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Use constant time comparison in tempURL

Use constant time comparison when evaluating tempURL to avoid timing
attacks (CVE-2014-0006). This is the havana backport of the master
patch.

Fixes bug 1265665

Change-Id: I11e4ad83cc4077e52adf54a0bd0f9749294b2a48
changes/86/67186/1
Samuel Merritt 7 years ago
committed by Thierry Carrez
parent
commit
b2c61375b3
1 changed files with 13 additions and 10 deletions
  1. +13
    -10
      swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py

+ 13
- 10
swift/common/middleware/tempurl.py View File

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ from urlparse import parse_qs
from swift.proxy.controllers.base import get_account_info
from swift.common.swob import HeaderKeyDict
from swift.common.utils import split_path
from swift.common.utils import split_path, streq_const_time
#: Default headers to remove from incoming requests. Simply a whitespace
@ -267,17 +267,20 @@ class TempURL(object):
if not keys:
return self._invalid(env, start_response)
if env['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD':
hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
request_method='GET')
if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
request_method='PUT')
if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
return self._invalid(env, start_response)
hmac_vals = (self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
request_method='GET') +
self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys,
request_method='PUT'))
else:
hmac_vals = self._get_hmacs(env, temp_url_expires, keys)
if temp_url_sig not in hmac_vals:
return self._invalid(env, start_response)
# While it's true that any() will short-circuit, this doesn't affect
# the timing-attack resistance since the only way this will
# short-circuit is when a valid signature is passed in.
is_valid_hmac = any(streq_const_time(temp_url_sig, h)
for h in hmac_vals)
if not is_valid_hmac:
return self._invalid(env, start_response)
self._clean_incoming_headers(env)
env['swift.authorize'] = lambda req: None
env['swift.authorize_override'] = True


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