longer be identical to the response environment down in GETorHEAD_base. Now, get_account_info works like this: * make an account HEAD request. * if the account info is in the request environment, return it. This is an optimization to avoid a double-set in memcached. * else, compute the account info from the response headers, store it in caches, and return it. This is much easier to think about; get_account_info can get and cache account info all on its own; the cache check and cache set are right next to each other. All the above is true for get_container_info as well. get_info() is still around, but it's just a shim. It was trying to unify get_account_info and get_container_info to exploit the commonalities, but the number of times that "if container:" showed up in get_info and its helpers really indicated that something was wrong. I'd rather have two functions with some duplication than one function with no duplication but a bunch of "if container:" branches. Other things of note: * a HEAD request to a deleted account returns 410, but get_account_info would return 404 since the 410 came from the account controller *after* GETorHEAD_base ran. Now get_account_info returns 410 as well. * cache validity period (recheck_account_existence and recheck_container_existence) is now communicated to get_account_info via an X-Backend header. This way, get_account_info doesn't need a reference to the swift.proxy.server.Application object. * both logged swift_source values are now correct for get_container_info calls; before, on a cold cache, get_container_info would call get_account_info but not pass along swift_source, resulting in get_account_info logging "GET_INFO" as the source. Amusingly, there was a unit test asserting this bogus behavior. * callers that modify the return value of get_account_info or of get_container_info don't modify what's stored in swift.infocache. * get_account_info on an account that *can* be autocreated but has not been will return a 200, same as a HEAD request. The old behavior was a 404 from get_account_info but a 200 from HEAD. Callers can tell the difference by looking at info['account_really_exists'] if they need to know the difference (there is one call site that needs to know, in container PUT). Note: this is for all accounts when the proxy's "account_autocreate" setting is on. Change-Id: I5167714025ec7237f7e6dd4759c2c6eb959b3fca
2016-02-11 15:51:45 -08:00
from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
from test.unit import patch_policies
@patch_policies([StoragePolicy(0, 'zero', True, object_ring=FakeRing())])
class TestAccountController(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.app = proxy_server.Application(
None, FakeMemcache(),
account_ring=FakeRing(), container_ring=FakeRing())
def _make_callback_func(self, context):
def callback(ipaddr, port, device, partition, method, path,
headers=None, query_string=None, ssl=False):
context['method'] = method
context['path'] = path
context['headers'] = headers or {}
return callback
def _assert_responses(self, method, test_cases):
if method in ('PUT', 'DELETE'):
self.app.allow_account_management = True
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'AUTH_bob')
for responses, expected in test_cases:
with mock.patch(
'swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(*responses)):
req = Request.blank('/v1/AUTH_bob')
resp = getattr(controller, method)(req)
self.assertEqual(expected,
resp.status_int,
'Expected %s but got %s. Failed case: %s' %
(expected, resp.status_int, str(responses)))
def test_account_info_in_response_env(self):
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'AUTH_bob')
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200, body='')):
req = Request.blank('/v1/AUTH_bob', {'PATH_INFO': '/v1/AUTH_bob'})
resp = controller.HEAD(req)
self.assertEqual(2, resp.status_int // 100)
self.assertIn('account/AUTH_bob', resp.environ['swift.infocache'])
self.assertEqual(
headers_to_account_info(resp.headers),
resp.environ['swift.infocache']['account/AUTH_bob'])
def test_swift_owner(self):
owner_headers = {
'x-account-meta-temp-url-key': 'value',
'x-account-meta-temp-url-key-2': 'value'}
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'a')
req = Request.blank('/v1/a')
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200, headers=owner_headers)):
resp = controller.HEAD(req)
self.assertEqual(2, resp.status_int // 100)
for key in owner_headers:
self.assertNotIn(key, resp.headers)
req = Request.blank('/v1/a', environ={'swift_owner': True})
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200, headers=owner_headers)):
resp = controller.HEAD(req)
self.assertEqual(2, resp.status_int // 100)
for key in owner_headers:
self.assertIn(key, resp.headers)
def test_get_deleted_account(self):
resp_headers = {
'x-account-status': 'deleted',
}
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'a')
req = Request.blank('/v1/a')
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(404, headers=resp_headers)):
resp = controller.HEAD(req)
self.assertEqual(410, resp.status_int)
def test_long_acct_names(self):
long_acct_name = '%sLongAccountName' % (
'Very' * (constraints.MAX_ACCOUNT_NAME_LENGTH // 4))
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, long_acct_name)
req = Request.blank('/v1/%s' % long_acct_name)
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200)):
resp = controller.HEAD(req)
self.assertEqual(400, resp.status_int)
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200)):
resp = controller.GET(req)
self.assertEqual(400, resp.status_int)
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200)):
resp = controller.POST(req)
self.assertEqual(400, resp.status_int)
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
def test_sys_meta_headers_PUT(self):
# check that headers in sys meta namespace make it through
# the proxy controller
sys_meta_key = '%stest' % get_sys_meta_prefix('account')
sys_meta_key = sys_meta_key.title()
user_meta_key = 'X-Account-Meta-Test'
# allow PUTs to account...
self.app.allow_account_management = True
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'a')
context = {}
callback = self._make_callback_func(context)
hdrs_in = {sys_meta_key: 'foo',
user_meta_key: 'bar',
'x-timestamp': '1.0'}
req = Request.blank('/v1/a', headers=hdrs_in)
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200, 200, give_connect=callback)):
controller.PUT(req)
self.assertEqual(context['method'], 'PUT')
self.assertIn(sys_meta_key, context['headers'])
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
self.assertEqual(context['headers'][sys_meta_key], 'foo')
self.assertIn(user_meta_key, context['headers'])
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
self.assertEqual(context['headers'][user_meta_key], 'bar')
self.assertNotEqual(context['headers']['x-timestamp'], '1.0')
def test_sys_meta_headers_POST(self):
# check that headers in sys meta namespace make it through
# the proxy controller
sys_meta_key = '%stest' % get_sys_meta_prefix('account')
sys_meta_key = sys_meta_key.title()
user_meta_key = 'X-Account-Meta-Test'
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'a')
context = {}
callback = self._make_callback_func(context)
hdrs_in = {sys_meta_key: 'foo',
user_meta_key: 'bar',
'x-timestamp': '1.0'}
req = Request.blank('/v1/a', headers=hdrs_in)
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(200, 200, give_connect=callback)):
controller.POST(req)
self.assertEqual(context['method'], 'POST')
self.assertIn(sys_meta_key, context['headers'])
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
self.assertEqual(context['headers'][sys_meta_key], 'foo')
self.assertIn(user_meta_key, context['headers'])
Generic means for persisting system metadata. Middleware or core features may need to store metadata against accounts or containers. This patch adds a generic mechanism for system metadata to be persisted in backend databases, without polluting the user metadata namespace, by using the reserved header namespace x-<server_type>-sysmeta-*. Modifications are firstly that backend servers persist system metadata headers alongside user metadata and other system state. For accounts and containers, system metadata in PUT and POST requests is treated in a similar way to user metadata. System metadata is not yet supported for object requests. Secondly, changes in the proxy controllers ensure that headers in the system metadata namespace will pass through in requests to backend servers. Thirdly, system metadata returned from backend servers in GET or HEAD responses is added to the cached info dict, which middleware can access. Finally, a gatekeeper middleware module is provided which filters all system metadata headers from requests and responses by removing headers with names starting x-account-sysmeta-, x-container-sysmeta-. The gatekeeper also removes headers starting x-object-sysmeta- in anticipation of future support for system metadata being set for objects. This prevents clients from writing or reading system metadata. The required_filters list in swift/proxy/server.py is modified to include the gatekeeper middleware so that if the gatekeeper has not been configured in the pipeline then it will be automatically inserted close to the start of the pipeline. blueprint cluster-federation Change-Id: I80b8b14243cc59505f8c584920f8f527646b5f45
2013-12-03 22:02:39 +00:00
self.assertEqual(context['headers'][user_meta_key], 'bar')
self.assertNotEqual(context['headers']['x-timestamp'], '1.0')
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
def _make_user_and_sys_acl_headers_data(self):
acl = {
'admin': ['AUTH_alice', 'AUTH_bob'],
'read-write': ['AUTH_carol'],
'read-only': [],
}
user_prefix = 'x-account-' # external, user-facing
user_headers = {(user_prefix + 'access-control'): format_acl(
version=2, acl_dict=acl)}
sys_prefix = get_sys_meta_prefix('account') # internal, system-facing
sys_headers = {(sys_prefix + 'core-access-control'): format_acl(
version=2, acl_dict=acl)}
return user_headers, sys_headers
def test_account_acl_headers_translated_for_GET_HEAD(self):
# Verify that a GET/HEAD which receives X-Account-Sysmeta-Acl-* headers
# from the account server will remap those headers to X-Account-Acl-*
hdrs_ext, hdrs_int = self._make_user_and_sys_acl_headers_data()
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'acct')
for verb in ('GET', 'HEAD'):
req = Request.blank('/v1/acct', environ={'swift_owner': True})
controller.GETorHEAD_base = lambda *_: Response(
headers=hdrs_int, environ={
'PATH_INFO': '/acct',
'REQUEST_METHOD': verb,
})
method = getattr(controller, verb)
resp = method(req)
for header, value in hdrs_ext.items():
if value:
self.assertEqual(resp.headers.get(header), value)
else:
# blank ACLs should result in no header
self.assertNotIn(header, resp.headers)
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
def test_add_acls_impossible_cases(self):
# For test coverage: verify that defensive coding does defend, in cases
# that shouldn't arise naturally
# add_acls should do nothing if REQUEST_METHOD isn't HEAD/GET/PUT/POST
resp = Response()
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'a')
resp.environ['PATH_INFO'] = '/a'
resp.environ['REQUEST_METHOD'] = 'OPTIONS'
controller.add_acls_from_sys_metadata(resp)
self.assertEqual(1, len(resp.headers)) # we always get Content-Type
self.assertEqual(2, len(resp.environ))
def test_cache_key_impossible_cases(self):
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
# For test coverage: verify that defensive coding does defend, in cases
# that shouldn't arise naturally
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
# Container needs account
swift.proxy.controllers.base.get_cache_key(None, 'c')
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
# Object needs account
swift.proxy.controllers.base.get_cache_key(None, 'c', 'o')
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
# Object needs container
swift.proxy.controllers.base.get_cache_key('a', None, 'o')
Privileged acct ACL header, new ACL syntax, TempAuth impl. * Introduce a new privileged account header: X-Account-Access-Control * Introduce JSON-based version 2 ACL syntax -- see below for discussion * Implement account ACL authorization in TempAuth X-Account-Access-Control Header ------------------------------- Accounts now have a new privileged header to represent ACLs or any other form of account-level access control. The value of the header is an opaque string to be interpreted by the auth system, but it must be a JSON-encoded dictionary. A reference implementation is given in TempAuth, with the knowledge that historically other auth systems often use TempAuth as a starting point. The reference implementation describes three levels of account access: "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". Adding new access control features in a future patch (e.g. "write-only" account access) will automatically be forward- and backward-compatible, due to the JSON dictionary header format. The privileged X-Account-Access-Control header may only be read or written by a user with "swift_owner" status, traditionally the account owner but now also any user on the "admin" ACL. Access Levels: Read-only access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. Read-write access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). Admin access is intended to indicate to the auth system that this list of identities has "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus changing the value of X-Account-Access-Control and thereby granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. The auth system is responsible for making decisions based on this header, if it chooses to support its use. Therefore the above access level descriptions are necessarily advisory only for other auth systems. When setting the value of the header, callers are urged to use the new format_acl() method, described below. New ACL Format -------------- The account ACLs introduce a new format for ACLs, rather than reusing the existing format from X-Container-Read/X-Container-Write. There are several reasons for this: * Container ACL format does not support Unicode * Container ACLs have a different structure than account ACLs + account ACLs have no concept of referrers or rlistings + accounts have additional "admin" access level + account access levels are structured as admin > rw > ro, which seems more appropriate for how people access accounts, rather than reusing container ACLs' orthogonal read and write access In addition, the container ACL syntax is a bit arbitrary and highly custom, so instead of parsing additional custom syntax, I'd rather propose a next version and introduce a means for migration. The V2 ACL syntax has the following benefits: * JSON is a well-known standard syntax with parsers in all languages * no artificial value restrictions (you can grant access to a user named ".rlistings" if you want) * forward and backward compatibility: you may have extraneous keys, but your attempt to parse the header won't raise an exception I've introduced hooks in parse_acl and format_acl which currently default to the old V1 syntax but tolerate the V2 syntax and can easily be flipped to default to V2. I'm not changing the default or adding code to rewrite V1 ACLs to V2, because this patch has suffered a lot of scope creep already, but this seems like a sensible milestone in the migration. TempAuth Account ACL Implementation ----------------------------------- As stated above, core Swift is responsible for privileging the X-Account-Access-Control header (making it only accessible to swift_owners), for translating it to -sysmeta-* headers to trigger persistence by the account server, and for including the header in the responses to requests by privileged users. Core Swift puts no expectation on the *content* of this header. Auth systems (including TempAuth) are responsible for defining the content of the header and taking action based on it. In addition to the changes described above, this patch defines a format to be used by TempAuth for these headers in the common.middleware.acl module, in the methods format_v2_acl() and parse_v2_acl(). This patch also teaches TempAuth to take action based on the header contents. TempAuth now sets swift_owner=True if the user is on the Admin ACL, authorizes GET/HEAD/OPTIONS requests if the user is on any ACL, authorizes PUT/POST/DELETE requests if the user is on the admin or read-write ACL, etc. Note that the action of setting swift_owner=True triggers core Swift to add or strip the privileged headers from the responses. Core Swift (not the auth system) is responsible for that. DocImpact: Documentation for the new ACL usage and format appears in summary form in doc/source/overview_auth.rst, and in more detail in swift/common/middleware/tempauth.py in the TempAuth class docstring. I leave it to the Swift doc team to determine whether more is needed. Change-Id: I836a99eaaa6bb0e92dc03e1ca46a474522e6e826
2013-11-13 20:55:14 +00:00
def test_stripping_swift_admin_headers(self):
# Verify that a GET/HEAD which receives privileged headers from the
# account server will strip those headers for non-swift_owners
headers = {
'x-account-meta-harmless': 'hi mom',
'x-account-meta-temp-url-key': 's3kr1t',
}
controller = proxy_server.AccountController(self.app, 'acct')
for verb in ('GET', 'HEAD'):
for env in ({'swift_owner': True}, {'swift_owner': False}):
req = Request.blank('/v1/acct', environ=env)
controller.GETorHEAD_base = lambda *_: Response(
headers=headers, environ={
'PATH_INFO': '/acct',
'REQUEST_METHOD': verb,
})
method = getattr(controller, verb)
resp = method(req)
self.assertEqual(resp.headers.get('x-account-meta-harmless'),
'hi mom')
privileged_header_present = (
'x-account-meta-temp-url-key' in resp.headers)
self.assertEqual(privileged_header_present, env['swift_owner'])
def test_response_code_for_PUT(self):
PUT_TEST_CASES = [
((201, 201, 201), 201),
((201, 201, 404), 201),
((201, 201, 503), 201),
((201, 404, 404), 404),
((201, 404, 503), 503),
((201, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('PUT', PUT_TEST_CASES)
def test_response_code_for_DELETE(self):
DELETE_TEST_CASES = [
((204, 204, 204), 204),
((204, 204, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 503), 204),
((204, 404, 404), 404),
((204, 404, 503), 503),
((204, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('DELETE', DELETE_TEST_CASES)
def test_response_code_for_POST(self):
POST_TEST_CASES = [
((204, 204, 204), 204),
((204, 204, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 503), 204),
((204, 404, 404), 404),
((204, 404, 503), 503),
((204, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('POST', POST_TEST_CASES)
@patch_policies(
[StoragePolicy(0, 'zero', True, object_ring=FakeRing(replicas=4))])
class TestAccountController4Replicas(TestAccountController):
def setUp(self):
self.app = proxy_server.Application(
None,
FakeMemcache(),
account_ring=FakeRing(replicas=4),
container_ring=FakeRing(replicas=4))
def test_response_code_for_PUT(self):
PUT_TEST_CASES = [
((201, 201, 201, 201), 201),
((201, 201, 201, 404), 201),
((201, 201, 201, 503), 201),
((201, 201, 404, 404), 201),
((201, 201, 404, 503), 201),
((201, 201, 503, 503), 201),
((201, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((201, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((201, 404, 503, 503), 503),
((201, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 404, 503, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('PUT', PUT_TEST_CASES)
def test_response_code_for_DELETE(self):
DELETE_TEST_CASES = [
((204, 204, 204, 204), 204),
((204, 204, 204, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 204, 503), 204),
((204, 204, 404, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 404, 503), 204),
((204, 204, 503, 503), 204),
((204, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((204, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((204, 404, 503, 503), 503),
((204, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 404, 503, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('DELETE', DELETE_TEST_CASES)
def test_response_code_for_POST(self):
POST_TEST_CASES = [
((204, 204, 204, 204), 204),
((204, 204, 204, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 204, 503), 204),
((204, 204, 404, 404), 204),
((204, 204, 404, 503), 204),
((204, 204, 503, 503), 204),
((204, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((204, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((204, 404, 503, 503), 503),
((204, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((404, 404, 404, 404), 404),
((404, 404, 404, 503), 404),
((404, 404, 503, 503), 404),
((404, 503, 503, 503), 503),
((503, 503, 503, 503), 503)
]
self._assert_responses('POST', POST_TEST_CASES)
Fix up get_account_info and get_container_info get_account_info used to work like this: * make an account HEAD request * ignore the response * get the account info by digging around in the request environment, where it had been deposited by elves or something Not actually elves, but the proxy's GETorHEAD_base method would take the HEAD response and cache it in the response environment, which was the same object as the request environment, thus enabling get_account_info to find it. This was extraordinarily brittle. If a WSGI middleware were to shallow-copy the request environment, then any middlewares to its left could not use get_account_info, as the left middleware's request environment would no longer be identical to the response environment down in GETorHEAD_base. Now, get_account_info works like this: * make an account HEAD request. * if the account info is in the request environment, return it. This is an optimization to avoid a double-set in memcached. * else, compute the account info from the response headers, store it in caches, and return it. This is much easier to think about; get_account_info can get and cache account info all on its own; the cache check and cache set are right next to each other. All the above is true for get_container_info as well. get_info() is still around, but it's just a shim. It was trying to unify get_account_info and get_container_info to exploit the commonalities, but the number of times that "if container:" showed up in get_info and its helpers really indicated that something was wrong. I'd rather have two functions with some duplication than one function with no duplication but a bunch of "if container:" branches. Other things of note: * a HEAD request to a deleted account returns 410, but get_account_info would return 404 since the 410 came from the account controller *after* GETorHEAD_base ran. Now get_account_info returns 410 as well. * cache validity period (recheck_account_existence and recheck_container_existence) is now communicated to get_account_info via an X-Backend header. This way, get_account_info doesn't need a reference to the swift.proxy.server.Application object. * both logged swift_source values are now correct for get_container_info calls; before, on a cold cache, get_container_info would call get_account_info but not pass along swift_source, resulting in get_account_info logging "GET_INFO" as the source. Amusingly, there was a unit test asserting this bogus behavior. * callers that modify the return value of get_account_info or of get_container_info don't modify what's stored in swift.infocache. * get_account_info on an account that *can* be autocreated but has not been will return a 200, same as a HEAD request. The old behavior was a 404 from get_account_info but a 200 from HEAD. Callers can tell the difference by looking at info['account_really_exists'] if they need to know the difference (there is one call site that needs to know, in container PUT). Note: this is for all accounts when the proxy's "account_autocreate" setting is on. Change-Id: I5167714025ec7237f7e6dd4759c2c6eb959b3fca
2016-02-11 15:51:45 -08:00
@patch_policies([StoragePolicy(0, 'zero', True, object_ring=FakeRing())])
class TestGetAccountInfo(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.app = proxy_server.Application(
None, FakeMemcache(),
account_ring=FakeRing(), container_ring=FakeRing())
def test_get_deleted_account_410(self):
resp_headers = {'x-account-status': 'deleted'}
req = Request.blank('/v1/a')
with mock.patch('swift.proxy.controllers.base.http_connect',
fake_http_connect(404, headers=resp_headers)):
info = get_account_info(req.environ, self.app)
self.assertEqual(410, info.get('status'))
if __name__ == '__main__':
unittest.main()